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A R T I C L E S
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Jeffrey G . Miller
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Summary
The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source 
by any person without a permit . Surprisingly, the 
first element of this prohibition, “addition,” remains 
undefined . It has been interpreted broadly by regu-
lators and judges to expand the prohibition to such 
an extent that it threatens to capture innocent people . 
EPA in particular has confused “addition” with “nav-
igable waters” to such an extent that it threatens to 
eviscerate half of the CWA’s regulatory strategies and 
programs: water quality standards and the §404 pro-
gram protecting wetlands . This Article examines the 
interpretation of “addition” within the CWA . It sug-
gests a definition that would not unduly expand the 
provision nor emasculate EPA regulatory programs . It 
rejects EPA’s unitary water theory in favor of a more 
workable solution .
This Article examines the meaning of the simple word “addition” in the first element of the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 prohibition against any addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source by any person, unless in compliance with a permit . 
Neither the U .S . Congress nor the U .S . Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has defined “addition” in this 
context . EPA and the courts have interpreted the element 
broadly to expand the offense . Some of their broad inter-
pretations threaten to make felons of innocent persons 
owning a particular class of point sources: those convey-
ing pollutants added by others to navigable waters . EPA’s 
conflation of “addition” with “navigable waters,” including 
its theory that all navigable waters are one entity, threatens 
to eviscerate half of the CWA’s regulatory strategies and 
programs: water quality standards, one of the CWA’s two 
grand strategies for pollution control; and §404, one of the 
CWA’s two permit programs for assuring water quality . 
The Article examines administrative and judicial interpre-
tations of “addition” as an element of the CWA . It suggests 
a definition that fits all appropriate fact situations, while 
avoiding both threats to innocent point source owners and 
to the viability of the water quality standards and wetlands 
protection programs . It rejects the need for and legality of 
EPA’s theory of unitary navigable water, EPA’s water trans-
fer rule based on that theory, and much of EPA’s “outside 
world” theory of “addition .”
I. No Statutory Definition
Section §301(1) prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person,”2 unless in compliance with several listed 
sections . The listed sections authorize the issuance of 
two types of CWA permits3 and specify their substantive 
requirements . Section 502(12) defines “discharge of a pol-
lutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to naviga-
ble waters from any point source .”4 In sum, the subsection 
1 . Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA 
§§101-607 .
2 . 33 U .S .C . §1311(1) .
3 . Permits issued pursuant to §402, 33 U .S .C . §1342, regulate water pol-
lution; permits issued pursuant to §404, 33 U .S .C . §1344, regulate 
filling wetlands .
4 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(12) . Because the term defined in §502(12), “discharge 
of a pollutant,” is not exactly the same as the term used in §301(a), “the 
discharge of any pollutant,” the definition in §502(12) arguably does not 
apply to the phrase used in §301(a) . However, courts routinely refer to 
§502(12) as defining “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a), without noting 
the difference . (Emphasis added throughout .) See, e.g., Committee to Save 
Mokelumne River v . East Bay Mun . Dist ., 13 F .3d 305, 307, 24 ELR 20225 
(9th Cir . 1993); Apalachicola Riverkeeper v . Taylor Energy Co ., LLC, 2013 
Author’s Note: The author acknowledges and thanks Laura Young, 
Pace 2015, for her assistance in completing the research and analysis 
for and editing of this Article, and Christine Swatzell, Pace 2012, 
for her assistance in the initial research and analysis for the Article.
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prohibits: (1) any addition (2) of any pollutant (3) to navi-
gable waters (4) from any point source (5) by any person,5 
except in compliance with a CWA permit . Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has called this the “core command “of 
the CWA .6
This Article, the first in a series of five, examines how 
EPA and the courts have interpreted the prohibitory clause 
“addition”—a common noun form of a verb with no statu-
tory definition—from 1972 to 2013 .7 It seeks to provide a 
definitive analysis of the term “addition”; and to explore 
the methods that EPA and courts have used to interpret 
the element .
Together, the five articles examine how EPA and the 
courts have interpreted the initial four jurisdictional ele-
ments of the water pollution control offense . Single articles 
examine each of the first four elements and a fifth article 
explores differences in the techniques courts have used to 
interpret them . The natures of the key words in these ele-
ments are very different: (1) “addition,” a common noun 
form of a verb with no statutory definition; (2)  “pollut-
ant,” a common noun with a statutory definition meaning 
or excluding specific substances or classes of substances, 
some of the included substances not fitting the common 
understanding of “pollutant;” (3)  “navigable waters,” a 
traditional Commerce Clause jurisdictional phrase with a 
WL 3779166 (E .D . La .); United States v . Bailey, 516 F . Supp . 2d 998 (D . 
Minn . 2007); Leslie Salt Co . v . Froehlke, 403 F . Supp . 1292, 1295, 5 ELR 
20039 (N .D . Cal . 1974), rev’d in part & modified in part on other grounds, 
Sierra Club v . Leslie Salt Col, 412 F . Supp . 1096, 6 ELR 20363 (N .D . Cal . 
1976), aff’d, Leslie Salt Co . v . Froehlke, 578 F .2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th 
Cir . 1978) .
5 . “By any person” is not included in the §502(12) definition . It is the last 
of the elements because it follows “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a) . 
There is little controversy about the interpretation of “person” as defined 
in §502(5) . The element is important because it confines violations of the 
CWA to the consequences of human activities . Of course, it is difficult to 
conceive of a civil or criminal offense without a human action .
6 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 298 (2009) . The author has called it elsewhere “the basic prohibition” 
of the CWA . See Jeffrey G . Miller et al ., Introduction to Environ-
mental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution Control 141 
(2008) .
7 . The other elements in the clause are similarly worthy of individual analy-
sis, although space constraints preclude discussion of them in this Article . 
Briefly, “pollutant” is a common noun with a statutory definition mean-
ing or excluding specific substances or classes of substances, some of the 
included substances not fitting the common understanding of “pollutant .” 
33 U .S .C . §1362(6) . “Navigable waters” is a traditional Commerce Clause 
(U .S . Const . Art . I, §8, cl . (3)) jurisdictional phrase with a short statutory 
definition having nothing to do with waterborne transportation . 33 U .S .C . 
§1362(7) . The touchstone of “navigable water” for Commerce Clause ju-
risdictional purposes is use in waterborne navigation . See The Daniel Ball, 
77 U .S . 557 (1870)) . “Point source” is an artificial construct with a statu-
tory definition, followed by lists of examples and exclusions . 33 U .S .C . 
§1362(14) . The key word in the final element, “person,” is defined in the 
normal legal sense (33 U .S .C . §1362(5)) and has led to virtually no litiga-
tion, although it has great importance . Disputes over the interpretations of 
the first four statutory terms have produced a steady stream of reported deci-
sions since the initial implementation of the statute . Even after four decades, 
many of these issues are unresolved and new issues continue to surface .
short statutory definition having nothing to do with water-
borne transportation; and (4) “point source,” an artificial 
construct with a statutory definition, followed by lists of 
examples and exclusions . The key word in the final element, 
“person,” is defined in the normal legal sense and has led 
to virtually no litigation, although it has great importance . 
Disputes over the interpretations of the first four statutory 
terms have produced a steady stream of reported decisions 
since the initial implementation of the statute . Even after 
four decades, many of these issues are unresolved and new 
issues continue to surface .
“Addition,” the noun form of the verb “to add,” is the 
action noun in the offense . Because offenses are actions, 
“addition” is the central element in the offense . This is 
more easily seen by rearranging the offense as a sentence: 
A person illegally adds pollutants to navigable water from 
a point source, unless he is in compliance with a permit . 
“Person” is the subject of the sentence, “adds” is the verb, 
and “pollutant” is the object . The rest of the sentence is a 
series of prepositional phrases: “to navigable water,” “from 
a point source,” “in compliance,” and “with a permit .” All 
of these prepositional phrases are adverbial phrases, modi-
fying “adds .” The last phrase, a defense rather than an ele-
ment of the offense, is a compound phrase, but is still an 
adverbial propositional phrase modifying “adds .”
It is important to keep the centrality of “addition” in 
mind when addressing the disputes considered in the Arti-
cle . Many of the defendants in these disputes raised “the 
passive point source” defense . They argued that their point 
sources added no pollutants to water, but merely conveyed 
already polluted water to downstream navigable water . The 
point sources were wholly passive, adding nothing that 
was not in the water already, and the defendants owning 
the point sources therefore did not violate the statute . This 
argument subtly rearranges the structure of the offense, 
making “point source” rather than “person” the subject 
of the sentence . It would make the sentence read: A point 
source illegally adds pollutants to navigable water by any 
person except in compliance with a permit . That, of course, 
makes no sense . The offense, like all other offenses, prohib-
its human conduct and activity, not point source conduct 
and activity .
Typical CWA cases involve industries or municipalities 
adding their pollutants to navigable waters through their 
own point sources (usually outfall pipes) from their own 
operations . The §402 permit program is designed with 
these cases in mind . Atypical cases involve persons adding 
their pollutants to navigable waters through point sources 
owned or operated by others . The statute explicitly deals 
with many but not all of these atypical cases . For instance, 
the pretreatment program in §307(b) controls industrial 
discharges of pollutants into municipal sewers leading to 
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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municipal treatment systems, from which they are added 
to navigable waters municipal outfalls, a large part of this 
atypical universe . These “indirect” industrial dischargers 
are not required to have §402 permits,8 but are directly 
regulated by technology-based effluent limitations for toxic 
pollutants and other limitations designed to prevent inter-
ference with the municipal treatment systems into which 
they are discharged or from passing through those systems 
untreated . The municipal treatment systems’ subsequent 
addition of the indirect industrial dischargers’ treated pol-
lutants to navigable waters is regulated by §402 permits 
issued to the municipalities, because the municipal systems 
are designed and intended to collect, treat, and discharge 
these industrial wastes . Similarly, both municipal and 
industrial stormwater systems are required under §402(p) 
to have permits . That is not remarkable: But for the munic-
ipal street and storm sewer systems, polluted stormwater 
would not be discharged to nearby streams; and but for 
the industrial operations, polluted stormwater would not 
be discharged to nearby streams .
However, there is an entirely different category of these 
atypical cases, in which the pollutants passing through 
point sources have no other relationship with the point 
sources or their owners . The following hypothetical illus-
trates these cases . Water from a spring on A’s property 
flows into a river adjoining that property . A maintains a 
farm road bordering the river . Because land at the inter-
section of the spring flow and the river becomes muddy 
and obstructs the passage of vehicles, A installs a culvert 
for the spring flow to the river, and elevates the farm road 
to pass over the culvert . Unknown to A, B is upset with 
C, his former girlfriend, and her family because she will 
no longer see him . C and her family live on the river, 
just downstream from A’s property, and use it as their 
water supply . In revenge for C’s renunciation of him, B 
pours several buckets of a deadly poison into the spring 
water just before it passes through the culvert, so that the 
poison enters the river through the culvert, flows into C’s 
water supply, and kills C and her family . Who would the 
prosecutor charge with homicide, A or B? Of course, she 
would charge B because B is the actor intending and act-
ing to cause the deaths . Would the prosecutor charge A, 
because of the role that his culvert played in the action? 
Of course not . She would not charge A because he did 
not act toward C and his culvert was not a but-for cause 
of the deaths . If A had never installed the culvert and B 
had poured poison in the spring flow, the same deaths 
would have occurred .
In the above hypothetical, who would the prosecutor 
charge with the crime of water pollution, A or B? Should 
she charge A, because A owned and operated the point 
source from which the pollutants flowed into the river 
and the owner or operator of a point source may add pol-
lutants to rivers from a point source only in compliance 
8 . See 40 C .F .R . §122 .2, which defines “discharge of a pollutant” not to in-
clude additions from “indirect sources,” which it, in turn, defines as sources 
adding nondomestic waste to municipal sewage treatment plants .
with a CWA permit? No, because A did not act toward 
the river with regard to the pollutants and was not a 
but-for cause of their entry into the river . If A had never 
installed the culvert and B had poured pollutants into 
the spring, the same pollutants would have entered the 
river . A would have had no reason to know he should 
apply for a CWA permit to add pollutants to the river . 
On the other hand, B acted toward the river with regard 
to the pollutants, B was the but-for cause of the pollut-
ants entering the river, and B had every reason to know 
that he should apply for a CWA permit to add pollutants 
to the river . B, not A or A’s point source, is the “any per-
son” who violated CWA §301(a); B added pollutants to 
the river from a point source . (Of course, if A installed 
the culvert knowing that B’s poison would enter the river 
more quickly and more completely, A would be complicit 
with B’s offenses .9)
Courts, including the U .S . Supreme Court,10 have gen-
erally rejected the “passive point source” owner defense, 
but only in cases in which the point source owner was not 
truly passive and without considering the above hypotheti-
cal or situations like it . Many decisions interpret “addi-
tion” broadly enough to convict the culvert owner in the 
above hypothetical, even though treating him as a §301(a) 
violator makes no sense and may even raise constitutional 
issues .11 The point source owner in the hypothetical, how-
ever, is defended by recognizing that under §301(a), a per-
son must act to add pollutants to navigable water from a 
point source . In the typical cases and most of the atypical 
cases, the point source owners are not really passive, they 
act to add pollutants to water where the pollutants would 
not otherwise be; but for their actions, the pollutants would 
not be in the water .12 In our hypothetical, however, A is a 
purely passive point source owner and is not a but-for cause 
of adding poison to the river . If the culvert had not existed, 
the poisons would still have entered the river and killed C 
and her family . B is the only but-for cause of the pollutants 
entering the river and the resulting deaths, and B added 
pollutants to navigable water from a point source, even if 
he did not own the point source .
9 . Violations of the CWA are criminal felonies if they are knowing, criminal 
misdemeanors if they are negligent, and may be civil offenses with no fault . 
§309(c), 33 U .S .C . §1319 .
10 . In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 
541 U .S . 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004), the Court held that the passive 
point source defense was “untenable .”
11 . United States v . Apollo Energies, Inc . 611 F .3d 679 (10th Cir . 2010), in 
which the court treated lack of causation and of mens rea as raising similar 
constitutional issues . See also the helpful note by Alex Arensberg, Are Mi-
gratory Birds Extending Environmental Criminal Liability, 38 Ecology L .Q . 
427 (2011) . Because §309(c) requires mens rea for criminal offenses and A 
in our hypothetical has no level of mens rea, the constitutionality of crimi-
nal prosecution for a CWA offense without causation is unlikely to be an 
issue . However, because civil liability under §309(a) or (b) is strict liability, 
requiring no mens rea, a civil prosecution against A for violating §301(c) 
without an act by A causing the violation is possible .
12 . In South Florida Water Management District, 541 U .S . 95, for instance, the 
defendant pumped polluted donor water into unpolluted receiving water 
and hence was a but-for cause of adding pollutants to the receiving water . 
If the defendant had not acted, the pollutants would not have reached the 
receiving water .
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In the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition 
of “addition” or controlling precedent, courts “are left to 
construe it ‘in accordance with its ordinary or natural 
meaning .’”13 Indeed, courts interpreting “addition” in the 
CWA use plain meaning and precedent more frequently 
than other interpretive devices .14 To determine the plain 
meaning of a word, courts may consult a dictionary,15 
although there is no unanimity which dictionary is pre-
ferred .16 A dictionary definition particularly helpful to 
understanding “addition” in §301(a) is “the act  .  .  . of add-
ing something to something else,”17 which can be restated 
as “the act of adding something (A) to something else (B),” 
when (A) would not otherwise be in (B) .” In the context 
of §301(a), it would read: “the act of adding A (any pollut-
ant) to B (navigable waters) from a point source,” when A 
(that pollutant) would not otherwise be in B (those navi-
gable waters) .”
The working hypothesis of this Article is that “addition” 
means “the act of a person adding a pollutant to navigable 
waters from a point source, when that pollutant would 
not otherwise be in those navigable waters .” Because the 
author’s definition of “addition” focuses on addition by a 
person rather than by a point source, it is possible for a 
point source to convey pollutants to navigable water with-
out adding them to it . This formulation of the definition 
still covers most passive point source situations, but does 
not include the passive owner in our hypothetical . This 
formulation emphasizes the causal concept inherent in 
the definition; addition does not happen spontaneously, 
something must cause it .18 It also incorporates part of what 
will be discussed below as part of EPA’s “outside world” 
13 . S .D . Warren Co . v . Maine Bd . of Envtl . Prot ., 547 U .S . 370, 376 (2006), 
quoting FDIC v . Meyer, 510 U .S . 471, 476 (1994) .
14 . The author’s research has found that courts used each of the precedent and 
plain-meaning canons of construction in 49 of the 61 decisions interpreting 
“addition,” or 80% . Courts employed the next most commonly used canons 
in only 19 decisions . Although courts predominantly used plain meaning to 
interpret “addition” until 1983, after that date, they used plain meaning and 
precedent almost equally .
15 . See William N . Eskridge Jr ., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 275 
(1987) (identifying one of the Chief Justice William Rehnquist Court’s 
canons of statutory construction as “follow dictionary definitions of terms 
unless Congress has provided a specific definition,” and noting that the dic-
tionary should be “of the era in which the statute was enacted .” See also 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A . Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts 415-24 (2012), for a detailed discussion of the nuances of 
using dictionaries in determining the “plain meaning” of statutes .
16 . According to Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, supra note 15, only a 
“scholarly” or “weighty” dictionary will do, and they list several dictionaries 
from different eras as possibilities . See Scalia & Garner at 415-24 . They 
also suggest using a dictionary contemporary with the use of the word being 
interpreted, the year 1972 in the case of the CWA, or later because diction-
aries’ definitions usually trail actual usage . Id . at 419 .
17 . See Oxford English Dictionary Online . Courts have consulted other dic-
tionaries . For instance, in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, 421 F .3d 1133, 
1143 (10th Cir . 2005), the court referred to the definition of “addition” in 
Webster’s New International Dictionary (2002): “the act or process of add-
ing .” In Friends of the Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist ., 2006 WL 
3635465 (S .D . Fla . 2006), the court referred to the definition in Webster’s 
3rd International Dictionary Unabridged (1993): “joining of one thing to an-
other .” See also S.D. Warren Co, 547 U .S . at 376, in which the Court looked 
to the dictionary definition of “discharge” in Webster’s New International 
Dictionary at 742 (2d ed . 1954) .
18 . The Eleventh Circuit recognized this in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. 
v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F .3d 1364, 1368-69, 32 ELR 20475 
theory of “addition .”19 This definition should yield appro-
priate results in the decisions examined below . EPA and the 
courts should adopt it .
II. Legislative and Administrative 
Definitions of “Addition”
CWA §502, the general definitional section of the statute, 
does not define “addition,” the statute does not define it 
elsewhere, and there is no legislative history directly sug-
gesting its meaning . Congress used “addition” in the CWA 
only in §§301(a) and 502(12),20 except in the irrelevant 
phrase “in addition to” or a variant .21 This should make 
interpretation of “addition” easy in most cases, because 
there is no congressional interference with the ordinary 
meaning of this straightforward, almost mathematical 
concept .22 And as we will see below, some cases are easy . 
On the other hand, with no indication of what Congress 
had in mind by using “addition,” beyond the word itself 
and the purpose of the statute to control water pollution, 
some “addition” decisions may not be easy . Indeed, some 
are difficult, with courts almost resorting to metaphysics .23
The general definitional section of EPA’s §402 regula-
tions, 40 C .F .R . §122 .2, does not define “addition” either . 
EPA’s few attempts to clarify the meaning of “addition” have 
only muddied the waters . In its initial attempt in National 
(11th Cir . 2002), aff’d on other grounds, South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
19 . As discussed below in the Article, the Supreme Court rejected the remainder 
of EPA’s “outside world” theory in Miccosukee. See 541 U .S . at 105 .
20 . Sierra Club v . El Paso Gold Mines, Inc ., 421 F .3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir . 
2005); Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited v . City of New York, 
273 F .3d 481, 493 (2d Cir . 2001) .
21 . For example, §212(2)(B), 33 U .S .C . §1292(2)(B), “In addition to the defi-
nition contained in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, ‘treatment works’ 
means  .  .  .” Section319(a)(1)(A), 33 U .S .C . §1329(A)(1)(A), also provides 
that “without additional action to control nonpoint sources  .  .  .  .” (Empha-
ses added .)
22 . The length to which Congress sometimes goes to interfere with straight-
forward scientific concepts is illustrated by its definition of “solid wastes” 
as “solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material” in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U .S .C . §§6901-6992k, ELR 
Stat . RCRA §§1001-11011 . See RCRA §1004(27), 42 U .S .C . §6903(27) .
23 . For instance, consider the idea that soil and vegetation withdrawn from a 
wetland in a landclearing operation are metamorphosed into pollutants the 
instant they are returned to the same wetland and that the pollutant is added 
to the wetland because no pollutant was there before, even though the same 
soil and vegetation were in the same wetland before and after the operation . 
Borden Ranch v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F .3d 810, 814, 32 ELR 
20011 (9th Cir . 2001); United States v . Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 335-36, 
30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) . Consider also the bizarre idea that all the 
disparate bodies of navigable water in the country are one and therefore 
channeling a heavily polluted navigable water into a pristine navigable water 
adds no pollutants to the pristine water because the polluted water and the 
pristine water are the same navigable water . Catskill Mountain Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited, Inc . v . City of New York, 273 F .3d 481 (2d Cir . 2001) . 
Equally metaphysical is the notion that water withdrawn with live fish from 
navigable water, run through a power plant to generate energy, and returned 
as fish puree to the same navigable water body adds nothing to the navi-
gable water because it never lost its status as navigable water, while water 
withdrawn from same navigable water to cool the same power plant and 
returned hot to the same navigable water body adds heat and fish puree to 
the navigable water because the water lost its status as navigable water dur-
ing its journey through the generator . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers 
Power Co ., 862 F .2d 580, 589, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988) .
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Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,24 EPA asserted that “addi-
tion from a point source occurs only if the point source 
itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the 
outside world.”25 In South Florida Water Management Dis-
trict v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the petitioner did not 
introduce pollutants into water, but pumped an already 
polluted water body into a less-polluted water body. The 
petitioner argued from EPA’s “outside world” theory that 
§402 permits are required only “‘when a pollutant origi-
nates from a point source,’ and not when pollutants origi-
nating elsewhere merely pass through the point source.”26 
The Supreme Court decisively rejected this argument. “A 
point source need not be the original source of the pollut-
ant: it need only convey the pollutant to navigable water.”27 
In doing so, however, the Court interpreted “point source” 
rather than “addition.” This Article addresses the “outside 
world” concept in several contexts in detail below, rejects 
it in part, and questions the usefulness of the remainder.
EPA’s second attempt to clarify “addition” was in a 
policy and later in the preambles to a proposed and final 
rule exempting water transfers from the requirement of 
obtaining §402 permits. While the rule does not mention 
“addition,” the preambles state that EPA’s interpretation 
of “addition” is the basis of the rule. However, on close 
reading of the preambles, they did not define “addition,” 
but instead interpreted the statute as a whole or interpreted 
“addition” in conjunction with “navigable waters” to mean 
all navigable waters as a unitary national entity, rather than 
individual navigable water bodies as singular entities. The 
Article addresses the policy and the rule in detail below and 
concludes they are erroneous interpretations of the CWA.
III. Judicial and Administrative 
Interpretations of “Addition”
As with most statutory interpretation, the meaning of 
“addition” is uncontroversial in most cases. It is usually 
fairly clear whether a person is adding pollutants to naviga-
ble water. You can often see a factory discharging discolored 
or foaming water into a river, visually adding pollutants. 
Indeed, most industrial and municipal dischargers admit 
they are adding pollutants to navigable water, by applying 
for CWA permits to do so. With that in mind, it is no sur-
prise that the “addition” element is not contested in many 
litigated cases.28 Even in decisions in which the “addition” 
element is challenged, courts often summarily hold that an 
addition has taken place.29
Most of these cases fall into three broad categories. The 
first, and most numerous, are situations in which point 
24. 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
25. 693 F.2d at 175.
26. 541 U.S. 95, 104, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
27. 541 U.S. at 105.
28. The author’s research has found that 61 decisions interpret “addition,” 68 
interpret “pollutant,” 75 interpret “point source,” and 138 interpret “navi-
gable waters.” Many of the decisions interpret more than one element.
29. In 14 of the 61 decisions considered in this Article, courts decided “addi-
tion” was or was not satisfied based solely on a recitation of either plain 
meaning or precedent.
source owner defendants claim they are not liable because 
other persons add pollutants to water upstream from the 
point sources, and the pollutants merely flow through 
the defendants’ passive point sources. The second, and 
least numerous, are situations in which the additions are 
directly or indirectly to or from the air. The final category 
consists of §404 cases involving additions in the process of 
clearing wetlands.
A. Passive Point Sources
Before examining the patterns in which defendants may 
raise the passive point source defense, it is useful initially 
to develop the concept of the discharge of pollutants and its 
supporting vocabulary. A point source, for instance a pipe, 
has two ends, one into which water enters and another 
from which water is discharged. Water entering the pipe is 
withdrawn from donor water and is referred to as influent. 
Water discharged from the pipe flows through the point 
source into the receiving water and is referred to as effluent. 
The donor water may be non-navigable (for instance, storm-
water runoff, isolated waters, or groundwater) or navigable 
(the same navigable water body as the receiving water or a 
different navigable water body). Passive point source owner 
or operator defendants argue that they are liable only for 
pollutants they add to water and that they are not liable for 
pollutants added by other persons to donor water before it 
reaches the defendants’ passive point sources. They argue 
that those others are the but-for causes of adding the pol-
lutants to the receiving water; without the addition of pol-
lutants by others to the donor water, pollutants would not 
enter the receiving navigable water. A significant flaw in 
this argument is that there may be more than one but-for 
cause of a violation.
Causation is an element of negligence and nuisance, the 
common-law precedents of basic pollution control legisla-
tion, including the CWA.30 It might be assumed that cau-
sation has no place in pollution control legislation, because 
it creates strict liability offenses.31 But strict liability at 
common law means liability without fault or intent, not 
liability without cause.32
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the passive point source defense in Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South Florida Water Manage-
ment District,33 based on lack of but-for causation. In Mic-
cosukee, plaintiffs challenged the transfer through pumps 
and pipes of a polluted navigable donor water into a less-
polluted navigable receiving water without a §402 permit. 
Defendants argued they did not add the pollutants to the 
less-polluted receiving water because others added them 
30. Miller, supra note 6, at 11-48.
31. The CWA’s civil offenses are strict liability; they have no mens rea compo-
nent. See §309(a) & (b); American Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, 412 F.3d 
536, 540 (4th Cir. 2005). The CWA criminal offenses, however, are not 
strict liability; the misdemeanor offense requires negligence, and the felony 
offense requires knowledge. See §309(c).
32. Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts 959-61 (2011).
33. 570 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002).
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earlier to the more-polluted donor navigable water . The 
court concluded:
When a point source changes the natural flow of a body 
of water which contains pollutants and causes that water 
to flow into another distinct body of navigable water into 
which it would not have otherwise flowed, that point 
source is the cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants . 
And, because the pollutants would not have entered the 
second body of water but for the change in flow caused by 
the point source, an addition of pollutants from a point 
source occurs .34
In other words, the point source owner defendant in this 
case was not truly passive .
On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the 
Supreme Court unanimously35 held that the passive point 
source defense in that case was “untenable,” putting the 
defense to rest, at least under the fact pattern at issue in 
the case . However, the Court did not base its holding on 
interpreting “addition,” as the Eleventh Circuit had, but 
on interpreting “point source,” for the definition of that 
element “makes it plain that a point source need not be 
the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey 
the pollutant to navigable waters .”36 The definition of point 
source is a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance .” 
(Emphasis added .) The Court’s failure to address causation 
was not a rejection of causation’s role in “addition,” because 
the Court simply did not address the meaning of “addi-
tion .” The Eleventh Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s Micco-
sukee decisions will be discussed in greater detail below .
Owners of point sources accused of violating the CWA 
have raised the passive owner defense when others ini-
tially introduced pollutants into donor water subsequently 
flowing through defendants’ point sources into navigable 
receiving water .37 These cases involved many fact patterns, 
34 . Id . at 1368-69 . Courts commonly use but-for analysis to determine cau-
sation for tort purposes . See Dobbs et al ., supra note 32 at §168 . The 
defendant’s action is the cause-in-fact of a harm if, but for the defendant’s 
conduct, the harm would not have occurred . This necessarily requires a 
comparison with what would have occurred if the defendant had not acted . 
Id. at §§168-69 . Of course, it is possible to have two defendants whose 
actions both are but-for causes of a harm . Id. at §171 . A but-for analysis 
of the passive point source owner and the person adding pollutants to the 
donor water will come to different results depending on the facts . If the 
pollutant added to the donor water would have entered the receiving water 
without the point source, the owner or operator of the point source is not 
the but-for cause of the addition and is not liable, at least not under a but-
for causation analysis . In either case, the person adding pollutants to the 
donor water is a but-for cause of the addition of the pollutants to navigable 
water from the point source, regardless of the liability of the owner or op-
erator of the point source .
35 . Although Justice Scalia dissented in part, he concurred with the majority on 
the passive point source issue . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 112-13, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
36 . Miccosukee, 541 U .S . at 105 . The Court’s second conclusion is that Con-
gress clearly intended that sewage treatment plants (publically owned treat-
ment works or POTWs) require §402 permits; POTWs “treat and discharge 
pollutants added to water by others .”
37 . Such cases arose under the Refuse Act, the predecessor of the CWA’s §402 
program, and early in the enforcement of the CWA . In United States v. 
Granite State Packing Co ., 470 F .2d 303, 3 ELR 20074 (1st Cir . 1972), 
the industrial defendant was liable under the Refuse Act for discharging its 
waste into water that subsequently flowed through a municipally owned 
culvert to navigable water . And in an early case under the CWA, United 
including runoff from abandoned mining operations, 
other surface runoff, dam-induced changes in water qual-
ity, water recirculated in industrial activity, and transfers 
of water between watersheds . The analyses in these cases 
by EPA and the courts,38 however, fall into three other cat-
egories based on whether the pollutants: (1) are recirculated 
within the same navigable water; (2)  originate in non-
navigable stormwater runoff; or (3)  are transferred from 
one navigable water to another navigable water . Decisions 
within these categories sometimes conflate the analysis of 
two elements, “addition” and “navigable waters .” They also 
routinely neglect to determine whether the defendants are 
truly “passive” point source owners or whether they act in 
some way to add pollutants to navigable water .
1. Additions From Circulated or Recirculated 
Water
In the decisions analyzed here, defendants withdrew pol-
luted navigable donor water, used it, and then discharged 
it through a point source to the same navigable receiving 
water from which the donor water was diverted prior to 
use . If the defendants did no more, under both EPA’s “out-
side world” theory and our suggested definition of “addi-
tion,” no permit is necessary .
a. Net/Gross Rule
At the outset of the implementation of the §402 permit 
program, EPA confronted the issue that many dischargers 
of polluted effluent withdrew polluted influent from and 
discharged polluted effluent to the same water body; some 
of the pollutants in their effluents were already in the influ-
ent donor water when they withdrew it . The dischargers 
were passive point source owners for pollutants already in 
their influent water: other polluters or nature itself initially 
introduced the pollutants to the donor water and therefore 
were the but-for causes of the defendants’ point sources 
adding those pollutants to the receiving water .
Thus, the question: Did the statute require point source 
owners or operators to treat pollutants that other persons or 
States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp ., 438 F . Supp . 945 (W .D . Tenn . 1976), the 
industrial defendant was liable under the CWA for the discharge of its waste 
into a municipally owned storm sewer that subsequently flowed through a 
point source into navigable water . In both cases, the enforcement target was 
the person initially adding pollutants to donor water, not the passive point 
source owner . The results were not unexpected; similar results would have 
occurred under negligence and nuisance law, the common-law antecedents 
of modern pollution control statutes . See, e.g., Springer v. Jos. Schlitz Brew-
ing Co., 510 F .2d 468 (4th Cir . 1975), in which Schlitz discharged brew-
ing waste into a municipal sewage treatment plant, causing the plant to 
discharge untreated waste into a river, injuring a downstream landowner’s 
property . The court held that Schlitz could be liable in negligence if in the 
exercise of reasonable care it could have anticipated that the treatment plant 
could not adequately treat the brewery waste . We do not know enough 
facts in these cases to determine whether the point source owner was also 
a but-for cause of adding pollutants to the receiving water, i .e ., whether it 
discharged donor water into receiving water that the donor water would not 
otherwise have entered .
38 . Courts in these cases typically deferred to one degree or another to 
EPA’s interpretation .
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nature itself caused to be in the donor water before the dis-
chargers first withdrew influent from it, used the influent, 
and then discharged it back to the same receiving water? 
The point source owners were not the but-for causes of the 
pollutants from the influent; the same pollutants would be 
in the receiving water if the point source never existed .39 
Industries challenged technology-based effluent standards 
because they perceived EPA would apply them in permits 
to require treatment of all pollutants in an industry’s dis-
charge, including pollutants present in the water before the 
industry withdrew it for use .40 Before courts dealt with the 
issue, EPA proposed and thereafter adopted a regulation 
allowing permit applicants to seek credit toward meeting 
their permits’ effluent limitations for pollutants already 
in their influents, the so-called net/gross regulation .41 
It should be noted that EPA’s rule applies only when the 
“intake water is drawn from the same body of water into 
which the discharge is made,” excluding water transfers 
later authorized by EPA’s water transfer rule .42
The net/gross rule is consistent with EPA’s concept that 
“addition” must come from the “outside world .” When an 
industry withdraws donor water from a navigable water 
body and returns it after use to the same navigable receiv-
ing water, the pollutants already in the donor water prior 
to the industrial use (1)  already have been added to the 
donor water by others or by nature and (2) are from the 
same world as the receiving water, not from the “outside 
world .” But the rule also flows from the causal aspect of 
“addition” developed in this Article . If the industrial point 
source owner had never withdrawn, used, and discharged 
the water or had never even existed, the same pollutants 
would still be in the same receiving water above and below 
the location of the same point source . Under the Eleventh 
Circuit’s analysis in Miccosukee, the point source owner in 
this situation would not be liable because the point source 
is not a but-for cause of adding these returned pollutants 
to the navigable water . Although the Supreme Court did 
not discuss causation in Miccosukee, its holding is consis-
tent with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning . A counterargu-
39 . The issue is more complicated in some circumstances . Industries often re-
quire clean water for their processes . For instance, the paper industry needs 
color-free water to make white paper and commonly treats the water it with-
draws to remove color before using the water in making paper . EPA uses 
another example in the preamble to its water transfer rule, stating that a 
drinking water treatment facility that removes solids from river water be-
fore delivering the water for consumer use would require a §402 permit 
before returning the solids to the river . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33705 (June 13, 
2008) . In both of these examples, the water treatment process adds chemi-
cals to the water to remove the unwanted materials from it, i .e ., adding alum 
to remove solids by flocculation . The materials removed from the water are 
thus mixed with new pollutants and cannot be returned to the water with-
out adding the new pollutants that were not originally in the water . Even 
with net/gross credits, dischargers must treat the new pollutants .
40 . Query whether the issue was ripe for review in the effluent guidelines, which 
were neutral on the issue . The issue only arose if and when EPA actually ap-
plied the effluent guidelines in permits in the manner feared by industry .
41 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .45(g) . “Gross,” of course, represents all of the pollutants in 
the effluent; “net” represents only those pollutants first introduced to water 
by the discharger .
42 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .45(g)(4) . EPA may waive this restriction if no degradation 
of the receiving water will result . The restriction is inconsistent with EPA’s 
treatment of water transfers, as will be discussed later in the Article .
ment might be that when the industry withdraws influent 
water, the water loses its navigable character, so that when 
the industry later discharges its effluent with the pollutants 
originally in the donor water to the navigable receiving 
water, the pollutants are newly added to navigable water .43 
This counterargument, however, is strained, while the 
main argument is straightforward .
EPA’s net/gross regulation allows the permit writer to 
grant credits toward a permit’s effluent limitations for the 
types and amounts of pollutants in an industry’s intake 
water as long as it discharges those pollutants back to 
the same navigable water from which it withdrew them . 
Under the suggested definition of “addition,” the industry 
did not add the pollutants to navigable water; they were 
already in the same navigable water and would have been 
in it if the point source had not existed .44 The point source 
owner was simply not the but-for cause of the pollutants’ 
presence in navigable water . Requiring an industry to 
treat such pollutants would be beyond EPA’s statutory 
authority because the industry did not add the pollutants 
to the navigable water .
b. Dams and Recirculation
A variant of the net/gross fact pattern arose when environ-
mental advocates challenged EPA’s failure to include dams 
in the §402 permit program and later challenged a pump-
storage hydroelectric project for discharging pollutants 
without a permit .45 As in the net/gross effluent guidelines 
challenges, dams and the pump-storage project withdrew 
donor water from navigable water and discharged it to the 
same navigable receiving water after use, thus recirculat-
ing the water . And as in the net/gross challenges, the sub-
stances discharged were in the donor water in some form 
to begin with and hence the point sources were arguably 
not the but-for causes of the pollutants being in the receiv-
ing water . But in these cases, the point source owners were 
not truly passive as to the pollutants: the owners’ use of 
43 . See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 862 F .2d 580, 
589, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988) . A similar metaphysical argument has 
been made in §404 cases: dredging removes soil and vegetation from wet-
lands, that material becomes dredged spoil when removed from the wetland, 
and dredged spoil is a pollutant . Therefore, when some of the removed ma-
terial is replaced in the same wetlands, the defendant added a pollutant for 
the first time and a §404 permit is required, even though the same material 
was in the wetland before and after the defendant’s actions . See United States 
v . Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) .
44 . That is not entirely true on a molecule-by-molecule basis . The industry 
cannot isolate the molecules of a pollutant in its intake water and simply 
transfer them to the discharge water without treatment . Those molecules 
mix with the molecules of the same pollutant added by the point source’s 
operation and both are subject to whatever pollution-control technology 
the industry uses . The net/gross credit works by allowing the point source 
to subtract from total number of molecules of the pollutant its treatment 
must remove the number of the molecules already in its intake water . Its 
treatment will remove some intake molecules and some operation molecules 
and it will discharge some intake molecules and some operation molecules . 
Since the molecules are fungible, as long as both sets of molecules are treated 
effectively, the receiving water will not know the difference .
45 . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . 
Cir . 1982) (the dams case); Consumers Power Co., 862 F .2d 580 (the pump-
storage project case) .
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the water changed the character of the pollutants in envi-
ronmentally detrimental manners . The changes the owners 
made in the pollutants were not merely metaphorical, but 
were observable, physical changes .
In Gorsuch,46 environmental advocates challenged EPA’s 
failure to regulate discharges from dams in the §402 
permit program . They contended that dams were point 
sources that added dam-induced pollutants into down-
stream waters . The issue of whether dams are point sources 
was not argued; EPA admitted that under some circum-
stances, dams are point sources .47 The pollutants identified 
by plaintiffs included low dissolved oxygen (DO) caused 
by impoundments,48 high DO caused by water cascad-
ing over dam spillways,49 temperature changes caused by 
impoundments,50 suspended solids caused by algae growth 
in impoundments,51 and similar material . The court held 
that what the petitioner characterized as pollutants were 
not pollutants, but merely changes in water quality .52 This 
will be discussed further in the Article on “pollutant .”53 
In the alternative, the court held that if the materials were 
pollutants, the dams did not add pollutants to the down-
stream water .
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) argued that 
dams created the impoundments, that pollutants were 
formed in and because of the impoundments, and that the 
dam then added the pollutants from the impoundments 
to the waters below . This amounts to arguing that dams 
are the but-for causes of the pollutant in their ultimate 
46 . 693 F .2d 156 .
47 . 693 F .2d at 165 .
48 . Fish need high dissolved oxygen (DO) . DO diminishes in quiescent water 
in an impoundment, particularly in deeper water . See Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 
161-62 .
49 . Too much DO, i .e ., super saturation, can cause trauma in fish associated 
with oxygen bubbles in the blood stream . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 164 .
50 . Shallow impoundments with high surface-to-volume ratios tend to raise wa-
ter temperatures, particularly at the surface . Deep impoundments with low 
surface-to-volume ratios tend to lower temperatures, particularly in deeper 
levels . Different aquatic species thrive at different temperature levels: trout, 
for instance, like lower temperatures and bass like higher temperatures . 
Higher temperatures also promote algae growth . See Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 
163 .
51 . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 164 .
52 . Id. at 171-74 .
53 . In an earlier, little-cited district court decision to the contrary, South Caro-
lina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F . Supp . 118, 8 ELR 20757 (D .S .C . 
1978), environmental groups sued to halt the construction of one dam 
and the continued operations of two other dams because they discharged 
pollutants without §402 permits . Plaintiffs argued that water entering the 
impoundments behind the dams was or would be high in DO and low in 
metallic substances, whereas water released by the dams was or would be low 
in DO and high in metallic substances, both changes were caused by the im-
poundments behind the dams and both were detrimental to fish . The court 
agreed, “[h]igh quality water  .  .  . will enter the facility  .  .  . and low quality 
water  .  .  . will be discharged . Thus the release of the water changed because 
of the impoundment constitutes the ‘addition’ of pollutants into a navigable 
water .” 457 F . Supp . at 126 . At least as to the change from high to low DO, 
the court was wrong; DO is depleted by, not added in, the reservoir . The 
court responded that low DO is pollution as defined in §502(19) and that 
“no reasonable purpose would be served by admitting pollution while deny-
ing the existence of a pollutant .” While the argument has intuitive appeal, it 
ignores the fact that §301(a) makes it illegal to add unpermitted pollutants, 
not to create pollution, and that Congress decoupled “pollutant” and “pol-
lution” in the CWA . At least under these sections, pollutants need not cause 
pollution . EPA was not a party to this case, and it does not appear that its 
“outside world” gloss of “addition” was before the court .
form . EPA argued for the first time that “addition from 
a point source occurs only if the point source itself physi-
cally introduces a pollutant into the water from the out-
side world .”54 Because most dam-caused pollutants were 
already in the reservoir water in some form before they 
flowed over or through the dam, EPA argued those pollut-
ants were not added to downstream waters by the dam, but 
merely flowed over or through the dam .
The U .S . Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(D .C .) Circuit found that nothing in the statute’s word-
ing, structure, or legislative history directly addressed the 
“addition” issue . It concluded that because both NWF’s 
and EPA’s interpretations were reasonable, it was bound to 
defer to EPA’s interpretation of the statute to a degree that 
would later become known as Chevron deference .55 EPA’s 
interpretation, however, was enunciated only in its litiga-
tion position in that and earlier cases and therefore was not 
entitled to what would come to be a Chevron level of def-
erence .56 Courts later rejected the D .C . Circuit’s excessive 
deference, appropriate only if EPA’s interpretation had been 
“adopted in a rulemaking or other formal proceeding,”57 
which it was not .
In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power 
Co.,58 the environmental group sued a pump-storage proj-
ect for withdrawing water containing live fish from Lake 
Michigan; pumping it to a hilltop reservoir at night; releas-
ing it during the day to run by gravity through a turbine 
to generate both electricity and coincidentally fish puree; 
and ultimately discharging it with fish puree, fish parts, 
and some surviving fish back into Lake Michigan . Because 
electricity is cheaper at night, when the company used it 
to pump water uphill, and more expensive during the day, 
when the company generated it by letting the water flow 
downhill through the turbine by force of gravity, the oper-
ation was profitable, producing energy when it was most 
needed and therefore most expensive .59
Acknowledging that the dead fish parts were pollutants, 
the outfall pipe was a point source, and Lake Michigan was 
navigable water, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that the defendant did not violate the CWA 
because it did not add pollutants to Lake Michigan: The 
fish parts were not from the “outside world,” but instead 
originated as whole fish in Lake Michigan waters . The key 
to the court’s reasoning was its proposition that the “water 
passing through the  .   .   . facility never loses its status as 
water of the United States”60 or, in the words of the district 
court, “the Lake water does not lose its status as navigable 
water simply because it is removed from the Lake, and 
54 . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 175 .
55 . Chevron U .S .A ., Inc . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, 467 U .S . 857, 14 ELR 
20507 (1984) .
56 . United States v . Mead Corp ., 533 U .S . 218 (2001) .
57 . Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc . v . City of New York, 
273 F .2d 481, 490 (2d Cir . 2001) .
58 . 862 F .2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988) .
59 . This explains why the operation was profitable, even though it requires more 
energy to pump water uphill than it generates by flowing downhill through 
the turbine .
60 . Consumers Power, 862 F .2d at 589 .
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since the fish never leave the Lake, they cannot be added to 
it from the outside world .”61 Although there was Supreme 
Court precedent (in another context) for the first part of 
this proposition, the court cited no authority for it .62 It 
took pains to explain that in normal industrial use, includ-
ing industrial cooling, water loses its status as navigable 
somewhere between the industry’s withdrawal of influent 
from the donor water, the industry’s use of the water in the 
industrial process, and the industry’s discharge of the efflu-
ent back into the same receiving water .63 If not, of course, 
the CWA would prevent little or no pollution . Thus, under 
the court’s analysis, when a power company withdraws 
water from Lake Michigan to turn a turbine, the water 
remains navigable while it is used and returned to the lake, 
but if the same or a different power company withdraws 
the same water from the same lake to cool a turbine, even 
the same turbine, the water is no longer navigable when it 
is returned to the same lake . EPA reiterated this distinc-
tion in the preamble to its water transfer rule .64 Neither the 
court nor EPA cited authority or explained the rationale 
for this difference . Despite revisiting the analysis annually 
for decades, this author is unable to explain it either, except 
as a results-oriented distinction or administrative and judi-
cial metaphysics .65
The probable reason the court did not cite Supreme 
Court precedent for its proposition that the water the 
defendant diverted for power generation did not lose its 
status as water of the United States was that the prece-
dent did not support the court’s distinction between the 
status of water diverted for power generation and water 
diverted for other industrial uses . The court did not need 
this unexplained and probably unexplainable distinc-
tion to support its ruling, however . It could, for instance, 
have held the defendant’s pump storage operation did not 
require a §402 permit because the change from live to 
dead fish occasioned by the defendant’s operation was a 
change in water condition, not the addition of a new pol-
lutant, relying on Gorsuch .
61 . Id . at 589, citing National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 657 F . 
Supp . 989, 1008, 17 ELR 20801 (W .D . Mich . 1987) .
62 . “[T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of pri-
vate ownership is unconceivable .” United States v . Chandler-Dunbar Water 
Power Co ., 229 U .S . 53, 69 (1913); cited with approval in S .D . Warren Co . 
v . Maine Bd . of Envtl . Prot ., 547 U .S . 370, 379, n .5 (2006) (stating “nor 
can we agree that one can denationalize waters by exerting private control 
over them”) . Both decisions involved water diverted to generate electric 
power . Neither, however, considered the particular type of diversion or the 
issue discussed here .
63 . Consumers Power, 862 F .2d at 589 .
64 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33704 (June 13, 2008) .
65 . There are some differences . In the cooling-water situation, the power plant 
adds heat to the water in the pipes, while in the electricity-generation situa-
tion the plant does not add fish . But this difference relates to the “addition” 
element, not the “navigable waters” element . It does not explain why the 
water in the plant is non-navigable in the first case but navigable in the 
second . In the cooling-water situation, §316(b) requires that the location, 
design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures mini-
mize adverse effects on the environment, while it requires no such location, 
design, construction, or capacity requirement for non-cooling water intake 
structures . But again, this has nothing to do with whether these waters are 
navigable . Another possible distinction is that in Consumers Power, the water 
is used to generate electricity, while in the other cases, it is used for industrial 
purposes . But generation of electricity is an industrial process .
As in the net/gross situation, these point source owners 
and operators appear not to have added pollutants from 
their influents to the navigable receiving waters, because 
the donor water and the receiving water were the same 
body of navigable water and the pollutants were already 
in the donor water when the industry withdrew it . At the 
same time, they differed from the passive dischargers in 
the net/gross situation, for these point sources were not 
truly passive; they manipulated material or characteristics 
already in the influent water to make them different and 
more harmful to the aquatic biota when discharged to the 
receiving waters . But for their actions, the point sources 
would not have created, discharged, or added to navigable 
water fish parts, low DO, or higher concentrations of sus-
pended solids; those substances would not otherwise be in 
the navigable receiving water . Whether there is an addition 
under either the suggested definition of “addition” or EPA’s 
“outside world” theory, therefore, depends on whether the 
pollutants already in the donor water are the same pollut-
ants that the point sources added to the receiving waters 
and whether they are pollutants at all, rather than water 
conditions . That is determined by the meaning of “pollut-
ant” rather than by the meaning of “addition .”
c. EPA’s “Outside World” Theory of 
Addition
EPA’s theory that addition “occurs only if the point source 
itself physically introduces a pollutant into the water from 
the outside world” first surfaced in the early 1980s as EPA’s 
litigation position in Gorsuch.66 Although EPA cited no 
statutory or other basis for it, the theory sounds logical . 
The “outside world” is such a nicely turned phrase that it 
lodges in our minds, a good example of a legal meme .67 It 
is no surprise that the theory is frequently cited and seldom 
questioned . Like many nicely turned phrases, however, it is 
more pleasing than precise .
Examined closely, the theory incorporates two ideas . 
First, the point source in question must itself introduce 
the pollutant into water . Second, the pollutant must origi-
nate from the “outside world .” The first idea, that the point 
source itself must introduce the pollutant into “the water,” 
conflates the “addition” and “point source” elements of 
the CWA offense . Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected 
it in Miccosukee as contrary to the statute’s definition of 
“point source” as a conveyance: “[A] point source need 
not be the original source of the pollutant: it need only 
convey the pollutant to navigable water .”68 Significantly, 
the United States agreed with the Court .69 The mining 
66 . 693 F .2d 156, 175, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) .
67 . Memes are contagious phrases, tunes, and other ideas that leap into our 
minds and propagate by leaping from them into the minds of others . The 
author explored “navigable water” as a meme in Jeffrey G . Miller, Evolution-
ary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 Pace L . Rev . 
409, 419-20 (2000) .
68 . South Florida Water Management District v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 
541 U .S . 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
69 . Id. at 105-06 .
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waste decisions, discussed below, also implicitly reject the 
first concept .
The second idea is also ambiguous . What does EPA’s 
phrase “into the water from the outside world” mean? It 
is not clear what “the water” in EPA’s phrase refers to . Is it 
the donor water, the receiving water, either, any navigable 
water or any water? The world outside “the water” will be 
different depending on which “water” is considered . In 
any event, could it make sense for the addition to be from 
the “inside world?” On the other hand, if the origin of the 
pollutant in an “addition” is inherently from the “outside 
world,” the phrase adds nothing to the definition of “addi-
tion .” No doubt EPA could develop this concept to be a 
meaningful part of a full definition of “addition,” but EPA 
has not attempted to define the word .
Moreover, the “outside world” idea plays havoc with 
the CWA’s second permit program, §404, which protects 
the loss of wetlands from unregulated filling . Most of the 
reported §404 decisions involve landclearing activities to 
prepare wetlands for agricultural or other uses, activities 
in which soil and organic material is moved from one loca-
tion to another in a wetland . It is not apparent how this 
material is from the world outside the wetland . EPA side-
steps the issue by observing that Congress defined “pol-
lutant” to include “dredged spoil,” knowing that it was 
removed from water, thereby sanctioning the application 
of §404 to wetlands landclearing cases . While this estab-
lishes one of the four elements of the offense, “pollutant,” 
it does not establish the other three, including “addition .” 
If “addition” includes the “outside world” concept, it is dif-
ficult to square it with most §404 cases, unless “outside 
world” applies to §402 cases, but not to §404 cases, which 
EPA has not argued and which would be contrary to the 
canon of statutory construction that words be interpreted 
the same throughout a statute, unless the statute explicitly 
indicates otherwise . The incompatibility of EPA’s “outside 
world” theory of “addition” and §404 is explored in greater 
detail below .
EPA’s “outside world” theory of “addition” is ambigu-
ous, unhelpful, inconsistent with §404, and contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miccosukee. Yet, as dis-
cussed below, EPA has continued to use it, as if Micco-
sukee had never been decided . It is time that EPA either 
abandons the theory or builds it to promulgate a com-
plete definition of “addition .” If EPA does not act in one 
of these manners, courts should recognize that the theory 
is without merit .
2. Additions From Stormwater Runoff
Although there was considerable skirmishing at the outset 
of the CWA’s implementation over whether surface storm-
water runoff was subject to the §402 permit program, 
Congress ended much of the contention by amending the 
CWA in 1987 to include §402(p) . In that subsection, Con-
gress directed EPA to issue or deny permits “for discharges 
composed entirely of stormwater” that are either “associ-
ated with industrial activity” or discharged from “munici-
pal separate storm sewer system[s] .”70 EPA’s implementing 
regulations included an amendment to its definition of 
“discharge of a pollutant,” specifying that the “definition 
includes additions of pollutants into waters of the United 
States from: surface runoff which is collected or channeled 
by man .”71 And in its stormwater regulations, it defined 
“discharge associated with industrial activity” to mean “the 
discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting 
and conveying storm water and that is directly related to 
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas 
at an industrial plant .”72
The “composed entirely of stormwater” wording of 
§402(p) is curious . If there were no pollutants in the 
stormwater, there would be no reason to regulate the dis-
charges . Indeed, if there were no pollutants in the storm-
water, adding it to navigable water from point sources 
would not violate the prohibition of §301(a) . If the point 
source owner could prove the water from these sources 
carried no pollutants, it would require no permit . EPA’s 
reference to “additions of pollutants  .   .   . from stormwa-
ter runoff” in its definition of “discharge of a pollutant” 
acknowledges this .
The most commonly litigated fact pattern in decisions 
on “addition” of pollutants from stormwater contamina-
tion involves mining operations, often inactive mining 
operations . For example, in American Mining Congress v. 
U.S. EPA, the plaintiff broadly challenged EPA’s interpre-
tation of the statutory phrase “discharge associated with 
industrial activity” in §402(p) as it applied to inactive 
mining operations .73 The plaintiff argued that because 
there is no “activity” at an inactive mine, EPA’s defini-
tion exceeded its statutory authority . The U .S . Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that EPA’s reliance 
on “associated with“ in the statutory phrase “associated 
with industrial activity” was reasonable, however, since 
nothing in that statutory phrase required temporal con-
currence between the mining activity and the polluted 
stormwater discharge .74 Finding no legislative history and 
nothing in the statute to the contrary, the court deferred 
to EPA’s interpretation .
Courts have universally rejected the passive owner 
defense when raised by owners and operators of point 
sources discharging pollutants in stormwater runoff 
from past, present, or neighboring mining operations . 
In these situations, courts have held that “addition” 
does not require the owner or operator of the point 
70 . Municipal separate storm sewers carry only stormwater, not sewage, while 
municipal combined sewers carry both stormwater and sewage .
71 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
72 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .26(b)(14) .
73 . 965 F .2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir . 1992) .
74 . Id . at 764 . A similar attempt to require temporal concurrence between “ad-
dition” and the polluting activity was rejected in National Cotton Council of 
America v. EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
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source to generate,75 cause,76 create,77 or be the source78 
or origin79 of the pollutant, but requires only that the 
point source convey the pollutant to navigable water . 
These decisions are entirely consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Miccosukee that the passive owner 
defense is “untenable .”80
The most thorough analysis of the issue regarding min-
ing wastes is in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.81 
There, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
noted that in the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” 
in §502(12), Congress modified “addition” with “any,” 
suggesting an expansive reading of “addition,” and that 
“viewed as a whole  .   .   . the liability and permitting sec-
tions of the Act focus on the point of discharge, not the 
underlying conduct that led to the discharge .”82 It also 
notes that the CWA “refers to the obligations of the ‘own-
ers and operators’ of a point source, suggesting that [they] 
 .  .  . are responsible for a functional point source”83 and that 
EPA’s regulations “focus  .   .   . on ownership of the point 
source, not the discharge-causing conduct .”84 EPA defines 
“owner or operator” as the regulated “facility or activity” 
and defines “facility or activity” as a “‘point source’ or any 
other [regulated] facility or activity .”85 The decision also 
cited relevant precedent from the Ninth Circuit,86 as well 
as EPA’s stormwater runoff regulations,87 to which it gave 
deference . Other mining decisions have rejected arguments 
that addition required intentional conduct88 or a greater 
75 . Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc . v . County of Los Angeles, 673 F .3d 880, 
900, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir . 2011), aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty . Flood Control 
Dist . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, 133 S . Ct . 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013) .
76 . West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc . v . Huffman, 624 F .3d 159, 167-
68, 40 ELR 20014 (4th Cir . 2010) .
77 . Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited v . City of New York, 273 
F .3d 481, 493 (2d Cir . 2001) .
78 . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla . v . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 280 
F .3d 1364, 1368 n .6, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir . 2002) .
79 . United States v . Law, 979 F .2d 977, 979, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir . 1992) .
80 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 
34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
81 . 421 F .3d 1133 (10th Cir . 2005) . See also the district court opinion, 2002 
WL 33932715 (D . Colo . Nov . 15, 2002), which covered much of the 
same ground .
82 . Sierra Club v . El Paso Gold Mines, Inc ., 421 F .3d at 1143, citing §§301(e), 
402(a)(1), and 101(a)(3), 33 U .S .C . §§1311(e), 1342(a)(1), and 1251(a)
(3) . This is perhaps somewhat simplistic, as illustrated by industrial dis-
charges into municipal sewerage systems . The municipalities must secure 
§402 permits for their discharges of treated effluent into navigable water, 
and the industries are not required to secure §402 permits for their discharg-
es into the municipal sewerage system; the industries are indirect discharges 
to the navigable water, 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(b) . But the industries are required 
to treat their wastes before discharging them to the municipal sewerage sys-
tem to meet pretreatment requirements established under §307(b) and are 
civilly and criminally liable for not doing so under §309(a) & (c) .
83 . 421 F .3d at 1143-44, citing §§301(g)(2) and 308(a), 33 U .S .C . §§1311(a)
(2) and 1318(a)(2) .
84 . 421 F .3d at 1144, citing 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 (definition of “addition of any 
pollutant”) and §122 .26(b)(14)(iii) .
85 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
86 . Committee to Save Mokelumne River v . East Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 
305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 1993); American Mining Cong . v . EPA, 965 
F .2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir . 1992); Beartooth Alliance v . Crown 
Butte Mines, 904 F . Supp . 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D . Mont . 1995) .
87 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .26(b)(14)(iii) (active and inactive mining operations re-
quire stormwater runoff permits under §402(p)) .
88 . United States v . Earth Sci ., Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir . 
1979) . Section §309(c) requires negligent conduct for misdemeanors and 
presence of pollutants after installation of the point source 
than before,89 and that addition could not be of pollutants 
already on the streambed or in the stream banks .90
A few passive point source decisions have involved the 
collection and channeling of non-mining-related storm-
water runoff .91 They reached the same conclusions as the 
mining-related stormwater runoff cases, for the same rea-
sons, especially the explicit coverage of stormwater runoff 
by Congress92 and EPA’s corresponding regulations .93
The mining waste decisions implicitly reject the first 
concept in EPA’s “outside world” gloss on “addition .” They 
held, as did the Supreme Court in Miccosukee, that point 
sources added pollutants to navigable water, even though 
the point sources did not introduce the pollutants into 
water in the first instance . Are the decisions consistent 
with the more-developed concept of “adding a pollutant to 
navigable waters from a point source when that pollutant 
would not otherwise be in those navigable waters?” Did 
the point sources cause the pollutants to be present in the 
receiving water? We can not be sure, because the courts 
did not undertake the factual analyses necessary to address 
those questions . It is probable that without the channel-
ing systems and their associated point sources, some of the 
same pollutants in the same runoff from the same mining 
operations would have made their way by force of grav-
ity to the same receiving waters . The point sources would 
not be but-for causes of adding these pollutants to these 
navigable waters; the pollutants would have made their 
way into these navigable receiving waters without the point 
sources . Of course, absent channeling systems and associ-
ated point sources, it is also probable that some of the same 
pollutants in the same runoff from the same mining opera-
tions would have percolated into the ground, evaporated 
into the atmosphere, or reached another surface water . The 
point sources would be but-for causes of adding these pol-
lutants to these navigable receiving waters; these pollutants 
would not have made their way into these navigable receiv-
ing waters without the point sources .
In many of these cases, the owners of the point sources 
existed and were available as defendants, while the per-
sons responsible for the mining waste in the runoff pass-
ing through defendants’ point sources no longer existed . 
Thus, if anyone was responsible for violating the CWA, it 
had to be the point source owners . Perhaps, in their zeal 
knowing conduct for felonies, and knowing conduct means knowledge of 
facts, not law .
89 . Committee to Save Mokelumne River, 13 F .3d 305 .
90 . Rybachek v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 904 F .2d 1276, 20 ELR 20973 (9th 
Cir . 1990) .
91 . Natural Res . Def . Council v . County of Los Angeles, 673 F .3d 880, 41 ELR 
20109 (9th Cir . 2011) (city liable for discharging pollutants from its storm 
drains into navigable water, even though others had placed pollutants in the 
stormwater), aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty . Flood Control Dist . v . Natural Res . 
Def . Council, 133 S . Ct . 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013); Environmental Prot . 
Info . Ctr . v . Pacific Lumber Co ., 469 F . Supp . 2d 803 (N .D . Cal . 2007) 
(stormwater from silvacultural activity requires a §402 permit, even though 
point source causes no net increase in pollutants reaching stream) .
92 . Section 402(p), 33 U .S .C . §1342(p) .
93 . Natural Res . Def . Council v . County of Los Angeles, 636 F .3d 1235 (9th 
Cir . 2011) . aff’d, Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 133 S . Ct . 710; Envtl. 
Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F . Supp . 2d 803 .
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to hold someone liable for violating the CWA, these deci-
sions focused on the “point source” element of the offence 
and ignored the “addition” element, with its causation 
component . Thus, El Paso Gold Mines specifically avoided 
discussion of causation . Such caution may be unnecessary 
in most cases, however, because there can be two but-for 
causes of a violation .
Under the second part of EPA’s “outside world” gloss on 
“addition,” these decisions would be easy . The mining and 
other materials were from the world outside the navigable 
water and were therefore added by the point sources . But 
EPA’s “outside world” theory begins with the concept that 
the point source must originally place the mining wastes 
into water .94 This is not the case in the mining waste deci-
sions, however, because the mining wastes were in storm-
water before it entered the point source; indeed, they were 
in the stormwater before it entered the defendant’s prop-
erty . The results are more complicated but accurate if we 
use our sophisticated definition that “addition means the 
act of a person adding something (A) to something else 
(B) from a point source when (A) would not otherwise be 
in (B) .” The mining wastes (A) are certainly added to navi-
gable water (B) from a point source, but would they other-
wise be in navigable water (B)?
In the absence of fact-finding in the decisions on this 
question, it is impossible to say with certainty . However, it 
is most probable that some of the mining wastes would have 
found their way by gravity and natural channels to navi-
gable water without the point sources, and some would not 
because they would have percolated into groundwater or 
evaporated . As long as some of those wastes would not have 
found their way to navigable waters on their own, the point 
sources add at least those mining wastes to navigable waters . 
That is enough to violate the statute and require a permit .
3. Additions From Water Transfers
The final variant of the “passive point source” fact pattern 
are transfers of water from one water body to another, spe-
cifically from more-polluted navigable donor water to less-
polluted navigable receiving water . Water transfers move 
water from one watershed to another for a variety of uses, 
of which agricultural irrigation and municipal water supply 
are the most common . The owners of point sources intro-
ducing the transferred water to the receiving water may be 
“passive,” in that they do not add pollutants to the donor 
water being transferred . But they are active in that they 
add more-polluted donor water to less-polluted receiving 
water . EPA misleadingly claims it has consistently taken 
the position that when donor navigable water is transferred 
to other navigable receiving water, nothing is added to the 
receiving water from the outside world because all naviga-
ble waters are one, the “unitary navigable waters” theory .95 
94 . That concept, however, has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Miccosu-
kee, 541 U .S . at 105 .
95 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 
95, 107, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) . The Court points out that there is at least 
one EPA General Counsel Opinion to the contrary . In Catskill Mountains 
EPA’s theory conflates meanings of “addition” and “navi-
gable waters,” forcing this Article to consider “navigable 
waters” as well as “addition” to understand and analyze 
EPA’s theory . Until quite recently, every appeals court con-
sidering the issue has ruled against EPA’s position .96
After these decisions, EPA significantly changed the 
legal landscape by promulgating its water transfer rule, 
for the first time97 cloaking its interpretation of “addi-
tion” with Chevron deference .98 The one court of appeals 
decision considering the issue after promulgation of the 
rule cited Chevron deference to uphold EPA’s position .99 
Petitions for judicial review of the rule in the circuit 
courts were consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit, which 
dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction .100 The Southern 
District of New York subsequently heard a consolidated 
challenge to the rule and in March 2014, vacated the rule 
in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. 
U.S. EPA (Catskill Mountains) .101 This opinion is not only 
the most recent decision on the issue, it is also by far the 
most comprehensive in its analysis . Appeals, of course, are 
sure to continue .
a. Early Decisions
Prior to EPA’s promulgation of the water transfer rule, 
the U .S . Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the U .S . 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Eleventh 
Circuit all rejected EPA’s interpretation of “addition” to 
exclude water transfers and EPA’s unitary navigable waters 
theory . The First Circuit initially considered the issue in 
Dubois v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,102 in which envi-
ronmental plaintiffs challenged the U .S . Forest Service’s 
approval of plans to expand a ski facility in a national for-
est . The plans included withdrawing polluted water from 
the East Branch of the Pemigewasset River to make snow 
and ultimately discharging the used water to the pristine 
Loon Pond, without a §402 permit . The district court held 
there would be no addition of pollutants to Loon Pond 
because all navigable waters were a “singular entity .”103 The 
district court also reasoned from the analogy of redistrib-
v. U.S. EPA, 2014 WL 1284544 (S .D .N .Y . Mar . 28, 2014), EPA explained 
that the outlier 1975 Opinion was overcome by a 1977 amendment to the 
CWA . See also Agency Interpretation, infra note 131, at 2-3, n .5 .
96 . Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc . v . City of New York, 
451 F .3d 77 (2d Cir . 2006); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla . v . South 
Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 280 F .3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir . 2002); 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc . v . City of New York, 
273 F .3d 481 (2d Cir . 2001); and Dubois v . U .S . Dep’t of Agric ., 102 F .2d 
1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir . 1996) .
97 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(i), 73 Fed . Reg . 33708 (June 13, 2008) .
98 . See United States v . Mead Corp ., 533 U .S . 218 (2001) .
99 . Friends of the Everglades v . S . Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 570 F .3d 1210 (11th 
Cir . 2009) .
100 . Friends of the Everglades v . U .S . EPA, 699 F .3d 1280, 42 ELR 20222 (11th 
Cir . 2012) . Federal appellate jurisdiction for judicial review of EPA actions 
under the CWA is conferred in §509(b), 33 U .S .C . §1396(b), and the water 
transfer rulemaking did not fall within any of the categories of actions for 
which §509(b) granted jurisdiction .
101 . Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc . v . U .S . EPA, 2014 
WL 1284544 (S .D .N .Y . Mar . 28, 2014) (Catskill Mountains) .
102 . 102 F .2d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir . 1996) .
103 . Id . at 1296 .
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uting water from the bottom of a pond to the top of the 
pond, requiring no permit even if accomplished by a point 
source . In reversing, the First Circuit rejected this anal-
ogy as ill-conceived, because redistribution of water within 
the pond was redistribution within one water body, not 
between two water bodies .104
The Second Circuit analyzed the issue of whether a 
water transfer was an “addition” in greater depth in 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City 
of New York (Catskill I) .105 Environmental plaintiffs chal-
lenged New York City’s transfer without a §402 permit 
of sediment-laden water from a reservoir in the Schoharie 
River through the Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a 
well-known and clear trout stream (or at least once clear 
below and still clear above the Shandaken Tunnel) . The 
transfer was part of the city’s water supply system, mov-
ing water it collected in the protected Catskill Moun-
tains Watershed for use in the city . The Schoharie River 
and Esopus Creek were connected in that they were both 
part of the larger Hudson River Watershed, but until 
they both entered the Hudson River, they were separate 
watersheds, having no natural influence on each other . 
The city argued, and the district court found, that there 
was no addition of sediment from the Shandaken Tun-
nel to Esopus Creek, relying on Gorsuch and Consumers 
Power. The Second Circuit rejected those precedents as 
having “accorded unjustified deference to the EPA’s inter-
pretation of ‘addition,’” because its interpretation was not 
developed in a rulemaking or other formal administrative 
process .106 The court also found that the decisions were 
distinguishable on their facts: In both of the earlier deci-
sions, navigable donor water was withdrawn from, used, 
and returned to the same navigable water, essentially 
a “recirculation of water” within the same water body, 
whereas Catskill I involved transferring water between 
different navigable watersheds .107
To explain Gorsuch and Consumers Power, the Second 
Circuit used the analogy of taking “a ladle of soup from 
a pot, lift[ing] it above the pot, and pour[ing] it back into 
the pot,” adding nothing to the pot . If this was held to be 
an “addition,” “EPA might as easily require a permit for 
Niagara Falls .”108 But the court explained that the analogy 
was not apt for the transfer between the Schoharie River 
and the Esopus: “No one can reasonably argue that the 
water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the 
104 . The First Circuit also cited earlier decisions, but they did not deal directly 
with water transfers . See Committee to Save the Mokalumne River v . East 
Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 1993) (over-
flow to stream from dam collecting polluted runoff from abandoned mining 
area, where the runoff would have reached the stream without the dam); 
Dague v . City of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343 (2d Cir . 1991) (culvert was 
a point source that added polluted waters from a landfill to nearby river); 
United States v . M .C .C . of Fla ., Inc ., 772 F .2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th 
Cir . 1985) (propeller of tugboat added bottom sediment to nearby sea grass 
beds by stirring up the sediment) .
105 . 273 F .3d 481 (2d Cir . 2001) .
106 . Id . at 489-91 .
107 . 273 F .3d at 491-92 .
108 . Id. at 491 . Of course, Niagara Falls would not violate §301(a) because the 
Falls is not a person .
‘same,’ such that the ‘addition’ of one to the other is a logi-
cal impossibility .”109
The city then argued there was no “addition” in the case 
under EPA’s “outside world” theory of addition because the 
city’s point source did not initially introduce the pollutants 
into water . The Second Circuit rejected that argument as 
well: “The tunnel itself need not have created the pollu-
tion; it is enough that it conveys the pollutants from their 
original source to the navigable water,” for point sources 
are conveyers, not creators or originators, anticipating the 
Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion in Miccosukee . 
The Second Circuit agreed with EPA’s interpretation that 
for an “addition” to occur, “a point source must intro-
duce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside 
world,”110 but only if “that ‘outside world’ is construed as 
any place outside the particular water body to which pol-
lutants are introduced,”111 or, in our nomenclature, from 
outside the receiving water . Using our understanding of 
“addition,” the city added sediment to the Esopus from the 
tunnel: but-for the tunnel, the sediments would not be in 
the Esopus .
The court specifically rejected the “singular entity” or 
“unitary navigable waters” theory that the addition of a 
pollutant to one navigable water is an addition of that pol-
lutant to all navigable waters, both as a matter of Second 
Circuit precedent112 and as leading to an absurd result . 
Concluding that the “transfer of water from a water body 
contaminated with myriad pollutants to a pristine water 
body containing few or no pollutants” is not an addition 
would be “inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the 
word ‘addition .’”113
Finally, the city argued that the legislative history and 
the structure of the statute supported its interpretation of 
“addition .” The court, however, found the legislative his-
tory to be “silent on the meaning of ‘addition .’”114 And the 
court found that the city’s reliance on §101(g) (expressing 
congressional policy that the authority of states to allo-
cate water use was not abrogated by the CWA) was offset 
by §101(a) (expressing congressional intent to restore and 
maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters) . The court 
found transfers of polluted water to pristine water would 
be inconsistent with §101(a) . In the end, the Second Cir-
cuit found no reason to depart from the plain meaning 
of “addition .”
The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue in even greater 
depth in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South 
Florida Water Management District,115 in which the plain-
tiffs challenged the pumping of canal water contaminated 
109 . Id . at 492 .
110 . Id . at 491, quoting Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 165 . Contra Miccosukee, 541 U .S . at 
105 .
111 . Id . at 491 . This is in accord with the Supreme Court’s later ruling in 
Miccosukee .
112 . Dague v . City of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 1991) . 
The facts in this decision may have amounted to a water transfer, but the 
court did not analyze it as such .
113 . Catskill I, 273 F .3d at 493 .
114 . Id .
115 . 280 F .3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir . 2002) .
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with agricultural nutrients into less-polluted water flowing 
to the Everglades, without a §402 permit . The Water Man-
agement District, like New York City in Catskill I, relied 
on Gorsuch and Consumers Power, but the Eleventh Cir-
cuit rejected that reliance for the same reasons the Second 
Circuit had rejected it .116 The Eleventh Circuit determined 
that the appropriate water body for determining whether 
a point source adds pollutants is the receiving water, not 
the donor water .117 It then rejected the passive point source 
argument, concluding that a point source need not be the 
origin of pollutants to add them to navigable water . In 
part, it used a dictionary definition of “from” to include 
“by” stating that “no dispute exists on whether pollut-
ants, in fact, are added to navigable waters  .  .  . by a point 
source   .   .   .   .”118 Finally, the court concluded that a point 
source adds pollutants to a navigable water if the “point 
source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants” into 
that receiving water .119 The point source, a pump, added 
pollutants from the donor water to the Everglades-bound 
receiving water “because the pollutants would not have 
entered the second body of water but for the change in flow 
caused by the point source, an addition of pollutants from 
a point source .”120
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosu-
kee Tribe of Indians of Florida,121 the Supreme Court upheld 
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “addition” did not 
require that point sources generate the pollutants they 
add to navigable waters . The Court underlined its rejec-
tion of the passive point source argument, describing the 
argument as “untenable .”122 The Court, however, based its 
ruling on the definition of “point source,” not on the defi-
nition of “addition .” The definition of “point source” as a 
“conveyance,” “makes plain that a point source need not 
be the original source of the pollutant: it need only convey 
the pollutant to ‘navigable waters .’”123 But it remanded the 
case for further factual findings on whether the donor and 
receiving waters were “meaningfully distinct .”
The government argued as amicus that the inclusion of 
“any” before three of the four elements of the offense of 
water pollution, and its absence before the fourth, navi-
gable water, “signals Congress’ understanding that NPDES 
[national pollutant discharge elimination system] permits 
116 . Id . at 1367-68 .
117 . Id . at 1368 .
118 . Id . The court’s conversion of “from” to “by” in the offense is unnecessary; the 
court’s “but-for” interpretation of “addition” is justification enough for its 
conclusion . And it is also ill-advised, as there is already a “by” prepositional 
phrase in the offense “by any person” in §301(a) . A sentence with two “by” 
prepositional phrases is awkward . Indeed, §502(12) uses “of,” “from,” and 
“to” in its prepositional phrases, while only §301(a) uses “by” in its preposi-
tional phrases, suggesting Congress used these prepositions advisedly .
119 . Id . at 1368-69 .
120 . Id .
121 . 541 U .S . 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
122 . Id . at 105 .
123 . Id . A secondary support for the Court’s conclusion was the intent of Con-
gress to impose §402 permitting requirements on municipal sewage treat-
ment plants, an intent that would be frustrated if POTW discharges were 
exempt from permitting because the pollutants they discharged all origi-
nated from industrial and domestic discharges into the sewer system . Mu-
nicipal sewage treatment plants are referred to as POTWs .
would not be required for pollution caused by the engi-
neered transfer of one ‘navigable water’ into another .”124 The 
Court did not respond to this argument . But it did express 
considerable skepticism of the “singular entity” theory, rela-
beled as the “unitary navigable water” theory .125 The gov-
ernment argued that §304(f)(F), directing EPA to develop 
information on how state and local programs could address 
“flow diversion facilities” as nonpoint sources, meant that 
water transfers are nonpoint source pollution . The Court 
noted, however, that §304(f)(F) did not “exempt nonpoint 
pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also 
fall within the ‘point source’ definition .”126
When the government argued that its long-standing 
unitary navigable water interpretation should be accorded 
deference, the Court noted that EPA’s interpretation of 
“addition” had not been consistent and was inconsistent 
with some of EPA’s own regulations, citing the net/gross 
regulation .127 The government further argued that it would 
be impractical for it to issue §402 permits for “every diver-
sion of one navigable water into another,” because “thou-
sands of new permits might have to be issued,” imposing 
special problems in “western States, whose water supply 
networks often rely on engineered transfers among various 
natural water bodies .”128 The Court commented, however, 
that such permitting might be necessary to protect water 
quality; the administrative burden could be lessened by 
issuing general rather than individual permits; and at least 
one state had interpreted the CWA as requiring permits for 
interbasin transfers .129 The Court might also have noted 
that diversions of water do not require CWA permits and 
that the discharge of irrigation return flow to navigable 
water after diversion does not require CWA permits either, 
considerably limiting the number of permits required .
The Court commented that treating all navigable water 
as one would be inconsistent with the water quality stan-
dards program .130 The Court was correct in this regard, but 
did not begin to understand how inconsistent the unitary 
navigable water theory is with the water quality standards 
program, an inconsistency this Article addresses in detail 
below . Although the Court decided the passive point source 
issue, it left open for the parties to argue the unitary navi-
gable waters theory on remand . Because the Court neither 
sustained nor rejected the unitary navigable waters theory, 
it has been reargued in cases before the Second and Elev-
enth Circuits and district courts . In the meantime, EPA 
124 . Miccosukee, 541 U .S . at 106 .
125 . Id. at 106-12 .
126 . Id . at 107 .
127 . Id . In the net/gross regulation, EPA established a process for granting dis-
chargers credit for pollutants in their intake water, but only if they dis-
charged to the same water body, an intrabasin transfer . As discussed above, 
EPA’s restriction of net/gross credits to situations where the donor and re-
ceiving waters are the same is inconsistent with allowing interbasin water 
transfers where the transferred water is polluted .
128 . Miccosukee, 541 U .S . at 108 . The applicability of general permits for water 
transfers is also explored, in somewhat more detail, in Chris Reagen, The 
Water Transfer Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens to Undermine the Clean 
Water Act, 83 Colo . L . Rev . 307, 35-37 (2011) .
129 . 541 U .S . at 108-09 .
130 . 541 U .S . at 107 .
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altered the legal landscape, first by issuing a detailed water-
transfer interpretive statement and later by promulgating 
a rule exempting water transfers from the requirement of 
obtaining §402 permits .
b. EPA’s Interpretive Memorandum and 
Water Transfer Rule
EPA’s interpretation of the applicability of §402 to water 
transfers (Agency Interpretation)131 and its subsequent pro-
posed and final water transfer rule132 are considered here 
together because they are virtually identical in content, 
wording, and rationale, differing only in the more formal 
structure and process of rulemaking and the greater defer-
ence due to a rule .133
After the Supreme Court’s Miccosukee decision, EPA 
developed the Agency Interpretation, concluding that 
Congress intended water transfers that “merely convey or 
connect navigable waters,” uninterrupted by industrial, 
municipal, or commercial use, be overseen by authorities 
other than §402 . Shortly thereafter, EPA published a pro-
posed rule to add “[d]ischarges from a water transfer” to 
the 40 C .F .R . §122 .3 list of exclusions from the §402 per-
mit program . Its proposed definition of “a water transfer” 
was a conveyance “of water of the United States to another 
water of the United States without subjecting the water to 
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use .”134 
The preamble to the proposed rule explained its back-
ground and rationale by repeating the body of its Agency 
Interpretation almost verbatim .135 Two years and 18,000 
public comments later,136 EPA promulgated the water 
transfer rule, with an accompanying preamble, virtually 
unchanged from its earlier proposal .137
The first difficulty with the water transfer rule is to 
determine exactly what legal issue it addresses, the start-
ing point for judicial review . Several issues are possible . 
First, on its face, the rule is a regulatory exemption for 
water transfers from the requirement that all additions of 
pollutants by point sources to navigable waters be in com-
pliance with a permit . Both the wording of the regula-
tion and its placement in a section listing such exemptions 
leave little doubt that it is a regulatory exception . That 
raises the legal issue of whether EPA has the authority 
131 . Memorandum From Gen’l Counsel Ann R . Klee, Agency Interpretation on 
Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers (Aug . 5, 
2005) [hereinafter Agency Interpretation], available at http://www .epa .gov/
ogc/documents/water_transfers .pdf .
132 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(i) .
133 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **34-35 . While the three docu-
ments are virtually identical in their substantive content, the proposed and 
final rules include sections required in promulgating regulations, but not in 
establishing policy . For instance, the preamble to the final rule has a section 
responding to comments made during the comment period after publica-
tion of the proposed rule .
134 . NPDES Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed . Reg . 32887, 32895 (June 
7, 2006) .
135 . Compare Agency Interpretation, with proposed rule, 71 Fed . Reg . 32887, 
32888-92 (June 7, 2006) .
136 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *10 .
137 . NPDES Water Transfers Final Rule, 73 Fed . Reg . 33697 (June 13, 2008), 
codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(i) .
to promulgate such a regulatory exemption . On judicial 
review, however, EPA insisted that the rule did not create 
a regulatory exemption .138 At the outsets of the Agency 
Interpretation, the preambles to the proposed and final 
rule, and its argument on judicial review, EPA suggested a 
second legal issue by stating that the precise legal question 
at issue was whether water transfers are “additions” under 
the CWA .139 EPA’s legal analysis in that context posits that 
a “holistic” interpretation of the CWA leads to the conclu-
sion that “addition” in the CWA does not include water 
transfers .140 This is not a definition of “addition,” but a 
statement of what is not an “addition,” divorced from the 
meaning of the word .141
A third possible legal issue is interpreting “navigable 
waters” to mean that all navigable waters are the same, the 
unitary navigable waters theory . This flows from EPA’s use 
of the theory to support its interpretation that transferring 
pollutants from one navigable water to another navigable 
water is not an “addition” of pollutants from the first navi-
gable water to the second navigable water, because both 
waters are the same .142 But the rule does not purport to 
define either “addition” or “navigable water,” the rule is 
not codified in the definitional section of the CWA regula-
tions, and the definitions in that section do not incorporate 
or suggest any of EPA’s concepts .143
What words in the statute, if any, does EPA’s rule inter-
pret? Why is it so difficult to identify the legal question at 
issue on judicial review? Is it because EPA is playing a shell 
game, shuttling our attention from one statutory word 
to another? The most straightforward approach to EPA’s 
objective would be for it to define “navigable waters” or 
“waters of the United States”144 to incorporate the unitary 
navigable waters theory . EPA studiously avoided doing 
138 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **34-35 .
139 . See Proposed Rule, 71 Fed . Reg . 32887, 32889; Final Rule, 73 Fed . Reg . 
33697, 33700; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **14-15 .
140 . See Proposed Rule, 71 Fed . Reg . 32887, 32889; Final Rule, 73 Fed . Reg . 
33697, 33701; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **20-26 .
141 . In discussing the scope of its “interpretation” of “addition,” EPA wrote 
that it “address[ed]” “addition .” Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 
18 . (Addressing a term is much less than defining the term .) At the same 
time, it expressly declared it was not “address[ing] the meaning of  .   .   . 
“navigable waters .”
142 . The initial conflation of “addition” and “navigable waters” was in Consumers 
Power: If live fish were in Lake Michigan waters when those waters were 
diverted to generate electricity, the fish in those diverted waters were not 
added to Lake Michigan when the diverted water was returned to the lake . 
EPA asserted that position in subsequent litigation, the Agency Interpreta-
tion, and the preamble to the final rule .
143 . The definitional section of the regulations is 40 C .F .R . §122 .2, while the 
exemption section in which the water transfer rule is located is 40 C .F .R . 
§122 .3 . In its Agency Interpretation, EPA maintains it does not address the 
meaning of “navigable waters,” and although it “addresses the meaning” of 
“addition,” it does not define “addition .” How useful would it be for the dic-
tionary to define “addition” as “an act that does not include water transfers”?
144 . Section 502(7) defines “navigable waters” as the “waters of the United 
States .” EPA does not define “navigable waters,” but instead defines “waters 
of the United States” in 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 and uses “waters of the United 
States” throughout its §402 permit regulations instead of “navigable wa-
ters .” The Agency must have thought that parties to CWA disputes would 
come to think only of “waters of the United States” when addressing CWA 
jurisdiction, thus evading Commerce Clause restrictions on the scope of 
“navigable waters .” If so, that sleight of hand did not work . See Catskill 
Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 at *5 .
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so in the Agency Interpretation and the rulemaking, 
although it could not avoid discussing the theory in those 
documents .145 Indeed, it has recently proposed comprehen-
sive amendments to its definition of “waters of the United 
States” which make no mention of the theory .146 Why is 
EPA so disinclined to interpret “navigable waters” to reach 
the result it wants? Probably because the unitary navigable 
waters concept is counterintuitive and the Supreme Court 
has already seriously questioned the viability of the theory 
under the CWA .147 Instead, EPA seems to have promul-
gated a rule exempting water transfers from the §402 per-
mit program . But courts have long held that EPA does not 
have authority to exempt additions of pollutants to navi-
gable water from point sources from being in compliance 
with permits148 and EPA admits that,149 leaving EPA no 
alternative but to attempt an interpretation of “addition” 
to exclude water transfers . However, the plain meaning 
of “addition” simply does not suggest such an exemption . 
That ultimately leaves EPA with its “holistic” interpreta-
tion of the statute to establish that Congress did not mean 
§§301(a) and 502(12) to prohibit water transfers in the 
absence of a permit, suggesting in turn that “addition” in 
§§301(a) and 502(12) cannot include water transfers . EPA 
is playing a shell game, but at least it’s understandable why 
EPA is playing it . Of course, if EPA has to play shell games 
to keep water transfers from requiring permits, the whole 
enterprise is dubious .
The Agency Interpretation begins by outlining the 
importance and pervasiveness of water transfers . It states, 
for instance, that the U .S . Department of the Interior’s 
145 . EPA began each of the documents by describing the legal issue addressed as 
“whether the movement of pollutants from one navigable water to another 
navigable water by a water transfer is [an] addition” (emphasis added) or a 
variant of that phrase . This admits of multiple bodies of navigable water, 
not a unitary navigable water . See Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 
2; 71 Fed . Reg . 32887, 32889; and 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33699 . But EPA 
could not avoid describing and using its unitary navigable water theory . For 
instance, in the Agency Interpretation, it quoted from the amicus brief of 
the United States for the Supreme Court in Miccosukee, stating that the issue 
in that case was “whether the pumping of water increased the sum of pollut-
ants in the navigable waters as a whole, as opposed to the particular receiv-
ing water .” Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 13 . In the preamble 
to its final rule, EPA quoted at length from the U .S . brief in Friends of the 
Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist .: “Nothing is being added ‘to’ ‘the 
waters of the United States’ .  .  . by virtue of the water transfer, because the 
pollutant at issue is already part of the ‘waters of the United States’ to begin 
with .” See 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33701 (June 13, 2008) .
146 . Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 
Fed . Reg . 22188 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014) . EPA does note in the preamble 
that it proposes “no change to the regulatory status of water transfers .” Id. at 
22189 . See also id. at 22203, stating that jurisdictional waters may include 
“ditches that connect two or more ‘waters of the United States .’”
147 . Miccosukee, 541 U .S . 95, at 106-12 . EPA stated in its Agency Interpretation 
that it developed its “holistic” theory because of the Court’s “concerns” with 
the unitary navigable waters theory .
148 . These decisions go back to Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F .2d 
1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D .C . Cir . 1977), regarding EPA’s attempt to create 
regulatory exceptions to the CWA permit program in its first set of per-
mit issuance regulations . See also Northwest Envtl . Advocates v . U .S . EPA, 
537 F .2d 1006, 1021-22 (9th Cir . 2008); Northern Plains Res . Council v . 
Fidelity Exploration & Dev . Co ., 325 F .3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir . 2003); 
Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14 . See also dicta in Milwaukee 
v . Illinois, 451 U .S . 304, 318, 11 ELR 20406 (1981) (“Every point source 
discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit .”) .
149 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *14 .
Bureau of Reclamation alone furnishes water to 140,000 
western farmers through water transfers,150 implying that 
as many permits might be required and farmers would 
be adversely affected if transfers were considered addi-
tions . This largely is a bogus issue . Water diversions from 
navigable water for agricultural use do not require §402 
permits, because diversions take away from rather than 
add to navigable water .151 As for the return to navigable 
water of irrigation water after use, the statutory defini-
tion of “point source” excludes “agricultural stormwater 
discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture .”152 
This exclusion is reinforced by §402(l), prohibiting EPA 
from requiring permits for “return flows from irrigated 
agriculture .” The statutory exclusion and prohibition 
remove most transfers of western irrigation water from 
the requirement to obtain a §402 permit . Although EPA 
demonstrates the importance of water transfers to agri-
cultural and municipal water supply, particularly in the 
West, it assumes but does not demonstrate that §402 
thwarts water transfers . Indeed, EPA’s three documents 
do not cite a single case in which §402 has blocked a 
western water transfer . Ironically, if §402 does thwart 
water transfers, EPA’s water transfer rule, reaching only 
interbasin transfers, is less protective of transfers than 
the statutory exclusion that reaches both interbasin and 
intrabasin transfers of irrigation return flow . In any event, 
EPA’s implicit suggestion that states are completely auton-
omous in the development of water resources is largely 
rhetorical in that most sizable water resources projects are 
federally funded; those 140,000 western farmers get their 
water from Bureau of Reclamation water transfers, i .e ., 
from federally funded public works .153
Water transfers are primarily, although not entirely, 
western phenomena associated with irrigated agriculture 
and municipal water supply . Indeed, western water law is 
composed of highly developed state systems for allocat-
ing water use as a property right and approving transfers 
of water between water basins .154 Although there was 
some concern at the outset of the §402 program that 
150 . Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 3 . EPA used the same informa-
tion in the preambles to its proposed and final rule . See proposed rule, 71 
Fed . Reg . 32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); and final rule, 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 
33699 (June 13, 2008) . The U .S . Department of the Interior’s Bureau of 
Reclamation operates only in the West .
151 . Thus, for purposes of §401 state certifications, a diversion of water from a 
river is not a discharge requiring a certification, because diversions are the 
very opposite of discharges . See PUD No . 1 of Jefferson Cnty . v . Washington 
Dep’t of Energy, 511 U .S . 700, 776, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) (Thomas, J ., 
dissenting) . The majority did not disagree in that case, but held that §401 
certifications were required for federal activities, not federal discharges .
152 . Section 502(14) . See also §402(l)(1) . The exclusion appears to be more ap-
propriate from “pollutant” than from “point source,” since stormwater, like 
any water, is conveyed; it is not a conveyance .
153 . See Reagen, Water Transfer Rule, supra note 128 at 320-35 (describing how 
dependent western agriculture and municipal water supplies are on water 
transfers) . Like EPA, Reagen assumes that §402 permits would frustrate 
them, but does not demonstrate that §402 permits have frustrated them . 
Unlike EPA, he concludes that water transfers should be subject to §402 
permits and that general permits may alleviate much of the burden on water 
transfers of regulation under §402 .
154 . See generally A . Dan Tarlock et al ., Water Resource Management (5th 
ed . 2002) .
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its implementation would conflict with state water use 
allocation,155 such conflict has not proven to be of obvi-
ously great magnitude . None of the decisions interpret-
ing “addition” or “navigable water” in water transfers 
arose in a western state or a state adopting a western 
use allocation scheme . None of the decisions involved 
irrigated agriculture, probably because the exclusion of 
irrigation return flow resolves most potential conflict 
between the water quality and water quantity regimes . 
No reported federal decision involves an actual conflict 
between federal water quality requirements and state 
water use allocation . Neither the Agency Interpretation 
nor the preambles to the proposed or final rule identify 
any such conflicts . EPA’s elaborate water transfer policy 
construct is an incomplete cure for an undocumented 
and perhaps theoretical problem .
Although EPA stated in the Agency Interpretation that 
the precise legal issue was whether water transfers were 
“additions,”156 neither that document nor the preambles 
to the proposed or final rule defined “addition .” Indeed, 
EPA never discussed the meaning of “addition” in those 
documents, other than to reiterate its earlier description 
of “addition” being “from the outside world .”157 Although 
EPA mentioned §§301(a) and 502, it did not analyze their 
applicability to the issue . It relied on the precedent of Gor-
such and Consumers Power, although neither supports the 
Agency Interpretation or the rule and both have been dis-
credited as persuasive precedent .158 Nor did EPA note the 
Supreme Court’s rejection in Miccosukee of the first concept 
of EPA’s “outside world” theory of “addition .”
Instead, EPA engaged in what it termed a “holistic” 
analysis of the CWA to determine that Congress envi-
sioned water transfers to be regulated by an unidentified 
155 . See H .R . Rep . No . 94-418 (1976), available at https://bulk .resource .org/
gao .gov/92-500/00006DA6 .pdf . The Report to Congress of the National 
Commission on Water Quality, submitted March 22, 1976, made no men-
tion of conflicts between the CWA and state water resource management 
use allocation . Congress established the Commission in §315, 33 U .S .C . 
§1325, to study the implementation of the CWA and to suggest changes or 
“mid-course corrections .” The more than 800-page-long Staff Draft Report 
accompanying the Report to Congress devoted its last five pages to water re-
source management, noting that water quality and water quantity programs 
were not as yet “completely compatible,” but citing no conflicts between the 
CWA and a water transfer and making no recommendations to make the 
programs more compatible .
156 . Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 2 .
157 . Id. at 10 . Moreover, EPA did not acknowledge that the Supreme Court had 
rejected at least the first of the two components of EPA’s “outside world” 
gloss on “addition” in Miccosukee .
158 . Gorsuch and Consumers Power dealt with intrabasin transfers, while the 
Agency Interpretation and rule deal with interbasin transfers and specifi-
cally exclude intrabasin transfers . Neither dams nor pump storage projects 
come within the rule for the same reason . Consumers Power is also outside 
the scope of the water transfer rule because the hydropower generation in 
that case was an industrial use of water that occurred between the diversion 
of the water from the lake and the return of the water to the lake, an inter-
vening industrial use the rule excludes from the exemption . The Second and 
Eleventh Circuits both rejected Gorsuch as precedent because it gave Chev-
ron strength deference to EPA’s “outside world” interpretation of “addition” 
when no such deference was due under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U .S . 218 (2001), insofar as it did not take place in a rulemaking or other 
formal regulatory activity . See Catskill I, 273 F .3d at 491; Miccosukee, 280 
F .3d at 1367-68 (11th Cir . 2002) .
federal or state authority other than §402 .159 Although EPA 
did not interpret the meaning of “navigable waters,”160 the 
only way that pollutants in navigable donor water could 
not be added to other navigable receiving water would be 
if all navigable waters are one, the unitary navigable water 
theory . The Agency Interpretation and preambles men-
tion this, but EPA did not explicitly adopt it or incorpo-
rate it into the definition of either “addition” or “navigable 
waters .” Indeed, EPA did not discuss the meaning of navi-
gable water in the Agency Interpretation, the rule, or the 
preambles . Moreover, EPA recently proposed a compre-
hensive amendment to its regulatory definition of “waters 
of the United States,” without a hint that the definition 
adopted the unitary waters theory .161 No wonder that the 
Southern District of New York in Catskill Mountains had 
great difficulty determining exactly which CWA terms 
EPA claimed Chevron deference for interpreting .162
EPA’s self-described “holistic” approach is to interpret 
particular parts of the CWA’s text, i .e ., “addition,” in the 
context of the entire statutory structure to avoid absurd 
results .163 EPA concludes that the CWA, interpreted as a 
whole, strikes a grand balance between federal water pollu-
tion control and state water use allocation . Looking at the 
entire statute, EPA observes that the CWA has several pro-
grams to control pollution other than the §402 permit pro-
gram, most notably the state-administered nonpoint source 
program .164 It admits that the CWA contains no provision 
specifically stating the §402 program covers or does not 
cover water transfers . But it contends that §§101(b), 101(g), 
304(f), and 510(2), taken together, establish a grand bal-
ance between federally directed water pollution control 
and state-controlled water use allocation, including state 
supervision of water transfers .165 EPA concludes that inter-
preting “addition” not to incorporate water transfers is con-
sistent with this understanding .166
Interpreting a long and complex statute such as the 
CWA as a seamless whole rather than a disjointed jumble 
of sections is a positive goal167 and one for which EPA is 
uniquely qualified . Despite EPA’s claim that its interpreta-
tion of “addition” to exclude water transfers is “holistic,” 
EPA fails to establish it . First, neither the sections EPA 
159 . Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 4-8 . See also Proposed Rule, 71 
Fed . Reg . 32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); Final Rule, 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 
33701 (June 13, 2008) .
160 . Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 18 n .19 .
161 . Definition of “Waters of the United States,” supra note 146, 79 Fed . Reg . 
22199 (proposed Apr . 12, 2014) .
162 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **14-15 .
163 . Although the Agency Interpretation and the preambles to both the pro-
posed final rules cited the interpretive canon of avoiding absurd results, 
none of them gave examples of absurd results from requiring water transfers 
to obtain §402 permits . The Agency Interpretation quotes Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Muszynski, 268 F .3d 91, 98, 32 ELR 20203 (2d Cir . 2001), to 
the effect that the most helpful canons in interpreting the CWA are the 
whole-statute canon and the avoid-absurd-results canon . The preambles to 
the proposed and final Water Transfer Rule repeat this . See 71 Fed . Reg . 
32887, 32889 (June 7, 2006); 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33701 (June 13, 2008) .
164 . Agency Interpretation, supra note 131, at 5 .
165 . Id . at 5-7 .
166 . Id . at 9 .
167 . See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324 (interpret a statutory section “by refer-
ence to the whole act”); Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 167-70.
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cited, the remainder of the statute, nor its legislative his-
tory explicitly establish any grand congressional design to 
strike a balance between water quality and water quan-
tity . Second, the four statutory provisions on which EPA 
bases its interpretation provide, at best, ambiguous support 
for the meanings EPA thrusts upon them . Third, while 
EPA focuses on the three subsections and one paragraph 
of the CWA,168 it ignores the remainder of the 200-page 
statute, consisting of over 500 subsections and over 800 
paragraphs, most of which are unambiguously focused on 
promoting pollution control . Section 301, the locus of the 
basic prohibition against the “discharge of any pollutant” 
without a permit, alone has 16 subsections and 40 para-
graphs . Claiming to interpret the statute as a whole to favor 
state regulation of water transfers without regard to federal 
concerns for water quality, based on weighing three short 
and ambiguous subsections against over 500 subsections 
and one short and ambiguous paragraph against over 800 
paragraphs,169 does not establish a “holistic” view of the 
statute . Finally, not only does EPA’s “holistic” interpreta-
tion ignore virtually all of the statute, it is in derogation 
of one-half of the regulatory strategies and programs of 
the statute: water quality standards, one of the CWA’s two 
grand strategies for pollution control, and §404, one of the 
CWA’s two permit programs for assuring water quality .
The initial sentence in the first of EPA’s four relied-upon 
statutory provisions, §101(b), recites congressional policy 
“to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsi-
bilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and elimi-
nate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and 
water resources   .   .   .   .” This subsection does not mention 
water transfers or the state allocation of rights to use water . 
It certainly does not state that water quantity trumps water 
quality . EPA may argue that it refers to western water rights 
when it speaks of “the primary responsibilities and rights 
of States  .  .  . to plan the  .  .  . use of  .  .  . water resources,” 
(emphasis added) for western water rights are allocated 
by states for public and private use . But “to plan” is more 
consistent with reference to the states’ roles in designating 
uses as the initial step in establishing water quality stan-
dards under §303(c) . The “to plan” in §101(b) also corre-
sponds with the §303(3) requirement that states establish a 
“continuing planning process” to assure that water quality 
standards are attained and maintained . Allocation of water 
rights requires authority well beyond planning, especially 
when most water rights are based on a first-come first-use 
basis,170 the very antithesis of planning .
The conclusion that the first sentence of the subsection 
refers to the state role in establishing water quality stan-
dards is supported by the remainder of the subsection, 
168 . Provisions denoted by a lower-case letter are subsections and those denoted 
by an Arabic number are paragraphs . Thus, §§101(b) & (g) are subsections, 
while §510(2) is a paragraph (although paragraphs are normally indented 
and that was not done in §510) .
169 . Since subsections incorporate the paragraphs, it may be simpler to refer to 
four out of 525 subsections .
170 . See Tarlock, supra note 154, at 154-58 .
which deals with federal and state roles in implementing 
other portions of the CWA, its grant program for con-
struction of publically owned treatment works, the §402 
and §404 permit programs, and federal research, techni-
cal assistance, and financial aid programs for state, local, 
and interstate agencies . This strongly suggests that the first 
sentence also speaks to federal and state roles in a CWA 
program, the water quality standards program, rather than 
to ordering CWA goals and goals external to the CWA, 
because none of the remainder of the subsection deals with 
ordering CWA goals and external goals .
The second of the CWA subsections on which EPA 
relies for its interpretation, §101(g), is the only one that 
unambiguously deals with the intersection of water qual-
ity and water quantity . It states congressional policy “that 
the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water 
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated 
or otherwise impaired by this chapter .” The subsection was 
added to the CWA in a 1977 Amendment, cosponsored 
by Sen . Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo .) and Sen . Gary Hart 
(D-Colo .), both representing western water-rights states .171 
The amendment, however, does not mention water trans-
fers or hint that water quality regulation is subordinate to 
water transfers, nor does its legislative history . Although 
water transfers may be inherent in water use allocation,172 
the initial diversion of water for an allocated use is not 
regulated by §402 . Water diversions add nothing to navi-
gable water; they only subtract from it . Once allocated 
and diverted, water is used, most commonly in irrigated 
agriculture, after which use it is eventually returned to a 
navigable water, often to a different water body than it was 
diverted from . When the diverted water is returned, now 
polluted, to the same navigable water body or to another 
navigable water body, the question arises whether a §402 
permit is required . Because §502(14) excludes “return 
flows from irrigated agriculture” from the definition of 
“point source,”173 no §402 permit is required in most cases 
for the return of water from agricultural diversions . This 
is reinforced by §402(l), which forbids EPA from requir-
ing a permit for irrigation return flow . Significantly, the 
CWA 1977 Amendments added all three of these provi-
sions, §§101(g), 402(l), and 502(14) . There is no evidence 
that Congress intended §101(g) to limit the reach of the 
§402 program, but if Congress did so intend, it defined 
171 . Although §101(g) was enacted five years after the 1972 CWA, amend-
ments are to be read harmoniously with the rest of the statute, as if they 
were part of the original statute . See Norman J . Singer & J .D . Shambie 
Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Interpretation [hereinafter 
Sutherland] §22:34 & 35; Eskridge, supra note 15, at 325, citing Brown 
v . Yuckert, 482 U .S . 137, 149-51 (1987); Sullivan v . Finkelstein, 496 U .S . 
617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J ., concurring in part) .
172 . Under western water law, diversion of water from a natural water body is a 
hallmark of appropriation . Once diverted and used, it may be returned to 
the same or a different water body . See generally Tarlock, supra note 154, 
ch . 5 .
173 . It may have been more straightforward for Congress to have placed this 
exclusion in the definition of “pollutant” rather than in the definition of 
“point source .” All of the examples of point sources given in the definition of 
point source are of conveyances of water rather than of types of water . Nev-
ertheless, the intent of Congress not to regulate these agricultural discharges 
is clear .
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that limit in §§402(l) and 502(14), removing only irriga-
tion return flows from the permit program .
The Conference Report for the 1977 Amendments 
emphasizes that §101(g) “is not intended to change exist-
ing law,”174 an intention repeated by Senator Wallop during 
U .S . Senate debates .175 Indeed, Senator Wallop acknowl-
edged in his floor statements that water quality, §402 
and §404 permits, and other measures under the CWA 
may legitimately and necessarily “have some effect on the 
method of water usage  .   .   . and incidentally affect indi-
vidual water rights .”176 He stated that the purpose of the 
amendment was to assure that effects on western water 
rights “if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary 
water quality considerations .”177 Reflecting all of this, the 
Supreme Court held in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. 
Washington Dep’t of Ecology that §§101(g) and 510(2) “do 
not limit the scope of water pollution controls that may be 
imposed on users who have obtained, pursuant to state law, 
a water allocation .”178
The third of EPA’s relied-upon subsections, §304(f), 
directs the Agency to issue guidelines to identify pollu-
tion from and pollution control techniques for a number of 
sources, such as “changes in the movement, flow, or circu-
lation of any navigable waters or ground waters, including 
changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, chan-
nels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.”179 EPA argues 
that the listing of these structures in a subsection regard-
ing “non-point sources” implies that dams, levees, chan-
nels, causeways, and flow diversions are nonpoint sources 
rather than point sources subject to the §402 permit 
program . This argument ignores the definition of “point 
source,” that specifically includes channels and ditches,180 
and that EPA admits that dams may be point sources .181 
While “flow diversions” are not on the list of examples of 
point sources, once waters are diverted for use in irrigation, 
they are transferred for that use in ditches, and “ditch” 
is listed in §502(14) as a point source . Thus, when chan-
nels and ditches discharge agricultural wastes, they are 
point sources, not nonpoint sources, although they may 
be exempt from permitting under §§402(l) and 502(14) if 
174 . Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Comm ., reprinted in 3 Leg-
islative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 [hereinafter Legis . 
Hist .], Comm . Print of the S . Comm . on Env’t and Pub . Works, at 186, 
234 & 236 .
175 . “It is not intended to change present law,” which is already established by 
§510(b) . 3 Legis . Hist . 531 .
176 . Id . at 532 .
177 . Id . Senator Wallop was concerned that western water rights might be in-
terfered with by persons using water pollution control measures to achieve 
other purposes . He indicated his concern was raised by the then-recent Op-
tion Papers for the Water Resource Policy study being conducted by the 
Water Resource Policy Council, raising options for using federal water pol-
lution control law to achieve “Federal purposes that were not strictly related 
to water quality .” Id . at 531 .
178 . 511 U .S . 700, 720, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) .
179 . §304(f )(F) (emphasis added) .
180 . Section 502(14), 33 U .S .C . §1362(14) . Of course, flow diversions are nei-
ther point nor nonpoint sources of pollution because they divert from rather 
than add to navigable waters .
181 . EPA admitted in Gorsuch that under some circumstances dams are point 
sources, even though they are not on the statutory list of examples . See 693 
F .2d at 165 .
they contain only irrigation return flow . “Well” may also 
be inferred to be a nonpoint source by being listed else-
where in §304(f), but is on the statutory list of examples of 
“point source,” an unnecessary exclusion unless wells are 
otherwise point sources .182 The Supreme Court in Miccosu-
kee commented that §304(f) does not mean water transfers 
are exclusively nonpoint pollution or are exempted from 
§402 when they are point sources,183 and EPA admitted 
that in its Agency Interpretation .184
Note also that §304(f)(F) deals only with “changes in 
the movement, flow, or circulation” of navigable waters” 
 .  .  . “by the construction” of the listed facilities, not by their 
operation . This wording suggests that for listed facilities 
that are point sources, the concern in §304(f) is not their 
ultimate discharge into receiving waters, but the effects of 
their location, design, and construction on donor waters . 
Although the flow-diversion portion of water transfer 
facilities are not regulated by §402, because flow diversions 
subtract from navigable water rather than adding to it,185 
the location, design, and construction of those facilities 
may raise water quality issues .
Although EPA does not emphasize it, §208(b)(2)(F) 
complements §§304(f)(F), 402(l), and 502(14) by requir-
ing states to identify and provide plans to control pollution 
from agricultural nonpoint sources, including irrigation 
return flow . Significantly, §§101(g), 208(b)(2)(F), and 
402(l), and the exemption for agricultural stormwater and 
irrigation return flows in §502(14), were all added to the 
CWA in the same set of amendments in 1977, and all origi-
nated in the Senate bill .186 The Senate Committee Report 
stated that the effect of the amendments “is to exempt 
irrigation return flows from all permit requirements” and 
made no mention of water diversions or western water 
rights .187 Similar comments were made in reporting the 
Conference Committee Report to the U .S . House of Rep-
resentatives .188 Indeed, all but §101(g) were “in recognition 
of a specific recommendation of the National Commis-
sion of Water Quality .”189 The Commission noted that “[w]
182 . Compare §304(f )(D), 33 U .S .C . §1314(f )(D), with §502(14), 33 U .S .C . 
§1362(14) .
183 . Miccosukee, 541 U .S . at 106 .
184 . Interpretive Memorandum, supra note 131, at 6 .
185 . Section 316(b) requires best available technology for cooling water intake 
structures associated with point sources, to minimize negative environmen-
tal impact .
186 . H .R . Rep . No . 95-830, at §§5(a), 33(a)-(c) (1977); Joint Explanatory State-
ment of the Conference Comm ., at 50, 52 & 69, reprinted in 3 Legis . 
Hist ., at 186, 197, 234, 236 & 253 .
187 . S . Rep . No . 95-370, at 35 (1977) (Clean Water Act of 1977), reprinted in 4 
Legis . Hist . 633, 668 .
188 . The “conference report exempts return flows from irrigated agriculture from 
all permit requirements  .  .  . and recognizes that this activity is not a point 
source,” with no mention of water transfers or western water rights . See 
Statement on the House floor by Rep . Roberts, Chairman, H . Comm . on 
Pub . Works and Transp ., authorizing committee for the 1977 Clean Water 
Act Amendments, Dec . 17, 1977, reprinted in 3 Legis . Hist . at 318 .
189 . 3 Legis . Hist . at 318. When Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, it estab-
lished a National Commission to study the implementation of the statute 
and report its recommendations to Congress . The National Commission on 
Water Quality submitted its Report to Congress on March 22, 1976, with 
recommendations for “mid-course” corrections for the statute . See H .R . 
Rep . No . 94-418 (1976) .
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hile there is little doubt that Congress defined irrigation 
return flows as point sources” in 1972, controlling them 
through the §402 permit program “has proved difficult .”190 
The Commission recognized, however, that pollution from 
irrigation return flow was an important cause of degrada-
tion in the nation’s waters and concluded it should not 
be exempted from coverage by the statute . Instead, the 
Commission recommended that irrigation return flow be 
addressed by more-flexible regulatory measures at the state 
level .191 At the same time, the Commission did not iden-
tify a conflict between the §402 permit program and water 
transfers or western water rights as the root of the irrigation 
return flow problem . Indeed, the Commission Report did 
not mention water transfers or western water rights .192 If 
Congress perceived that §402 interfered with water trans-
fers, it did so in the context of irrigated agriculture, and 
it dealt with that issue completely in 1977 by adding lan-
guage in §§208(b)(2)(F), 304(f)(F), 402(l), and 502(14) .
The final provision supporting EPA’s “holistic” analysis, 
§510(2), provides that nothing in the CWA shall “be con-
strued as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters  .  .  . of 
such states .” This preemption preclusion provision should 
be read in conjunction with §510(1), which provides that 
the CWA does not preclude a state from adopting or enforc-
ing a limitation on discharges of pollutants or a require-
ment respecting water pollution control, except that a state 
cannot adopt or enforce such a limitation or requirement 
less-stringent than a federal requirement under the CWA . 
This section does not mention water transfers and does not 
hint that regulation of water quality is in any way subor-
dinate to allocation of water use . The first part of the sec-
tion suggests it is limited to federal and state roles in water 
pollution control . The Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 held 
that “[s]ections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of 
each State to allocate water quantity as between users; they 
do not limit the scope of water pollution controls  .  .  .  .”193 
Finally, as noted by the Southern District of New York 
in Catskill Mountains, the protection of state rights and 
jurisdiction in §510 applies “[e]xcept as expressly provided 
in this chapter .” “Because this language does not address 
what other provisions of the Act ‘expressly’ provide[ ],” this 
provision has little bearing on the interpretation of those 
190 . 3 Legis . Hist . at 40 . The difficulty resulted from differences in geogra-
phy, climate, agricultural method, and drainage, and water application 
methods made it impossible to develop uniform national technology-
based standards .
191 . National Commission on Water Quality, Report to Congress, 40-1 (Mar . 
22, 1976) . The Staff Draft Report issued November 1975 elaborated on 
this . See 3 Legis . Hist . at I-51 to I-54 .
192 . National Commission on Water Quality, supra note 191 . Staff Draft Re-
port at VI-54 to VI-55 . The Commission staff did discuss the relation-
ship between water quality control and water use allocation . The staff saw 
the two as complementary in part, because water resources are diminished 
when they are too polluted to be available for successive use . At the same 
time, the staff commented that water quality and water quantity concerns 
were not yet “completely compatible,” but made no recommendations to 
make them so . The Commission itself did not note any incompatibility 
between water quality and water quantity and made no recommendations 
to reconcile any incompatibility .
193 . 511 U .S . 700, 720, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) .
other provisions—i .e ., §§301(a) and 502(12) .194 In other 
words, the preemption preclusion applies only when the 
statute is silent .
The three subsections and one paragraph analyzed 
above simply do not support EPA’s assertions that Congress 
intended a grand balance in the CWA between federal 
water quality control and water use allocation; that Con-
gress intended water transfers to be exempt from the §402 
permit program; or that Congress intended water transfers 
not to be “additions” in the CWA . None of the four provi-
sions mention water transfers . The Supreme Court has held 
that three of them do not so limit the CWA . The legisla-
tive sponsor of §101(g), which speaks the most directly of 
any of the four provisions to water resource management, 
agreed on the Senate floor that water allocation may be 
subordinate to water quality control . To interpret §301(a), 
the central prohibition of the statute, to exclude a major 
category of discharges, such as water transfers, based on 
four ambiguous, minor provisions out of hundreds of pro-
visions in the statute would require that the provisions 
unambiguously establish the exclusion . They do not .
As the Supreme Court suggested in Miccosukee, EPA’s 
interpretation of “addition” and its unitary navigable water 
theory are also inconsistent with one of the CWA’s two 
grand strategies for controlling water pollution . Before the 
enactment of the CWA in 1972, water quality standards 
were the only strategy employed for that purpose .195 With 
the enactment of the CWA’s technology-based standards 
requirements in 1972, water quality standards temporar-
ily took a secondary, fallback role in pollution control, 
but resurfaced as the potential driver for further pollution 
reduction after pollution sources achieved technologically 
achievable pollution reduction .196 Water quality standards 
and their implementation are a multistage process with 
interplay between EPA and states that Congress estab-
lished in detail . In the first step, states designate the desired 
uses to be made of different navigable waters within their 
borders,197 such uses as body contact sports, cold water 
fisheries, and drinking water without treatment . In the 
next step, states designate the maximum concentrations 
of various pollutants, known as criteria, compatible with 
the designated uses of the water bodies . Designating uses 
is a political decision, designating criteria is a scientific 
decision . EPA must approve a state’s designated uses and 
194 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *23 .
195 . See Frank F . Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §3 .03 .
196 . See generally Oliver A . Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: 
Law, Policy, and Implementation (2d ed . 2002) . It may seem impossible 
that water pollution could be treated beyond the best technology achievable 
to meet water quality standards . But while the CWA specifies cost criteria 
to be considered in promulgating technology-based standards, it does not 
specify them in establishing water quality standards . Compare §304 (a)(&)
(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), and (4)(B), 33 U .S .C . §1314(a) & (b)(1)(B), (2)(B), and 
(4)(B) . Thus, cost constraints may limit technology-based standards, while 
more expensive means of controlling pollution may be necessary and re-
quired to achieve water quality standards .
197 . Section 303(c)(2); 40 C .F .R . §131 .2; see also 40 C .F .R . §130 .2 . Accord-
ing to EPA’s regulations, a “water quality standard defines the water quality 
goals of a water body, or portion thereof, by designating the use or uses to 
be made of the water  .  .  . establishing the water quality goals for a specific 
water body .”
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supporting criteria, but EPA’s role is much greater with cri-
teria .198 If a state does not adopt an approvable water qual-
ity standards program, EPA must do so .199
Once these uses and criteria are in place, effluent limita-
tions for individual §402 permits affecting specific water 
bodies or segments are calculated to achieve the more strin-
gent of state established water quality criteria or EPA-pro-
mulgated technology-based standards .200 This inherently 
requires examining navigable waters as individual water 
bodies and separate segments of individual water bodies, 
rather than as a unitary whole body of navigable water . 
Section 302(a) restates this explicitly for more-protective 
water quality uses: If application of effluent limitations in a 
permit based on technology-based standards would “inter-
fere” with the “attainment or maintenance of that water 
quality in a specific portion of the navigable water  .  .  . efflu-
ent limitations  .  .  . for such point source or sources shall be 
established which can reasonably be expected to contribute 
to the attainment or maintenance of such water quality .”201 
The CWA also requires states to develop a list of “those 
waters within the State” that will not achieve water quality 
standards and “for each segment of the navigable waters”; a 
list of point sources preventing achievement of water qual-
ity standards for toxic pollutants; and control strategies for 
those point sources to achieve the standards .202 Section 
319 complements this by requiring states to identify “those 
navigable waters within the State, which” cannot attain 
water quality standards without controlling nonpoint 
sources and to identify “particular nonpoint sources which 
add significant pollution to each portion of the” identified 
navigable waters .203 In developing nonpoint source con-
trol management plans under §319, states are to “develop 
and implement [them]  .   .   . on a watershed-by-watershed 
basis .”204 EPA’s implementing regulations have states sub-
mitting lists of “water quality limited segments,”205 “the 
water quality of all waters of the United States” and “waters 
needing action,”206 “those waters within the State” and “all 
navigable waters in such State” not meeting water quality 
standards,” “each segment of navigable waters included on 
such list,” and “a water” meeting a condition .207
One aspect of water quality standards merits special 
mention, for it overlays this entire pattern . EPA’s regula-
tions require states to establish antidegradation programs 
198 . Use designation is a political decision, having nothing to do with science . 
Establishing criteria, however, requires a scientific judgment of the concen-
tration of particular pollutants that will or will not interfere with a chosen 
use . EPA has established detailed scientific guidance on criteria and requires 
states to follow that guidance or demonstrate that other criteria are appro-
priate using scientifically defensible methods . 131 C .F .R . §131 .11 . By con-
trast, EPA is wholly responsible for establishing technology-based standards . 
§§301(b), 304, and 306 .
199 . Section 303(b), (c)(4) .
200 . Sections 301(b), 302(b); 33 U .S .C . §§1311(b), 1312(b) .
201 . Section 302(a); 33 U .S .C . §1312(a) (emphasis added) .
202 . Section 304(l)(1), 33 U .S .C . §1314(l) . See also EPA’s implementing regula-
tions, 40 C .F .R . Parts 130 & 131 .
203 . Section 319(a)(1)(A) & (B), 33 U .S .C . §1329(a)(1)(A) & (B) .
204 . Section 319(b)(4), 33 U .S .C . §1329(b)(4) .
205 . 40 C .F .R . §131 .7 .
206 . 40 C .F .R . §130 .8 .
207 . 40 C .F .R . §130 .10(d) .
for waters that have achieved the criteria established for 
their designated uses .208 This requirement helps ensure that 
pristine waters remain pristine . That is wholly antithetical 
to transferring a polluted water into a pristine water .
Water quality standards are established, and achieve-
ment of them is accomplished river by river, stream by 
stream, lake by lake, water segment by water segment, 
reflecting local conditions, local uses, and local goals . The 
standards result in effluent limitations for particular point 
sources to meet particular local water quality goals . Con-
sidering all navigable waters as one does not conform to or 
accomplish this strategy on a conceptual basis, much less 
on a point source-specific basis . How does a state compile 
a list of waters meeting specific and different conditions 
if all waters are one? If all navigable waters are one, they 
would have the same designated use and be subject to the 
same criteria . Perhaps, EPA considers navigable waters as 
one just for the purposes of defining addition, but mul-
tiple waters for other purposes . That would be an odd con-
cept, perhaps unworkable, and contrary to the canon of 
construction that words are to be interpreted identically 
throughout a statute .209 It is also contrary to the CWA’s 
definition section, which provides that the definitions it 
provides apply throughout the statute “[e]xcept as other-
wise specifically provided .”210
The Supreme Court in Miccosukee commented on the 
inconsistency between the unitary navigable waters theory 
and water quality standards .211 EPA ignored the Court’s 
comment and did not respond to it either in the Agency 
Interpretation or in the preambles to its proposed and 
final rule . Indeed, in the preamble to the final rule, when 
responding to public comments that the water transfer 
rule was inconsistent and would interfere with water qual-
ity standards, EPA only addressed the concern as it related 
to water impoundments for settling sediments in mining 
wastes, merely replying that the rule “does not affect the 
permitting of such facilities”212 and that states can estab-
lish their own water quality standards if they wish to .213 Its 
assurance was wholly unresponsive to the broader question 
of the compatibility of the rule and the theory with water 
quality standards under the CWA .
EPA’s “outside world” and unitary navigable water theo-
ries also create significant inconsistencies with the §404 
program . In a typical §404 wetlands landclearing case, 
soil and vegetation are moved from one area to another 
208 . 40 C .F .R . §131 .12 . See also §304(d)(4)(B), 33 U .S .C . §1324(d)(4)(B) . Al-
though the 1972 version of the CWA did not mention the antidegradation 
policy, water quality standards existing at that time contained such provi-
sions and §303(a) continued them in force . When Congress amended §303 
in 1987, it included a reference to the antidegradation policy in §303(d)(4)
(B) . The Court discusses the history of the antidegradation policy in PUD 
No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U .S . 700, 
718, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) .
209 . Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324, citing Sullivan v . Stroop, 496 U .S . 478, 83 
(1990); United Sav . Ass’n of Tex . v . Timbers of Inwood Forest Assts, Lt ., 484 
U .S . 335 (1998) . See also Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 170-73 .
210 . Section 502, 33 U .S .C . §1362 .
211 . 541 U .S . at 107 .
212 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33703; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *35 .
213 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33705; Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at *35 .
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area in the same wetland to convert it to a dry and level 
field for agricultural or other use .214 If the unitary navi-
gable water theory is applied to such landclearing, there is 
no addition, because the material redeposited in the wet-
land was already in the waters of the United States (the 
wetland) and therefore could not be added to the waters 
of the United States (another part of the same wetland) . 
Responding to comments on this, EPA attempted to avoid 
the issue in the preamble to the final transfer rule by point-
ing out that the definition of “pollutant” includes “dredged 
spoil,” which by definition comes from water . EPA believes 
this makes it clear that Congress “explicitly forbade dis-
charges of dredged material” except in compliance with 
a §404 permit, emphasizing that “dredged material” is a 
“pollutant .”215 Therefore, EPA believed the rule “would not 
have an effect on the 404 program .”216
The expected origin of dredged spoil pollutants in navi-
gable water, however, only addresses the issue of whether 
dredged spoil is a “pollutant .” But an activity does not 
violate §301(a) because it satisfies one of the four elements 
of the offense (“pollutant”); it must meet all four elements, 
including “addition” and “navigable waters .”217 Under 
both EPA’s “outside world” and “unitary navigable water” 
glosses on “addition” and “navigable waters,” the dredged 
spoil does not come from a world or a water outside the 
wetland or the unitary navigable water . Unless “addition” 
and “navigable water” have different meanings for §402 
and for §404, many activities currently regulated under 
§404 are not subject to §404 jurisdiction under EPA’s 
interpretations because the waters from which fill mate-
rial is taken and the waters to which it is redeposited are 
one and the same . But, again, words are to be read con-
sistently throughout the statute under both cannons of 
statutory construction and the wording of §502 .218 The 
interpretation of “addition” in §404 cases is discussed in 
more detail below .
The Agency Interpretation and the preamble to the pro-
posed rule view the CWA as constructing a grand balance 
between state powers to allocate water use and federal pow-
ers to protect water quality . Perhaps, perceiving the weak-
ness of this grand balance approach, discussed above, the 
preamble to the final rule more modestly relies on the same 
three subsections and one paragraph simply to establish 
congressional intent that water transfers not be regulated 
214 . Avoyelles Fishermen’s League, Inc . v . Marsh, 715 F .2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 
(5th Cir . 1983) .
215 . 73 Fed . Reg . at 33703 .
216 . Id.
217 . See, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc . v . U .S . EPA, 399 F .3d 486 (2d Cir . 
2005) (rejecting challenge to EPA regulation extending §402 permit re-
quirements to concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) making no 
additions to navigable water, even though CAFOs are statutorily defined as 
point sources); Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, 2011 WL 61882 
(W .D . Wash . 2011) (unpermitted CAFO not discharging pollutants to 
navigable water does not violate the statute); Nelson Faria Dairy, Inc ., Hig-
bee v . Starr, 598 F . Supp . 323 (E .D . Ark . 1984), aff’d without opinion, 782 
F .2d 1045 (8th Cir . 1985); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc . v . Hudson, 2012 WL 
6651930, 43 ELR 20010 (D . Md . Dec . 20, 2012) (unpermitted CAFO not 
discharging pollutants to navigable water does not violate the statute) .
218 . Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324; Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 
170-73 .
under §402, because application of §402 to water transfers 
would interfere with or subvert state water use allocation, 
which the CWA preserves . However, the four provisions, 
whether individually or collectively, do not support even 
this more modest argument, as discussed above . Moreover, 
the Agency Interpretation and the preambles never explain 
how subjecting water transfers to §402 jurisdiction has 
interfered or will interfere with or subvert state water use 
allocation . If such interference or subversion is real, surely 
EPA would be aware of examples of it during the 40-year 
history of the §402 program . But the legislative history 
of §101(g), added in 1977 and addressing this issue more 
directly than any other subsection in this statute, men-
tioned no examples of such interference or subversion . Nor 
does EPA mention any examples of such interference or 
subversion in its Agency Interpretation or the preambles to 
its proposed and final rules .
Because use of such examples could only strengthen 
EPA’s justification for the transfer rule, EPA’s failure to 
mention water transfers negatively impacted by §402 
infers such negative impacts are few and far between, if 
they exist at all . The lack of relevant case law also sug-
gests water transfers negatively impacted by §402 are not 
numerous or are not severely impacted . The only examples 
of water transfers challenged for not having §402 permits 
are in Florida, New Hampshire, and New York, states 
with no western water-law allocation schemes . Indeed, in 
none of those decisions is there a hint that the water diver-
sion in question was part of a state water use allocation 
scheme . Moreover, despite New York City’s allegations in 
Catskill I and II that the application of §402 would cripple 
the city’s water supply, presumably by requiring expensive 
treatment of the polluted water before its transfer, the Sec-
ond Circuit noted that there was considerable flexibility 
on how the CWA’s requirement could be met under the 
circumstances .219 Indeed, if the holding in Catskill II has 
crippled the city’s ability to supply water to its citizens, 
that inability has been a well-kept secret in the dozen years 
following the decision . Not only did EPA fail to describe 
the extent of economic harm occasioned by the lack of 
the rule, it failed to describe the extent of environmental 
harm that would be caused by the rule . What sort of a 
reasoned balance is that?
c. Post-Interpretive Memorandum and 
Water Transfer Rule Decisions
In Catskill I, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court to proceed with the remedy phase . Appeal-
ing from the district court’s decision on remand, New 
York City asked the Second Circuit to reconsider Catskill 
I in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miccosukee 
and EPA’s 2005 Agency Interpretation . In Catskill Moun-
219 . Catskill II, 451 F .3d 77, 85 . The best available technology for preventing 
sediments in the transferred water, for instance, might be locating intake 
structures at different points in the reservoir, enabling the waters withdrawn 
to be taken from the location the least burdened by sediments at the time .
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tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York 
(Catskill II),220 the Second Circuit held that the Supreme 
Court’s Miccosukee decision confirmed rather than ques-
tioned Catskill I, in particular the Second Circuit’s distinc-
tion between interbasin (Gorsuch and Consumers Power) 
and intrabasin (Dubois and Catskill I) transfers . Indeed, as 
discussed below, the Miccosukee Court had even adopted 
the Second Circuit’s “soup ladle” analogy designed to illus-
trate the differences between such transfers . The Second 
Circuit then considered EPA’s new Agency Interpretation, 
looking at its “power to persuade” rather than giving it 
Chevron deference .221 It found nothing in the document 
that the city had not raised, albeit in a less-detailed way, in 
Catskill I. The Second Circuit concluded:
In the end,  .  .  . these “holistic” arguments about the allo-
cation of state and federal rights, said to be rooted in the 
structure of the statute, simply overlook its plain lan-
guage  .  .  .  . It is the meaning of the word “addition” upon 
which the outcome of Catskill I turned and which has 
not changed, despite the City’s attempts to shift attention 
away from the text of the CWA to its context .222
Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly employ 
the two-step Chevron deference test to EPA’s water transfer 
rule, it left no doubt how it would have decided the case 
under Chevron. With regard to the first step, whether the 
statute is ambiguous, the court in Catskill I held the stat-
ute’s plain meaning was clear .223 With regard to the second 
step, whether the Agency’s interpretation was reasonable, 
the court held “[n]o one can reasonably argue that the 
water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the 
‘same’” and that such a conclusion led to absurd results .224
After Catskill II, EPA promulgated its water transfer rule 
and multiple parties filed petitions for judicial review in 
several federal courts of appeal and in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York . The appeals court petitions were con-
solidated in the Eleventh Circuit . At the time, the Eleventh 
Circuit already had an appeal before it, from a citizen suit 
in which the validity of the rule was an issue . The Eleventh 
Circuit stayed the consolidated petition for judicial review 
until it decided that appeal in Friends of the Everglades v. 
South Florida Water Management District,225 reexamining 
its earlier rejection of the unitary navigable water theory.226 
It initially noted that all existing court of appeals prece-
dents had rejected the theory,227 but that none had consid-
ered EPA’s new regulation, which was entitled to Chevron 
220 . Catskill II, 451 F .3d 77 (2d Cir . 2006) .
221 . Catskill II, 451 F .3d . at 82, citing United States v . Mead Corp, 533 U .S . 
218, 235 (2001), and Chevron U .S .A ., Inc . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, 
467 U .S . 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984) . Under Mead, Chevron deference is 
due only to agency interpretations developed in rulemaking or other formal 
administrative procedure .
222 . Catskill II, 451 F .3d at 82 .
223 . Catskill I, 273 F .3d at 492 & 94 .
224 . Id. at 492 .
225 . 570 F .3d 1210 (11th Cir . 2009) .
226 . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla . v . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 280 
F .3d 1364 (11th Cir . 2002) .
227 . Friends of the Everglades v . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 570 F .3d 1210, 
1218 (11th Cir . 2009) .
deference .228 The court then undertook the familiar two-
step Chevron analysis: (1)  is the statute ambiguous; and 
(2) if so, is the agency’s interpretation a reasonable one?
As to ambiguity, the Eleventh Circuit found that prec-
edents either did not involve interbasin transfers, Gorsuch 
and Consumers Power, or did not consider whether the 
statute was ambiguous, Catskill I & II and its Miccosukee 
decision.229 The court was not correct, however, in read-
ing Catskill I & II to find ambiguity in the meaning of 
“addition .”230 After analyzing the wording of the relevant 
provisions and the structure of the statute as a whole, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was ambiguous whether 
“addition  .  .  . to navigable waters” in §502(12) “referred to 
waters in the individual sense or as one unitary whole .”231 
The court concluded that the use of the plural “waters” was 
not dispositive, for it could be used to denote all waters 
in general or specific waters in particular, for example, 
the waters of Mobile Bay .232 While the absence of “any” 
before “navigable waters” and its presence before the other 
three elements of the offense was suggestive that “navigable 
waters” was meant generally rather than specifically, that 
inconsistency was not dispositive either, because Congress 
included or omitted “any” before “navigable water” or 
“navigable waters” elsewhere in the statute randomly rather 
than connoting either general or specific waters .233 All of 
these arguments, of course, are directed at the meaning of 
“navigable water,” not “addition .”
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the struc-
ture of the statute as a whole did not resolve the ambi-
guity . In this inquiry, it considered the statute’s objective 
of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s 
waters in §101(a), the dominant role of the §402 permit 
program in achieving that objective, and the absurdity of 
“pumping dirty canal water into a reservoir of drinking 
water” without a permit .234 The court found that while “it 
may seem inconsistent with the lofty goals” of the CWA 
“to leave out of the permitting process the transfer of pol-
lutants from one navigable body of water to another,  .  .  . 
it is no more so than to leave out all non-point sources, 
allowing agricultural run-off to create a huge ‘dead zone’ 
in the Gulf of Mexico .”235 That is a bad analogy, however, 
for Congress chose explicitly not to regulate nonpoint 
sources through the §402 permit program . It did not make 
an explicit choice to exempt water transfers from the §402 
permit program .
In the end, the Eleventh Circuit wrongly found the 
statute ambiguous and, for the same reasons, found EPA’s 
interpretation of “addition” reasonable, although the court 
might have reached a different interpretation on its own . 
228 . Id . at 1219 .
229 . Id . at 1220-22 .
230 . Catskill I, 273 F .3d at 492, 94; Catskill II, 451 F .3d at 84 .
231 . Friends of the Everglades, 570 F .3d at 1223 .
232 . In the absence of an indication in the statute to the contrary, the singular in-
cludes the plural and the plural includes the singular . See Scalia & Garner, 
supra, note 15, at 129-31 . See also 1 U .S .C . §1 .
233 . Friends of the Everglades, 570 F .3d at 1224-25 .
234 . Id . at 1225-26 .
235 . Id . at 1227 .
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The court’s examination of the structure of the statute, on 
which it based both its Chevron step one and step two anal-
yses, is significantly deficient . The court failed to examine 
or even to perceive the weaknesses in EPA’s arguments that 
§§101(b), 101(g), 304(f)(F), and 510(1) established a grand 
balance between water quality and water quantity . And it 
failed entirely to consider that the rule was inconsistent 
with the water quality standards strategy of the statute and 
with the §404 permit program .
To illustrate the reasonableness of EPA’s interpretation, 
the Eleventh Circuit posited the analogy of the four-mar-
ble rule:
Two buckets sit side by side, one with four marbles in it 
and the other with none . There is a rule prohibiting “any 
addition of any marbles to buckets by any person .” A 
person comes along, picks up two marbles from the first 
bucket, and drops them into the second bucket . Has the 
marble-mover “add[ed] any marbles to buckets?” On the 
one hand, as the Friends of the Everglades might argue, 
there are now two marbles in a bucket where there were 
none before, so an addition of marbles has occurred . On 
the other hand, as the Water District might argue and as 
the EPA would decide, there were four marbles in buckets 
before, and there are still four marbles in buckets, so no 
addition of marbles has occurred . Whatever position we 
might take if we had to pick one side or the other we can-
not say that either side is unreasonable .236
While either interpretation may be reasonable when 
involving solid, inert marbles, are they equally reasonable 
when involving four ounces of liquid or dissolved toxic pol-
lutants in a bucket? To get equal amounts of liquid or dis-
solved pollutants in both buckets (two ounces in each), the 
contents of both buckets would have to be mixed together 
in a larger container and then equally divided between the 
two buckets, considerably more complicated than playing 
marbles . Moreover, the end result would be two buckets 
with poisonous water rather than one, not consistent with 
the goals of the CWA, especially the antidegradation pro-
vision, which the court did not consider .
Once the Eleventh Circuit decided this citizens suit 
appeal, it turned to the consolidated petitions for judicial 
review of the water transfer rule and dismissed them for 
lack of jurisdiction under §509(b) .237 In the meantime, 
the Southern District of New York had stayed the consoli-
dated petitions before it, pending the outcome of the peti-
tions in the Eleventh Circuit .238 After the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed those petitions, the Southern District vacated 
its stay and proceeded with judicial review of the rule in 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. 
EPA .239 In this, the most recent decision on the issue, the 
district court vacated and remanded EPA’s rule . Turning 
to the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court agreed 
236 . Friends of the Everglades, 570 F .3d 1228 .
237 . Friends of the Everglades v . U .S . EPA, 699 F .3d 1280, 42 ELR 20222 (11th 
Cir . 2012) .
238 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 at *26 .
239 . Id.
with the Eleventh Circuit that the CWA was ambiguous 
as to whether it required water transfers to have §402 per-
mits .240 On the Chevron step-two analysis, however, the 
court found EPA’s interpretation to be unreasonable for 
many of the reasons discussed above, especially because: 
(1) EPA’s “holistic” analysis of the CWA was anything but 
holistic, examining only the four small parts of the stat-
ute supposedly favoring its conclusion and ignoring the 
overwhelming remainder of the statute not supporting it; 
and (2) EPA gave no reasoned justification for its decision, 
including an explanation of how the rule was consistent 
with water quality standards and the §404 permit program 
and an analysis of the relative harms to the economy and 
the environment of promulgating and of not promulgating 
the rule . The decision is very thorough, making it easy for 
the Second Circuit to affirm on appeal, especially because 
it is in accord with the Second Circuit’s own earlier deci-
sions . If the Second Circuit does affirm, the decision will 
result in a split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
on EPA’s rule, setting the basis for a grant of certiorari by 
the Supreme Court for resolution of the issue it did not 
reach earlier in Miccosukee .
An interesting and perhaps significant aspect of the 
appellate decisions discussed above is that all but one 
develops or adopts an analogy to describe the unitary navi-
gable waters theory or to distinguish interbasin from intra-
basin transfers .241 The district court in Catskill Mountains 
240 . Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544, at **31-55 . Although, as discussed 
above, it appears that the Second Circuit had already concluded that the 
statute was not ambiguous on that issue with regard to EPA’s Agency Inter-
pretation, it had not precisely held so because EPA had not yet promulgated 
its water transfer rule, so that the Second Circuit was not performing a 
Chevron analysis .
241 . The Supreme Court in Miccosukee adopts the analogy from Catskill I that in 
an intrabasin transfer, “‘one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the 
pot, and pours it back into the pot  .  .  . [not adding] soup or anything else 
to the pot’” 541 U .S . at 110, quoting 273 F .3d at 492 (discussed in further 
detail in the Article at Section III .C .1 ., below) . The Second Circuit devel-
oped the “soup ladle” analogy to characterize Gorsuch and Consumers Power, 
both involving discharges of water from one water body back to the same 
water body, and to distinguish them from Catskill I, involving the discharge 
from one water body to a distinctly different water body . The Second Cir-
cuit agreed that no permit was required for a transfer within the same water 
body, otherwise, “the EPA might as easily require a permit for Niagara Falls .” 
273 F .3d 292 . In the case of Niagara Falls, the discharge is not “by any 
person” and would therefore not require a CWA permit . The district court 
in Dubois, in adopting the government’s unitary navigable waters theory (in 
that decision called the “singular entity” theory), developed the analogy of 
a “pond in which ‘we place a pipe  .  .  . and we pump the pond water from 
the bottom to the surface . No one would reasonably contend that internal 
pumping causes an “addition” of pollutants to the pond . Instead, we would 
consider the pumping to be a redistribution of pollutants from one part of 
the pond to another .’” Dubois v . U .S . Dep’t of Agric ., 102 F .3d 1273, 1296-
97, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir . 1996) (quoting the unreported district court 
decision) . The First Circuit rejected the comparison as “not at all analogous 
to the instant case” that featured a transfer between two distinct bodies of 
water that would not mingle in a state of nature . Id. at 1297 . In Friends of 
the Everglades, Inc. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 3635465 at 
*34 (S .D . Fla . 2006), a post-Miccosukee decision, the defendant offered, as 
an analogy for the unitary navigable water theory, “a hypothetical law that 
bans the addition of wine to the United States . The ban would undoubtedly 
apply to the importation of wine from, for example, France or Italy . How-
ever, it would have no effect on the movement of wine from California to 
Florida, as movement between states would not result in the addition of any 
wine to the United States as a whole .”
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labeled them “warring analogies .”242 These analogies raise 
several questions . Why do the courts of appeal use analo-
gies in all but one of their water transfer decisions, but use 
them in only one other decision interpreting “addition”?243 
Why do courts use them so pervasively to interpret “addi-
tion,” but not to interpret “pollutant,” “navigable water,” or 
“point source?”
Are the analogies useful in determining the meaning of 
“addition”? We use analogies to explain an abstract or dif-
ficult idea by making it more concrete and easier to under-
stand, suggesting that courts find the idea of the unitary 
navigable water theory singularly difficult to grasp . But the 
idea of all navigable water being one entity is not difficult 
to understand . What is difficult to understand is the ratio-
nale of applying that abstract concept to water pollution 
control . The analogies may help understand the theory, but 
they do not suggest a rationale for the theory, and they 
certainly do not explain the meaning of “addition .” The 
wine import ban analogy in Friends of the Everglades, for 
instance, is understandable as a means of economic protec-
tionism, but why would we require §402 permits for trans-
fers of water from Manitoba244 to Montana, but not from 
Idaho to Montana, when the water quality impacts are the 
same? The four-marble analogy raises the question of why 
our water pollution control statute would authorize dou-
bling the number of polluted stream miles, as opposed to 
continuing pollution only where it currently exists; indeed, 
this is inconsistent with EPA’s antidegradation policy .245 
The courts’ use of analogies regarding the unitary navi-
gable water theory signals their unease with the theory; the 
analogies they develop do not alleviate that unease .
If a point source adds a pollutant to a navigable water 
in the course of an interbasin transfer, that transfer should 
require a §402 permit . EPA has exempted such a transfer 
from §402, however, in its water transfer rule . EPA jus-
tifies its rule, not as an interpretation of “addition,” but 
instead as a “holistic interpretation” of the statute, based 
on four brief passages that EPA sees as establishing a 
“grand balance” between water quality achievement and 
water resource management . Examined closely, none of the 
four passages support EPA’s use of them . Even if they did, 
four brief passages are insufficient to support any grand 
balance in a 200-page-long statute . Worse, the “unitary 
navigable waters” theory underlying EPA’s interpretation 
of “addition” in the rule is incompatible with water qual-
ity standards, particularly the antidegradation policy, and 
drastically limits the jurisdiction of the §404 permitting 
program . EPA’s flimsy construct cannot withstand the 
force of the basic goals and strategies of the CWA, each 
rooted in long, explicit, and detailed statutory provisions . 
242 . Indeed, the district court used warring analogies as one indication in its 
first-step Chevron analysis to find that the CWA was ambiguous on the 
meaning of “addition” in the context of water transfers .
243 . The court in Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F .3d 1133, 1145 
(10th Cir . 2005), analogized abandoned mining operations to leaky faucets: 
“[I]f you own the leaky ‘faucet,’ you are responsible for its ‘drips .’”
244 . Manitoba intervened as a plaintiff in Catskill Mountains, seeking to overturn 
the rule . See Catskill Mountains, 2014 WL 1284544 (caption to decision) .
245 . 40 C .F .R . §131 .12 . See also 33 U .S .C . §303(d)(4)(B) .
The rule and the theory are contrary to the purposes and 
structures of the statute, are bad policy, and should either 
be withdrawn by EPA or overturned on judicial review .
On the other hand, the definition of “addition” sug-
gested in this Article applies comfortably to water transfers, 
without creating interpretive difficulties . Under that defini-
tion, water transfers that add pollution to receiving waters 
require §402 permits . Transfers are the but-for causes of 
pollutants from dirty navigable donor water flowing into 
clean navigable receiving water; they add pollutants from 
the donor water to the receiving water, when the pollutants 
would not otherwise be in the receiving water . This will not 
sound the death knell of western water rights; EPA offers 
no evidence that §402 has interfered in any significant way 
with western water rights for the last 40 years, probably 
because the CWA itself exempts the return of agricultural 
irrigation water from the §402 permit program .
B. Indirect Additions to Water From the Air
Some point sources directly add pollutants to the air and 
indirectly add the same pollutants to water, when grav-
ity or precipitation take them from the air to the water 
below . The most-detailed analyses of such indirect addi-
tions are in challenges to aerial spraying of pesticides into 
or near navigable water in an attempt to eradicate mos-
quitoes carrying the West Nile virus or other pathogens . 
In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York,246 the 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin New York City from spray-
ing pesticides, on the grounds that the spraying consti-
tuted the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from 
point sources without §402 permits . The city applied 
the pesticides for a purpose and in a manner EPA had 
approved under the federal statute regulating the manu-
facturing, sale, and use of pesticides, the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) .247 FIFRA 
authorizes applications of EPA-registered pesticides, for 
EPA-approved purposes, and in accordance with direc-
tions on EPA-approved labels .
The Southern District of New York decided the case 
primarily on the grounds that Congress intended pesti-
cide application to be governed by FIFRA rather than the 
CWA, and that Congress did not intend the CWA’s citizen 
suit provision to be used to enforce FIFRA, which lacks 
such a provision . But the court also held, with little analy-
sis, that pesticides sprayed near water and drifting into 
water were not added to water . According to the court, 
the city “discharge[d] the insecticides into the atmosphere 
and not into the navigable waters . It would be stretch-
ing the language of the statute well beyond the intent 
of Congress to hold that the de minimus incidental drift 
over navigable waters is a discharge from a point source 
into those waters .”248 The court commented that the “fact 
that a pollutant might ultimately end up in the navigable 
246 . 2000 WL 1401458 (S .D .N .Y . 2000), rev’d, 351 F .3d 602 (2d Cir . 2003) .
247 . 7 U .S .C . §§136-136y, ELR Stat . FIFRA §§2-35 .
248 . No Spray Coalition, 2000 WL 1401458 at *3 .
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waters as it courses through the environment,” does not 
make its use a violation of CWA §301(a) . If it did, every 
emission of “smoke, exhaust fumes and pesticides” would 
violate the statute .249
Two neighboring New York district courts came to the 
same conclusion, using both the same and different reason-
ing . In Altman v. Town of Amherst,250 the Western District’s 
main reasoning was that pesticides used for their intended 
purposes were not pollutants, also holding that FIFRA 
rather than the CWA governed . In Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. 
v. Suffolk County,251 the Eastern District’s main reason-
ing was cursory: “[a]tmospheric emission of aereal adulti-
cides are not defined as a pollutant [and] at no time was 
the spray made directly to navigable water .” The court also 
held that FIFRA governed the situation and that the spray 
bars attached to trucks and planes were not point sources . 
Finally, it deferred to EPA’s policy that such spraying of 
pesticides was not subject to permitting under CWA §402 .
The Second Circuit reversed all three decisions, on dif-
ferent grounds . In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New 
York,252 it held that if the plaintiffs alleged a cognizable 
cause of action for a violation of the CWA, they could 
maintain a citizen suit under it . The court, however, did 
not address whether the plaintiffs in the case alleged a cog-
nizable CWA cause of action, in particular whether dis-
charges of pesticides into the atmosphere near navigable 
water could constitute an addition to the navigable waters 
into which they drifted or whether spraying pesticides in 
compliance with FIFRA could violate the CWA . In Alt-
man v. Town of Amherst, the Second Circuit found that the 
district court had granted a motion for summary judgment 
on an insufficient record and remanded the case to proceed 
with discovery, allowing plaintiffs to make their case that 
defendant had added pollutants to navigable waters from 
point sources .253 The court stated that until EPA “articu-
lates a clear interpretation of current law—among other 
things, whether properly used pesticides released into or 
over waters of the United States can trigger the require-
ment for a NPDES permit—the question of whether prop-
erly used pesticides can be pollutants that violate the CWA 
will remain open .”254
Before the Second Circuit decided Peconic Baykeeper, 
Inc. v. Suffolk County,255 EPA, hoping to avoid such litiga-
tion or at least affect its outcome, issued an interpretive 
statement and promulgated a rule exempting from the 
§402 permit requirements the application of registered 
FIFRA pesticides for FIFRA-approved purposes and in 
accordance with FIFRA-approved labels . The exemption 
covered both (1) direct application to navigable waters for 
control of waterborne pests and (2)  application to land 
adjacent to navigable waters for control of pests on adjacent 
249 . Id .
250 . 190 F . Supp . 2d 467 (W .D .N .Y . 2001) .
251 . 585 F . Supp . 2d 377 (E .D . N .Y . 2008) .
252 . 351 F .3d 602 (2d Cir . 2003) .
253 . 47 Fed . Appx . 62 (2d Cir . 2002) .
254 . Id . at 67 .
255 . 600 F .3d 180 (2d Cir . 2010) .
land, from which pesticides drift into navigable waters .256 
The Second Circuit thereafter decided Peconic Baykeeper, 
cognizant of the rule, which the Sixth Circuit by then had 
overturned in National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. 
EPA,257discussed immediately below . Because the Sixth 
Circuit had stayed its mandate, the rule remained in effect 
and authorized many of the defendant’s actions . On the 
facts found by the district court, however, some of the 
spraying appeared not to be in conformity with the FIFRA 
label, and the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
ruling to that extent .
Although judicial review of EPA’s pesticide application 
rule in National Cotton Council focused on EPA’s inter-
pretation of “pollutant,” it also considered the meaning 
of “addition .” EPA argued that pesticides are not pollut-
ants, while admitting that excess pesticides and pesticide 
residues are pollutants .258 It then argued that pesticide 
applicators spray pesticides (nonpollutants), but do not 
spray excess pesticides or pesticide residue (pollutants) . 
Thus, EPA argued, pesticide applicators do not add pol-
lutants to the water because the pesticides they spray are 
not “pollutants” and they do not spray excess pesticides or 
pesticide residue, which are pollutants . Excess pesticides 
and pesticide residue “are not created [and hence are not 
added] until later, presumably after they are already in the 
water .”259 But the Sixth Circuit concluded that EPA offered 
no support, other than this descriptive narrative, “for its 
assertion that a pesticide must be ‘excess’ or ‘residue’ at the 
time of discharge [addition] if it is to be considered as dis-
charged from a point source. This omission of authority is 
understandable, as none exists .”260 Indeed, EPA’s seman-
tic gymnastics261 ignore the reality that when the pesticide 
applicator sprays pesticides, it is simultaneously spraying 
molecules of pesticide, a few of which hit their targets and 
most of which do not, but instead fall into water, although 
it is impossible to tell at the point of spraying which mol-
ecules of the sprayed material will be in each category .
The court rejected EPA’s attempt to tie “addition” to 
“point source” in a temporal sense, finding it “unsupported 
by the Act” and contrary to the purpose of the permit pro-
gram to prevent harmful discharges, which include “dis-
charges which are innocuous at the time they are made 
256 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(h) .
257 . 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
258 . This mirrors earlier arguments by EPA that consumer products used for 
their intended purposes are not waste under the RCRA, governing the man-
agement and disposal of hazardous waste . For instance, EPA determined 
that lead shot fired over water at ducks or skeet, missing them, and falling 
in the water were consumer products used for their intended products and 
were not waste under EPA’s definition of that term . See Cordiano v . Meta-
com Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199 (2d Cir . 2009) . The argument might 
be applicable to pollutants fitting only within one of the subcategories of 
“waste” in §502(6), e .g ., “chemical waste .”
259 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 939 .
260 . Id .
261 . EPA’s semantic gymnastics in National Cotton Council are reminiscent of the 
metaphysics of United States v. Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th 
Cir . 2000) (discussed in the Article at Section III .C .1 ., below), in which 
dredged material is metamorphosed into pollutants when the dredge lifts 
from the water .
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but extremely harmful at a later point .”262 It found that 
the plaintiff’s position conformed to EPA’s “outside world” 
gloss on “addition,” because the pesticide applicator adds 
pesticide residue or excess to the water from the outside 
world . Moreover, although not noted by the court, spray-
ing the pesticide from a point source is the but-for cause of 
the pesticide residue and excess entering navigable water .263
In Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. 
Department of the Army,264 environmental advocates 
challenged the Army’s incineration of chemical warfare 
agents, in part because CWA §301(f) prohibits the “dis-
charge  .   .   . [of ]  .   .   . any  .   .   . radiological, chemical, or 
biological warfare agent .” The state of Utah had issued 
a Clean Air Act (CAA)265 permit authorizing emissions 
from the U .S . Army’s incinerator . The plaintiffs con-
tended that some of those emissions would be added to 
navigable waters by unspecified “atmospheric deposition,” 
in violation of §301(f) .266 The Tenth Circuit rejected the 
claim, concluding that the “stack emissions constitute 
discharges into the air—not water,”267 labeling them 
“indirect discharges .”268 In addition, the court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ argument because it would create a regula-
tory conflict between the CWA and the CAA, enacted by 
Congress to regulate such emissions .269
In both of these situations, it is important to remember 
that all four elements of §301(a) must be met before the 
CWA is violated, and the only issue considered in this Arti-
cle is whether these types of emissions into the air consti-
tute additions to water . The two other significant questions 
are whether these materials are pollutants, especially those 
whose purpose is introduction in, on, or into the water and 
whether point sources convey them to the water or merely 
into the air . Even if all four elements are met in a given 
instance, it is possible that another statute governs or that 
regulation by another statute could influence how EPA or 
courts interpret one of the elements .
None of the decisions in these cases analyze the “addi-
tion” element in any depth, although many of them allude 
to it . The most that can be deduced from the decisions is 
that spraying pesticides directly on water may be addition, 
while long-range land and water deposition from smoke-
262 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 939 .
263 . See Weinberger v . Romero-Barcelo, 456 U .S . 305, 12 ELR 20538 (1982), 
a citizen suit against Navy bombing practice in which many bombs missed 
their targets and landed in the sea . Although the case is similar on the facts, 
the Court did not analyze the “addition” issue .
264 . 111 F .3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir . 1997) .
265 . Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA 
§§101-618 .
266 . Chemical Weapons Working Grp., 111 F .3d at 1489-91 .
267 . Id . at 1490 .
268 . Id . at 1490 n .3 . “Indirect discharges” was a confusing choice of words be-
cause “indirect dischargers” under the CWA refers to industrial discharg-
ers to municipal sewage treatment systems . See 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 . While 
those indirect dischargers do not require §402 permits, they are subject to 
directly applicable and directly enforceable technology-based pretreatment 
standards for toxic pollutants and to general prohibitions against interfering 
with or passing untreated through a municipal sewage treatment plant . See 
§307(b), 33 U .S .C . §1317(b) .
269 . 111 F .3d at 1490-91 . See also United States ex rel . McKeown v . Port Auth . 
of N .Y . & N .J ., 162 F . Supp . 2d 173 (S .D .N .Y . 2001) .
stacks are not direct addition, but may be indirect addition . 
While spraying pesticides from an airplane and spewing 
air pollutants from smokestacks appear to be similar, in 
that both emit material into the air and some of the mate-
rial predictably finds its way into water by natural means, 
the actions are very different in terms of their underlying 
facts . The underlying factual differences in turn result in 
differences in the feasibility of regulating them within the 
CWA’s structure . And those differences, in turn, affect the 
analysis of how to interpret the CWA in pari materia with 
the other statutes.
The underlying factual differences between these two 
situations are apparent . The pesticide-spraying plane flies 
above water, points the nozzles of its spray bar at the water, 
the target pests it aims at are in or fly above the water, 
and most of the pesticide inevitably enters the water with-
out making contact with the targets . The pesticides enter 
the water from the plane much as they would pour into 
the water from a horizontal industrial or municipal out-
fall pipe terminating a few feet above the receiving water . 
So described, it is difficult to characterize this as anything 
other than direct addition of the pesticides to the water . 
The smokestack, however, is not above the water, but is 
on dry land, perhaps many miles from water . It points its 
emissions straight up into the air . It has no targets in or 
above the water; its purpose is to dispose of waste into the 
air . Some of its emissions eventually come to rest on land, 
some on water, and some wander to the upper atmosphere . 
Some of its emissions ultimately may fall into hundreds of 
separate water bodies, located in many states downwind 
from the smokestack . In turn, any one of these waters may 
receive pollutants from many upwind smokestacks in dif-
ferent states . It is difficult to characterize the smokestacks 
as adding this material to any particular water, except indi-
rectly and inadvertently .
Direct addition by spraying pesticides over water is 
susceptible to regulation under the CWA because there is 
an identifiable pollutant, an identifiable point source, an 
identifiable addition, and an identifiable navigable receiv-
ing water, usually located in the same state in which the 
spraying occurs . Issuing or denying a CWA permit for 
spraying pesticides on a particular water body adds no 
complications to the normal CWA permit issuance pro-
cess, requiring only the determinations of whether there 
are applicable technology-based standards (there are none 
at present), whether best management practices are avail-
able to minimize the waste pesticide and pesticide residue 
that reach the water, and whether the spraying will inter-
fere with the attainment of the designated water quality 
standards applicable to the receiving water . Most of the rel-
evant environmental protection can be provided by issuing 
a CWA permit requiring best management practices or by 
denying the permit because the spraying will violate water 
quality standards .
On the other hand, emissions from smokestacks are far 
more difficult to regulate under the CWA . Because EPA has 
not promulgated a technology-based standard under the 
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CWA for smokestack emissions, it would have to base the 
permit’s effluent limitations in a CWA permit for smoke-
stack emissions largely on preventing the emissions from 
violating the water quality standards of the waters into 
which they fell .270 Indeed, when issuing a CWA permit, 
EPA or the state must ensure that the pollutants discharged 
will not violate water quality standards “established pur-
suant to any State law or regulations .”271 Moreover, the 
permit issuer must notify both EPA and downwind states 
whose waters are affected of the proposed permit, allowing 
them to comment and request a public hearing .272 If EPA 
is the permit issuer, it could establish effluent limitations 
in the permit to meet affected water quality standards in 
states downwind from the permitted source .273 If a state is 
the permit issuer, EPA presumably could veto a permit that 
failed to provide effluent limitations to meet affected water 
quality standards in downwind states .274
Applying water quality standards to smokestack emis-
sions, however, presents two complications . First, the emis-
sions from a smokestack, particularly a tall one, may fall 
into many downwind water bodies in many states . The 
only way to determine which water bodies smokestack 
emissions might enter is by developing a mathematical 
model, by definition only an approximation of reality .275 
Once each of the hundreds of receiving water bodies are 
identified, the states in which each receiving water body 
is located must calculate the total maximum daily load 
(TMDL) for each relevant pollutant to determine whether 
the smokestack emissions would have to be limited . If they 
do, the states in which the affected water bodies are located 
would have to develop waste-load allocations to determine 
how much of the required emission reductions would be 
allocated to the particular smokestack . This invites inter-
state disputes, because the state with the receiving water 
develops TMDLs for its waters and has every incentive to 
disproportionately burden out-of-state pollution sources . A 
single smokestack whose emissions eventually fall into hun-
dreds of water bodies could be subject to hundreds of such 
exercises for a variety of pollutants . Worse, the exercises for 
each water body would have to consider each smokestack 
whose emissions enter that water body, and there may be 
hundreds of such smokestacks .
Developing TMDLs considering traditional water pol-
lution sources took decades and protracted litigation,276 
strongly suggesting that the more difficult task of control-
ling thousands of indirect smokestack sources in hundreds 
of TMDLs would take the better part of this century 
and convert most litigation lawyers into TMDL warriors . 
270 . In the absence of promulgated effluent guidelines for technology-based 
standards, the permit writer could devise technology-based standards on a 
case-by-case basis using best engineering judgment . See §402(a) .
271 . Section 301(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added) .
272 . Section 402(b)(3) & (5) .
273 . See Arkansas v . Oklahoma, 503 U .S . 91, 22 ELR 20552 (1992) .
274 . Section 402(d) .
275 . See, e.g., Ohio v . U .S . EPA, 784 F .2d 224, 16 ELR 20447 (6th Cir . 1986), in 
which the court held that EPA’s reliance on a computer-generated model to 
calculate emissions limitations for smokestacks was arbitrary and capricious .
276 . See Houck, supra note 196 .
Water pollution permits are simply not designed to control 
smokestack air pollution . Similar complications prompted 
the Supreme Court to reject the considerably easier appli-
cation of injured downstream states’ common-law torts to 
point source pollution from upstream states .277
Programs have been developed under the CAA, how-
ever, to deal with just such problems . It is far more fea-
sible to regulate smokestack emissions under the CAA 
than under the CWA . While it is beguiling for friends of 
clean water to interpret the CWA to regulate all activities 
producing emissions that eventually enter water, particu-
larly in cases where most or all of the material inevitably 
falls into nearby navigable water278 (atmospheric deposi-
tion is a major source of water pollution, accounting, for 
example, for most of the mercury in the Great Lakes and 
the acidification of lakes in the Northeast and neighbor-
ing Canada),279 nothing in the CWA speaks explicitly to 
regulating such indirect additions . “Addition” could be 
interpreted to cover them or not cover them . Each of the 
actions at issue, however, is routinely and typically regu-
lated by another federal statute, the CAA or FIFRA . Those 
other statutes authorize EPA to take the impact on water 
quality into account in regulating air emissions and pesti-
cide applications, enabling EPA to prevent water pollution 
without invoking the CWA .280 The question in both situa-
tions is how best to interpret the statutes involved to imple-
ment them without conflict .
The underlying concept of in pari materia comes into 
play when two statutes may govern the same situation . In 
pari materia posits that “similar statutes should be inter-
preted similarly”281 and “interpreted together, as if they 
were one law .”282 A corollary is that statutes should be 
277 . See International Paper Co . v . Ouellette, 479 U .S . 481, 495-500, 17 ELR 
20327 (1987) .
278 . A pioneering article makes the case that atmospheric deposition of pollut-
ants into navigable water may violate the basic prohibition of the CWA . See 
Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and Smoke: Regulating Atmospheric Deposi-
tion of Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 29 UCLA J . Envtl . L . & Pol’y 
215 (2011) . Amil Anthony’s argument might be stronger if augmented with 
an element-by-element analysis . However, he underestimates the interfer-
ence with the CAA and FIFRA of regulating air emissions and pesticide 
application under the CWA . While his argument may not lead to a revolu-
tionary expansion of CWA jurisdiction, it may provide a template in par-
ticularly deserving cases, much as Mary Christina Wood’s article, Regulating 
Discharges Into Ground Water: The Critical Link in Pollution Control Under 
the CWA, 12 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 369-426 (1988), did for CWA citizen 
suits against point source addition of pollutants to tributary groundwater .
279 . Anthony, supra note 278, at 221-32 .
280 . CAA §109(b), 42 U .S .C . §7409(b), requires EPA to promulgate primary 
and secondary air quality standards, primary standards protecting public 
health and secondary standards protecting public welfare, both of which 
could include effects on water, see CAA §302(h), 42 U .S .C . §7602(h) . Air 
quality standards are much like water quality criteria under the CWA: they 
trigger many of the regulatory requirements under their respective statutes . 
Moreover, the CAA includes a regional cap-and-trade program to control 
acid rain deposition from midwestern coal-fired power plants affecting wa-
ters in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada . See CAA §§401-
416, 42 U .S .C . §§7651-7651o. FIFRA §3(c)(5)(C), 7 U .S .C . §136a(c)(5)
(C), provides as one criterion for EPA’s registration of a pesticide for a par-
ticular use that “it will perform its intended function without unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment .” “Environment,” of course, includes 
“water .” See FIFRA §2(j), 7 U .S .C . §136(j) .
281 . Eskridge, supra note 15, at 327 .
282 . Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 252 . See also Sutherland, supra note 
170, at §51:2 .
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interpreted not to conflict with each other .283 If a conflict 
between statutes cannot be avoided, the more-specific stat-
ute or the latest in time governs .284 The initial question is 
whether statutes are in pari materia. Justice Antonin Scalia 
writes that statutes relating to the same subject, having one 
object in view, or acting in one system fall within that cate-
gory . Under that definition, surely the CAA and the CWA 
are in pari materia: Both protect the ambient environment, 
have similar goals, have similar structures, share common 
tactics and strategies to control discharges of pollutants 
to air and water, and even have very similar provisions .285 
FIFRA is further afield; it is a product-control statute with 
a completely different structure than the CWA, using dif-
ferent tactics and strategies, and having no similar provi-
sions .286 As a product-control statute, its first purpose is to 
assure that pesticides are efficacious,287 as well as not unrea-
sonably harmful to the environment .288 Although FIFRA 
is not as closely related to the CWA as is the CAA, Justice 
Scalia has observed that all statutes are part of a single cor-
pus juris, and courts should interpret them accordingly .289
Interpreting statutes in pari materia avoids interpret-
ing a statute to conflict with another statute, and avoids 
creating requirements on the regulated public that con-
flict with requirements imposed on it by other statutes . 
The in pari materia analysis of whether the CWA applies 
to spraying pesticides regulated by FIFRA is different 
from whether the CWA applies to emitting pollutants 
from smokestacks regulated by the CAA . The CWA and 
FIFRA do not perform the same functions in protecting 
the environment . Under FIFRA, EPA registers pesticides 
for uses and applications that will not result in “unreason-
able effects on the environment,” including water .290 By 
its nature, EPA’s determination in the registration process 
is whether a pesticide will have unreasonable effects on 
water generally, rather than on particular water bodies, 
for it is not clear to what water bodies pesticides will be 
applied until they are manufactured, sold, and about to 
be used, well after FIFRA registration . Under the CWA, 
however, EPA’s determinations of whether to issue or 
deny a permit and of what effluent limitations to include 
in a permit are based, in part, on protecting individual 
water bodies and the water quality standards designated 
283 . Sutherland, supra note 170, at §51:2 .
284 . Id.
285 . Both have ambient standards, NAAQS, national ambient air quality stan-
dards, and WQS, water quality standards, that are to be met by controlling 
pollution . Both use technology-based standards . Both are implemented by 
cooperative federalism . Both have similar inspection, enforcement, and citi-
zen suit provisions .
286 . Instead of controlling the discharge of pollutants by individual sources, FI-
FRA registers pesticides .
287 . FIFRA §3(c)(5)(A), 7 U .S .C . §136a(c)(5)(A) (that “[the product’s] compo-
sition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it”) .
288 . FIFRA §3(c)(5)(C), 7 U .S .C . §136(5)(C) (that “[the product] will 
perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on 
the environment”) .
289 . Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 252-56 . See also Sutherland, supra 
note 170, at §51 .3, “various statutes relating to environmental policy” are in 
pari materia .
290 . FIFRA’s definition of “environment” includes water . See FIFRA §2(j), 7 
U .S .C . §136(j) .
for them . Moreover, FIFRA’s “unreasonable effects of the 
environment” standard involves an “economic, social, and 
environmental” risk/benefit analysis,291 while the water 
quality standards designated under the CWA for particu-
lar water bodies are not limited by economic impact or 
any other risk/benefit analysis .292
If EPA denies a CWA §402 permit for spraying a pesti-
cide on a particular water body or adds conditions beyond 
those already imposed by FIFRA on such spraying to 
achieve its water quality standards, the denial or extra 
conditions would not interfere with FIFRA’s goals of pro-
viding that approved pesticides are efficacious and do not 
unreasonably adversely affect the environment . There is no 
conflict if both statutes apply; the more-stringent require-
ments govern in any particular situation, providing the 
greatest protection of the environment . Finally, issuing or 
denying a CWA permit for spraying pesticides on a partic-
ular water body adds no complications to the normal CWA 
permit issuance process, requiring only the determinations 
of whether there are applicable technology-based standards 
(there are none at present), whether management practices 
are available to minimize the pesticide that reaches the 
water, and whether the spraying will interfere with attain-
ment of the designated water quality standard for the par-
ticular and known water body .
On the other hand, the CWA and CAA perform many 
of the same or similar functions in protecting the environ-
ment . Both provide for the issuance of permits to sources 
of emissions or discharges of pollutants to protect the 
environment . Both apply technology-based standards for 
pollution reduction and both condition permits to meet 
ambient standards in the air or water . They are in pari 
materia and should be interpreted in harmony . Of course, 
they could be in harmony if both applied to a particular 
smokestack and the more-stringent of the two governed . 
That is how the CWA reconciles differences between fed-
eral and state water pollution requirements .293 And the 
imposition of the more-stringent standard does not inter-
fere with the environmental protection afforded by the 
superseded statute, since by definition it provides greater 
environmental protection . But because the CAA primar-
ily regulates smokestacks, and some emissions from many 
or most smokestacks eventually fall into water, requiring 
CWA permits for smokestack emissions could result in 
the CWA superseding the CAA in many or most cases, 
a result almost certainly not intended by Congress . 
Moreover, the issuance of CWA permits to smokestacks 
imposes such great complications on CWA permit issu-
ance process that it is doubtful Congress intended the 
CWA to apply in such cases .
Concluding that spraying pesticides onto navigable 
water is a classical addition of pollutants to navigable water 
from a point source under the CWA does not conflict with 
291 . FIFRA §2(bb), 7 U .S .C . §136(bb) .
292 . CWA §§303 & 304(a), 33 U .S .C . §§1313 & 1314(a) . But see CWA 
§302(b), 33 U .S .C . §1312(b) .
293 . CWA §510, 33 U .S .C . §1370 .
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FIFRA . Moreover, the considerations necessary to issue or 
deny a CWA §402 permit for spraying pesticides into water 
do not differ substantially from the considerations neces-
sary to issue or deny §402 permits for adding pollutants 
to navigable water from other point sources . On the other 
hand, concluding that emissions from a smokestack require 
a CWA permit because some of those emissions eventu-
ally enter navigable water would conflict with the CAA by 
largely superseding it . Moreover, the difficulties in issuing 
CWA permits for smokestack emissions are overwhelming . 
While it may be tempting to define the CWA’s jurisdic-
tion to include regulation of emissions from the occasional 
smokestack whose emissions largely fall on and signifi-
cantly pollute an adjacent body of water, this author knows 
of no principled way to differentiate between smokestacks 
that sufficiently pollute a water body to be regulated under 
the CWA and those that pollute many water bodies insuf-
ficiently to be regulated under it .
While the above analysis is directed toward pesticides 
sprayed from airplanes and emissions from smokestacks, 
the same analysis can be performed to determine whether 
any activity discharging pollutants into the air that come 
to rest, in whole or in part, in water is regulated by the 
CWA or another statute, usually the CAA . For instance, 
EPA regulates paint-spraying under the CAA,294 but would 
spray-painting a bridge or a shipyard when some paint falls 
into the water also require a CWA permit?
C. Section 404 Decisions
Section 301(a) declares that the addition of pollutants to 
navigable waters from point sources is unlawful, except 
in compliance with a §402 or §404 permit . The decisions 
reviewed earlier in this Article primarily concerned addi-
tions not in compliance with §402 permits . The following 
decisions concern activities not in compliance with §404 
permits . The only structural differences between the two 
is that §402 authorizes EPA and states with approved pro-
grams to issue permits for discharges of “pollutants,” while 
§404 authorizes the U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps) and states with approved programs to issue permits 
for discharges of “dredged or fill material .”295 The §502(6) 
definition of “pollutant” includes “dredged spoil,” which 
appears to be synonymous with “dredged material,” while 
that definition does not include “fill material .” Most mate-
rials used as fill, however, fall under the broad §502(6) def-
inition of “pollutant .”296 This poses a potential ambiguity: 
Under which section should a permit be issued when the 
fill material added to navigable water consists of or con-
tains pollutants? Under §402 because the material contains 
pollutants, or under §404 because the pollutants are fill 
material? Section §402(a) suggests a solution to this prob-
lem by authorizing EPA to issue permits for the discharge 
294 . 40 C .F .R . §§11511, 11514, 11516, 11519 & 11522 .
295 . The approval of state programs is more limited under §404 than under 
§402 . Compare §404(g), with §402(b) .
296 . For instance, biological material, rock, and sand . See §502(6) .
of pollutants, “except as provided in [§404 .]” Accordingly, 
the Corps is to issue permits under §404 for the addition of 
dredged or fill material and EPA is to issue permits under 
§402 for the addition of other pollutants .297 EPA and the 
Corps define “fill material” to mean “material [that] has the 
effect of  .  .  . [c]hanging the bottom elevation of water .”298
Section 404 has come to be seen as the guardian of wet-
lands . Its scope, however, is too narrow to achieve that goal . 
Most reported §404 decisions concern the issue of whether 
particular landclearing and related wetlands development 
activities require §404 permits . By definition, §404 only 
regulates additions of material to wetlands or other navi-
gable water, not extractions of material or water from wet-
lands or other navigable water . Landclearing or drainage 
activities do not inherently fill or add material to wetlands . 
Indeed, if wetlands developers could sweep a giant vacuum 
device over a wetland and suck up all the vegetation, other 
loose material, and water, they could clear and dry the 
wetland, without adding anything to it or filling it in any 
way, as long as they emptied the vacuum cleaner elsewhere 
on dry land . Thus, owners of wetlands can drain them to 
dry land with impunity, as long as they add no pollutants 
while doing so, even if they intend later to fill the dried for-
mer wetlands .299 In terms of damage to wetlands, removal 
of wetland soils harms wetlands as much or more than fill-
ing wetlands with wetlands soils, but §404 regulates only 
the latter .
Section 404 landclearing decisions run a spectrum from 
moving unwanted material from one part of a wetland to 
fill other parts of the same wetland, which almost all courts 
consider addition,300 to the sort of incidental fallback that 
occurs when digging a hole in sand and some sand trickles 
back from the shovel into the hole, which almost all courts 
hold is not addition .301 Most of the decisions on the spec-
trum in between broadly interpret “addition” to require 
297 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeastern Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261 (2009) .
298 . 40 C .F .R . §232 .2 .
299 . See, e.g., Save Our Cmty . v . U .S . EPA, 971 F .2d 1195, 22 ELR 21532 (5th 
Cir . 1992) . See also Orleans Audubon Soc’y v . Lee, 742 F .2d 901, 15 ELR 
20030 (5th Cir . 1984) (the deliberate drainage of a swamp is not the dis-
charge of fill material); and Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc . v . Marsh, 
715 F .2d 897, 13 ELR 2094 (5th Cir . 1983) . The notion that, once drained, 
a wetland may be filled because it is no longer navigable water, however, is 
at odds with the well-established doctrine that once a water is navigable, it 
is always navigable . United States v . Appalachian Elec . Power Co ., 311 U .S . 
377, 408 (1940) .
300 . See, e.g., United States v . Cundiff, 555 F .3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir . 
2009); Borden Ranch P’ship v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F .3d 810, 
32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001); United States v . Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 
30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000); United States v . M .C .C . of Fla ., Inc ., 772 
F .2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir . 1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, 
Inc., 715 F .2d 897; United States v . Fabian, 522 F . Supp . 2d 1078 (N .D . 
Ind . 2007); N .C . Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assoc ., LLC, 278 
F . Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003); United States v . Hummel, 2003 WL 
1845365 (N .D . Ill . 2003); United States v . Bay-Houston Towing Co ., 33 
F . Supp . 2d 1033 (N .D . Ill . 1998); United States v . Sinclair Oil Co ., 767 F . 
Supp . 200, 21 ELR 21323 (D . Mont . 1990) .
301 . See, e.g., National Mining Ass’n v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F .3d 
1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D .C . Cir . 1998); National Ass’n of Home Builders 
v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2007 WL 259944 (D .D .C .); American Min-
ing Cong . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F . Supp . 267, 27 ELR 20589 
(D .D .C . 1997) .
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§404 permits . After examining these decisions, the Article 
will consider how they square with EPA’s “from the outside 
world” gloss on “addition” and the Agency’s theory of uni-
tary navigable water .
1. Redeposit
Most redeposit decisions are rooted in Avoyelles Sports-
men’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,302 in which an environmental 
group challenged a soybean farmer’s clearing of wood-
lands that exhibited wetlands characteristics, without a 
§404 permit . The defendants and the government had 
argued before the district court that landclearing by the 
mere removal of wetlands vegetation without a §404 
permit was not an addition and therefore not a violation 
of §301(a) . The district court rejected this argument as 
“untenable” because it would “frustrate the ecological 
purposes of the CWA .”303 The U .S . Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue on appeal, 
because the district court’s factual findings demon-
strated that defendant’s landclearing activities included 
filling small sloughs, partially filling large sloughs, dig-
ging holes, and burying logs in them, rendering this 
more than a “mere removal” case .304 The court held that 
“‘addition’  .  .  . may reasonably be understood to include 
‘redeposit,’” finding that definition consistent with both 
the purpose and the legislative history of the CWA .305 
The court noted in passing that the EPA’s “outside world” 
theory might jeopardize the application of §404, but did 
not address the issue because no party raised it .306
Avoyelles involved landclearing activity in which defen-
dants moved materials considerable distances, for rede-
posit in the same wetlands . Other decisions consider more 
modest movement of material, many of them involving 
“sidecasting .” Sidecasting occurs when soil is removed by 
digging a hole, often a ditch, and the soil is then placed 
beside the hole, an activity that moves material but does 
not add new material . In United States v. Deaton,307 the 
defendant argued that sidecasting could not be addition, 
because the ordinary meaning of addition is the intro-
duction of new material or an increase in the amount of 
material already there, while in sidecasting, there is no new 
material or increase in the amount of material .308 The U .S . 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
the CWA does not prohibit the addition of “material,” but 
rather prohibits the addition of a “pollutant .” Earth and 
vegetable matter are not “dredged spoil” before they are 
excavated by defendants, but once they are removed from 
the ditch, they became “dredged spoil,” which is a “pol-
lutant .” When defendants redeposit the material in the 
302 . Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc., 715 F .2d 897 .
303 . Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc . v . Alexander, 473 F . Supp . 525, 536, 11 
ELR 20315 (W .D . La . 1979) .
304 . Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc., 715 F .2d at 923 .
305 . Id .
306 . 715 F .2d at 924, n .43 .
307 . 209 F .3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) .
308 . Deaton, 209 F .3d at 335 .
wetland, they add a pollutant where there had been no pol-
lutant before .
The court’s semantic sleight of hand is ingenious, almost 
metaphysical . But it ignores that much, if not all, of the 
soil and vegetative matter moved were “pollutants” under 
the statute’s definition, even before they became dredged 
spoil .309 The Supreme Court also impliedly rejected the 
theory in Miccosukee when it adopted the Second Circuit’s 
Catskill I soup-ladle analogy for addition .310 In it, the soup 
in the pot represents navigable water (whether one body 
of navigable water or unitary navigable waters) . Let’s say 
the soup is cream of asparagus soup; it consists of water 
and some biological material (cream, asparagus pieces, 
and asparagus residue), just as wetlands bottoms consists 
of water and biological material (wetlands vegetation and 
the organic portion of the soil) . The ladle lifts soup from 
the pot and pours it back in, adding nothing, according to 
the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit . Why would 
pouring the cream and asparagus residue and pieces from 
the soup back into the soup pot add pollutants to the water 
where there were none before?311 Because they were not 
pollutants before they were taken from the soup, but they 
were pollutants when they are replaced in the soup? That is 
a strained reading . Strained reading, of course, is far from 
plain meaning, the preferred reading of “addition .”312
The Fourth Circuit in Deaton justified its reading of the 
statute by reference to the statute’s purpose; dredged spoil is 
as harmful to the waters of the United States whether it was 
dredged from the same or different waters .313 That, how-
ever, depends entirely on what the court means by harm-
ful . If the harm is pollution, moving indigenous biological 
material, sand, or soil from one part of a natural wetland to 
another part of the same wetland is far less harmful than 
moving dredged spoil laden with heavy metals and toxic 
pollutants from a navigation channel or port bottom to 
a natural wetland, the initial focus of §404 . Moreover, if 
the purpose of §404 is to prevent the loss of wetlands, the 
harm consists of the destruction of wetlands by digging 
drainage ditches in them, not regulated by §404, rather 
than by redepositing or sidecasting some of the wetlands 
dug to form the ditches, apparently regulated by §404 .
309 . The definition lists “biological material” as a pollutant and “biological ma-
terial” includes vegetation and the organic portion of the soil . See §502(6) . 
The definition states that biological material and other substances are pol-
lutants when they are “discharged into water .” Although the courts engaged 
in this metaphysical transformation do not cite the phrase, it does support 
their arguments . However, the phrase seems to be a meaningless redundan-
cy . It certainly would have been an odd and roundabout way for Congress 
to have established that redepositing or sidecasting dredged spoil requires a 
§404 permit . When Congress enacted this definition, it considered §404 to 
regulate the disposal of spoil from river and harbor dredging far from the 
site of the dredging . In this context, the dredged material would not have 
been from the same place as the disposal site, and the metaphysical transfor-
mation would have been unnecessary .
310 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 
110, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Catskill I, 273 F .3d 481, 492 .
311 . The D .C . Circuit rejected such a notion in National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F .3d 1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D .C . Cir . 1998) .
312 . See Jarecki v . G .D . Searle & Co ., 367 U .S . 303, 307-08 (1961) (where 
“[t]he statute admits a reasonable construction which gives effect to all of its 
provisions  .  .  . we will not adopt a strained reading”) .
313 . United States v . Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 336, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) .
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Despite the strained reasoning of Deaton, subsequent 
sidecasting and similar decisions followed it . Addressing 
the argument that sidecasting adds nothing new to the 
wetland, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cundiff314 
combined Deaton’s metamorphosis theory with the Avoy-
elles conclusion that any other interpretation of addition 
would read §404 out of the statute .315 Cundiff further sup-
ported its decision with a nod to Chevron deference,316 
but since neither EPA nor the Corps defined “addition” 
in regulations, it is not apparent how Chevron deference is 
relevant . A Michigan district court held in United States v. 
Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc.317 that sidecasting in the con-
struction of drainage canals in a peat-harvesting operation 
was not incidental fallback, but instead was “purposeful 
relocation”—in other words, “addition .”318
Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers319 held that “deep ripping” of wetlands constitutes 
addition . Deep ripping pokes holes in a relatively imper-
meable layer of soil beneath a wetland, so that the wetland 
drains . In the process, the soil is “wrenched up, moved 
around, and redeposited somewhere else .”320 When the 
defendant argued that he added nothing new to the wet-
land, the Ninth Circuit cited Deaton and Avoyelles and 
rejected an argument that only incidental fallback took 
place . An Illinois district court in United States v. Hum-
mel321 even held that material excavated to create a ditch 
for sewer lines in a wetland was added to the wetland when 
the material was placed on top of the sewer lines to fill 
the ditch . Perhaps, the most extreme of these decisions is 
United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc.,322 where the Elev-
enth Circuit held that a tugboat propeller in essence dug 
a channel by repeatedly traversing the same area, push-
ing bottom sediment onto adjacent sea grass beds, thereby 
adding dredge spoil to the sea grass beds by redepositing 
the material onto the ocean bed, a dubious application of 
Avoyelles.323 There are similar decisions,324 and few con-
trary ones .325
314 . 555 F .3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir . 2009) .
315 . Id. at 213-14 . See also Avoyelles, 715 F .3d at 924, n .43 .
316 . Cundiff, 555 F .3d at 214 .
317 . 33 F . Supp . 2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E .D . Mich . 1999) .
318 . Bay-Houston Towing, 33 F . Supp . 2d at 605 .
319 . 261 F .3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001) .
320 . Borden Ranch, 261 F .3d at 815 .
321 . 2003 WL 1845365 (N .D . Ill 2003) (citing Deaton and distinguishing delib-
erate redeposit of material from incidental fallback) .
322 . 772 F .2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir . 1985) .
323 . M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F .2d at 1506 . The material moved from developing 
a channel through grass beds was not added to navigable water for two 
reasons . First, it was not from the outside world . Second, the material was 
not a “pollutant” since it was not “discharged into water,” §502 (6); it was 
already in the water and never left the water . The metamorphosis theory will 
not work either, for the sediment was never out of the water .
324 . See, e.g., United States v . Fabian, 522 F . Supp . 2d 1078 (N .D . Ind . 2007) 
(moving material, including earth, dirt, and sand laterally in a wetland 
constituted addition); United States v . Sinclair Oil Co ., 767 F . Supp . 200, 
21 ELR 21323 (D . Mont . 1990) (moving streambed material to redirect a 
channel constituted the redeposit or addition of fill material) .
325 . See, e.g., United States v . Wilson, 133 F .3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th 
Cir .1997) (holding that sidecasting was not addition in a criminal pros-
ecution; two of the three judges on the panel filed concurring opinions, 
and the decision appears superseded by the Fourth Circuit’s Deaton deci-
sion); United States v . Hallmark Constr . Co ., 30 F . Supp . 2d 1033 (N .D . Ill . 
2. Incidental Fallback
The “redeposit” decisions discussed above essentially hold 
that moving soil and biological material from one part of a 
wetland to another part of the same wetlands is an “addi-
tion” of the material to the other part of the wetland . As 
the points of removal and redeposit converge, however, 
that understanding becomes increasingly strained . When 
the two points are the same, the ordinary understanding 
of “addition” collapses, and the metaphysics of Deaton is 
all that remains . That helps explain why courts have drawn 
the “addition” line at incidental fallback .
Environmental plaintiffs challenged the Corps’ initial 
exclusion from its regulatory definition of “discharge” 
the de minimis soil movement that occurs during nor-
mal dredging operations . The Corps settled the case and, 
pursuant to the settlement, replaced the exemption with 
explicit coverage of any redeposit of dredged materials 
including “incidental fallback .”326 The National Mining 
Association challenged the jurisdiction of the Corps to 
regulate “incidental fallback” as an “addition” of dredged 
or fill material . Incidental fallback occurs when material 
is excavated from water or wetlands by lifting and mov-
ing it elsewhere and some of the sediment incidentally falls 
back into the water or wetlands from which it is removed . 
The Corps argued that under Avoyelles this was “addition .” 
But that decision involved removing substantial amounts 
of material and intentionally redepositing it some distance 
away from where it was removed . It did not involve remov-
ing substantial amounts of material and inadvertently 
redepositing a small amount of it at or very near the point 
of removal .
The D .C . district court in American Mining Congress 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held that “incidental 
fallback” was not “addition” for several reasons .327 Most 
importantly, incidental fallback is an inevitable conse-
quence of dredging, and §404 does not regulate dredging 
(removing), it only regulates filling; dredging is regulated 
by 33 U .S .C . §403 . Second, legislative history indicates 
that Congress did not intend §404 to regulate “the small-
volume incidental discharge that accompanies excavation 
and landclearing activities .”328 Third, the Corps took the 
position for 18 years prior to the challenged regulation, 
that §404 did not regulate incidental fallback,329 a posi-
tion also taken by courts .330 Finally, Congress had rejected 
amendments to expand the jurisdiction of §404 to include 
such incidental discharge .331
1998) (construction of a farm pond where the only discharge is incidental 
fallback did not constitute addition) .
326 . This history is recited in detail in American Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 951 Supp . 267, 269-71, 27 ELR 20589 (D .D .C . 1997) .
327 . Id . at 273 .
328 . Id .
329 . Id . at 274 .
330 . Salt Pond Assocs . v . U . S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 815 F . Supp . 766, 23 ELR 
21026 (D . Del . 1993); United States v . Lambert, 18 ERC 1294, 13 ELR 
20045 (M .D . Fla . 1981), aff’d, 695 F .2d 536, 13 ELR 20436 (11th Cir . 
1983) .
331 . American Mining, 951 F . Supp . at 276 .
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The D .C . Court of Appeals affirmed,332 rejecting the 
Corps’ metamorphosis theory that wetlands sediment 
becomes a “pollutant” (dredged spoil) once it is removed 
from a wetland and thus when it falls back, it is added as 
a pollutant for the first time . The court stated that regard-
less of any “legal metamorphosis,” it “fail[ed] to see how 
there can be an addition of dredged material when there is 
no addition of material,” reasoning that “Congress could 
not have contemplated that the attempted removal of 100 
tons of that substance could constitute an addition sim-
ply because only 99 tons of it were actually taken away .”333 
The plaintiffs argued that the inability to regulate redeposit 
of dredged material would read §404 out of the statute, 
an observation made by the Fifth Circuit in Avoyelles.334 
The court responded the Corps could regulate some forms 
of redeposit, but not all redeposit, at least not incidental 
fallback redeposit .335 Although the Corps promulgated an 
interim revised rule, it did not satisfy regulated industry, 
and skirmishes over the details of the incidental fallback 
exclusion continued .336
3. Section 404, the Outside World, and the 
Unitary Navigable Waters Theory
Defendants in §404 cases could use EPA’s outside world 
gloss on “addition” and its unitary navigable waters theory 
as the bases for arguing that §404 does not prohibit many 
unpermitted wetlands-clearing operations . When a land 
developer moves material from one part of a wetland, a 
navigable water, to another part of the same wetland, the 
same navigable water, the material arguably does not come 
from outside the wetland’s or navigable water’s world . This 
is underscored by the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
Second Circuit’s analogy of taking a ladle of soup from 
a pot, lifting it from the pot, and pouring it back into the 
pot . Nothing is added to the pot . If EPA’s “outside world” 
gloss is applied to movement of soil within the same wet-
lands, no §404 permit is required for most clearing and 
filling of wetlands and most reported decisions upholding 
CWA actions against such activity are ill-founded, unless 
one part of a wetland is “outside world” to another part of 
the same wetland .
This “outside world” gloss by itself, however, would not 
affect the original purpose of §404, which was to regulate 
disposal of material dredged from harbors and navigation 
channels and disposed of in noncontiguous wetlands .337 In 
such activities, dredged material is taken from one navi-
gable water, a river or harbor, and discharged to another 
332 . National Mining Ass’n v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F .3d 1399, 28 
ELR 21318 (D .C . Cir . 1998) .
333 . Id . at 1404 .
334 . Id . at 1405 . See Avoyelles, 715 F .2d at 924, n .43 .
335 . National Mining, 145 F .3d at 1405 .
336 . American Mining Cong . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F . Supp . 2d 23 
(D .D .C . 2000) .
337 . “Congress understood ‘discharge of dredged material’ to mean open water 
disposal of material removed during the digging or deepening of navigable 
waterways .” See American Mining, 951 F . Supp . at 273 (citing pertinent 
legislative history) .
navigable water, an unrelated wetland, so that the material 
dredged is from outside the wetland, and a §404 permit 
would be required .
The combination of the “outside world” gloss and uni-
tary navigable waters theory, however, undermines §404’s 
applicability in both situations . Whether water and mate-
rial discharged to a wetland originate from the same 
wetland, from a different wetland, or from anywhere in 
navigable water, if all navigable waters are one, the dredged 
materials do not come from the outside world . Even that, 
however, would not eliminate §404 entirely; it would still 
apply to filling wetlands with material not originating in 
water . But that is not what Congress intended . It enacted 
§404 in 1972 to apply to discharges of material from dredg-
ing river channels and harbors and discharging them into 
nonadjacent waters, including wetlands, and amended it in 
1977 to affirm that it applied, inter alia, to filling wetlands, 
including by landclearing activities . The “outside world” 
gloss and the “unitary navigable water” theory are incon-
sistent with these congressional objectives .
The Fifth Circuit in Avoyelles recognized in a footnote 
that the “outside world” theory could jeopardize the oper-
ation of §404, but did not address the issue because no 
party raised it .338 The court surmised that no party raised 
the issue because “‘dredged’ material is by definition mate-
rial that comes from the water and a requirement that all 
dredged spoil come from outside the water world would 
effectively remove the dredge-and-fill provision from the 
statute .”339 In other words, the Fifth Circuit suggested that 
the “outside world” theory could not apply to §404 because 
its application would render §404 without meaning .
Its logic is wrong on at least two grounds . First, the 
“outside world” theory would not eliminate the application 
of §404; the section would still apply to adding dredged 
spoil that originated from outside the wetland being filled, 
including the original target of §404, dredged spoil from 
harbors and navigation channels . Second, if the “outside 
world” theory did eviscerate §404, the most natural con-
clusion is that the theory is with the CWA and the theory 
does not apply to any part of the statute . EPA’s suggestion 
that the theory applies to §402, but does not apply to §404 
requires interpreting “addition” differently under §402 and 
§404, counter to the canon requiring us to “interpret the 
same  .   .   . terms in a statute in the same way .”340 It also 
ignores the fact that critical use of “addition” is in the 
definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in §301(a), which 
prohibits the discharge of a pollutant except in compli-
ance with a §402 or §404 permit . EPA’s argument would 
require interpreting the same word “addition” differently 
depending on whether the allegation was that it was not in 
compliance with a §402 or a §404 permit .
338 . Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc . v . Marsh, 715 F .2d 897, 924 n .43, 13 
ELR 20942 (5th Cir . 1983) .
339 . Id .
340 . Eskridge, supra note 15, at 324, citing Sullivan v . Stroop, 496 U .S . 478, 
484 (1990); United Sav . Ass’n . of Tex . v . Timbers of Inwood Forest Assts ., 
Ltd ., 484 U .S . 365 (1998) . See also Scalia & Garner, supra note 15, at 
170-73 .
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In response to comments that its proposed water trans-
fer rule and the related unitary navigable waters theory 
would undermine §404, EPA adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 
comments in the Agency’s preamble to the final water 
transfer rule: “Because Congress explicitly forbade dis-
charges of dredged material except as in compliance with 
 .   .   . [§404], today’s rule has no effect on the 404 permit 
program .”341 EPA’s explanation misses the mark, as did 
the Fifth Circuit . The Fifth Circuit’s observation merely 
establishes that dredged material is a “pollutant” and has 
nothing to do with whether there is an “addition” of that 
pollutant; all elements of the §301(a) prohibition must be 
met before a §404 permit is required . While EPA’s “outside 
world” theory of “addition” does not itself entirely eviscer-
ate the §404 program, when combined with EPA’s uni-
tary navigable waters theory, they eviscerate most of the 
reach of §404 . If all navigable waters are one, then moving 
dredged spoil from one part of a navigable water or wet-
land to another part of the same navigable water or another 
wetland does not require a permit because the waters or 
wetlands are the same .
The current dominant purpose of §404 is to regulate 
the disposal of dredge and fill material into wetlands, 
most often material redeposited within a single wetland by 
landclearing activities . Courts have universally interpreted 
“addition” to include redepositing such material from one 
part of a wetland to another part of the same wetland . 
Their interpretation is compatible with our suggested defi-
nition of addition, as well as with EPA’s “outside world” 
theory of addition, so long as the part of the wetland from 
which the material is taken is located at some remove from 
the part of the wetland into which the material is redepos-
ited . Although courts are comfortable with this, they have 
balked in applying “addition” to situations where the place 
of extraction and the place of deposit are virtually identi-
cal, as with incidental fallback . Sidecasting is so close to 
incidental fallback that decisions interpreting “addition” to 
include sidecasting push the meaning of “addition” about 
as far as it can go . EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory, 
however, would eliminate the application of §404 in cases 
in which spoil is moved from navigable water, including 
wetlands, to navigable water, including wetlands, whether 
the navigable water or wetlands are the same or different . 
EPA avoids this conclusion by stating that its unitary navi-
gable waters theory applies to §402 but not to §404 .
EPA’s explanation falls before the canon that statutory 
terms are to be interpreted consistently throughout a stat-
ute, unless specifically provided otherwise in the statute . 
341 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33703 (June 13, 2008) .
Moreover, the definition of “navigable waters” in §502 
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, 
when used in this chapter  .  .  . [t]he term ‘navigable waters’ 
means  .  .  .  .” The CWA does not specifically provide that 
“navigable waters” has different meanings in §402 and 
§404 . EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory is incom-
patible with §404 and is therefore incompatible with the 
CWA . For that reason and others discussed in this Article, 
EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory must be rejected in 
its entirety .
IV. Conclusion
EPA has not promulgated a definition of “addition,” 
although it has interpreted the element as addition “from 
the outside world” and as excluding water transfers . These 
interpretations neither define “addition” nor withstand 
scrutiny . Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the first 
concept in EPA’s “outside world” theory, holding in Mic-
cosukee that a point source need not be the original source 
of a pollutant for a point source to add it to navigable water . 
The Eleventh Circuit’s Miccosukee decision suggested that 
“addition” incorporates the notion of but-for causation, a 
principled and useful distinction between actions that add 
or do not add pollutants . The definition suggested at the 
outset of this Article incorporates that notion: “‘addition’ 
is the act of a person adding a pollutant to navigable waters 
from a point source, when that pollutant would not other-
wise be in those navigable waters .”
With few exceptions, when applied to decisions inter-
preting “addition” in the difficult fact patterns examined 
above, the definition suggested in this Article either leads 
to results consistent with the decisions or may have done 
so if the decisions had made more-detailed findings of fact 
to address the causation aspect of “addition .” Section 404 
sidecasting redeposit decisions push “addition” to its outer 
limit and cross that limit when it comes to incidental fall-
back . EPA’s “outside world” gloss on “addition,” its uni-
tary navigable waters theory, and the water transfer rule 
based on them are all contrary to the CWA’s water quality 
standards program, eliminate most of the traditional juris-
diction of its §404 program, and are unsupported by the 
CWA . EPA should disavow the two theories and withdraw 
the rule . If EPA fails to do so, courts should reject the theo-
ries, overturn the rule, and give no deference to the Agen-
cy’s interpretations supporting them . Finally, EPA should 
promulgate this Article’s suggested definition of “addition” 
in 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
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TABLE A 
Decisions Interpreting “Addition”
Supreme Court Decisions
1. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370 (2006)
2. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004)
Court of Appeal Decisions
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir. 2011)
4. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 40 ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010)
5. Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Waste Management Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009)
6. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir. 2009)
7. National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009)
8. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006)
9. Sierra Club and Mineral Policy Center v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005)
10. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 35 ELR 20049 (2d Cir. 2005)
11. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004)
12. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003)
13. Alabama Rivers Alliance v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 325 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
14. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir. 2002)
15. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001)
16. Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001)
17. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000)
18. National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
19. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir. 1997)
20. North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 112 F.3d 1175, 27 ELR 20929 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
21. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997)
22. Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996)
23. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Utility District, 13 F.3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993)
24. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992)
25. Save Our Community v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 22 ELR 21532 (5th Cir. 1992)
26. American Mining Congress v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 965 F.2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992)
27. Rybachek v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 20 ELR 20973 (9th Cir. 1990)
28. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988)
29. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc. 772 F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir. 1985)
30. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board, 717 F.2d 992, 14 ELR 20598 (6th Cir. 1983)
31. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983)
32. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
33. Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 12 ELR 20368 (8th Cir. 1982)
34. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979)
35. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1976)
36. American Iron & Steel Institute v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 6 ELR 20068 (3d Cir. 1975)
District Court Decisions
37. Community Ass’n for the Restoration of the Environment v. Nelson Faria Dairy, Inc., 2011 WL 61882, No. 04-3060 (E.D. Wash. 
Jan. 7, 2011)
38. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 630 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
39. United States v. Fabian, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 37 ELR 20083 (N.D. Ind. 2007)
40. National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2007 WL 259944, No. 01-0274 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2007)
41. Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
9-2014 NEWS & ANALYSIS 44 ELR 10805
42. Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 2006 WL 3635465, No. 07-13829 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 
2006)
43. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates, LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003)
44. United States v. Hummell, 2003 WL 1845365, No. 00 C 5184 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2003)
45. United States PIRG v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Me. 2002)
46. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 2002 WL 33932715, No. 01PC2163 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002)
47. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. O’Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. 2002)
48. United States ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 162 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
49. American Mining Congress v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000)
50. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1401458, No. 00 Civ. 5395 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000)
51. United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co, 33 F. Supp. 2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
52. United States v. Hallmark Const. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 28 ELR 21438 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
53. Frobel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
54. American Mining Congress v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 951 F. Supp. 267, 27 ELR 20589 (D.D.C. 1997)
55. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995)
56. Salt Pond Associates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 815 F. Supp. 766, 23 ELR 21026 (D. Del. 1993)
57. United States v. Sinclair Oil Co., 767 F. Supp. 200, 21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990)
58. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 17 ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
59. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 12 ELR 20268 (D.D.C. 1982)
60. United States v. Lambert, 18 ERC 1294, 13 ELR 20045 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff ’d, 695 F.2d 536, 13 ELR 20436 (11th Cir. 1983)
61. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 11 ELR 20315 (W.D. La. 1979)
62. South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978)
63. United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976)
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TABLE B 
ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Decision 
Number
Year +/-a Type of Caseb Canons Usedc Number of 
Canons Used
CWA § 
Supreme Court Decisions
1. 2006 + Jud. Rev. 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12 6 §401
2. 2004 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12 6 §402
Court of Appeals Decisions
3. 2011 + Cit. S. 4, 10, 11 3 §402
4. 2010 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 5 §402
5. 2009 -- Cit. S. 2, 3, 5, 10, 11 5 §402
6. 2009 + Enf. 3, 10, 11, 12 4 §404
7. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 5 §402
8. 2006 + Cit. S. 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12 6 §402
9. 2005 + Cit. S. 3, 6, 10, 11, 12 5 §402
10. 2005 + Cit. S. 2, 3, 10, 11, 12 5 §402
11. 2004 + Cit. S. 2, 3, 10, 11, 12 5 §404
12. 2003 + Jud. Rev. 4, 10, 11 3 §401
13. 2002 + Cit. S. 3, 10, 11 3 §402
14. 2001 + Cit. S. 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 6 §402
15. 2001 + Jud. Rev. 2, 7, 10, 11 4 §404
16. 2001 + Cit. S. 9, 10, 11 3 §402
17. 2000 + Enf. 2, 7, 10, 11 4 §404
18. 1998 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 6 §404
19. 1997 -- Crim. 1, 10, 11 3 §404
20. 1997 -- Jud. Rev. 8, 10, 11, 12 4 §401
21. 1997 -- Cit. S. 1, 9 2 §402
22. 1996 + Cit. S. 1, 6, 10, 12 4 §402
23. 1993 + Cit. S. 10, 11 2 §402
24. 1992 + Crim. 10, 11 2 §402
25. 1992 -- Cit. S. 3, 10, 11 3 §404
26. 1992 + Jud. Rev. 2, 3, 5, 10, 12 5 §402
27. 1990 + Jud. Rev. 10, 11 2 §402
28. 1988 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 3, 10, 11, 12 5 §402
29. 1985 + Enf. 2, 11 2 §404
30. 1983 -- Cit. S. 11 1 §402
31. 1983 + Enf. 2, 5, 10, 11 4 §404
32. 1982 -- Jud. Rev. 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12 6 §402
33. 1982 -- Cit. S. 10 1 §402
34. 1979 + Cit. S. 10 1 §402
35. 1976 -- Jud. Rev. 10 1 §401
36. 1975 -- Jud. Rev. 10 1 §402
District Court Decisions
37. 2011 -- Cit. S. 10, 11 2 §402
38. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 3, 10, 11 3 §402
39. 2007 + Enf. 11 1 §404
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Decision 
Number
Year +/-a Type of Caseb Canons Usedc Number of 
Canons Used
CWA § 
40. 2007 -- Jud. Rev. 11 1 §404
41. 2007 + Cit. S. 11 1 §402
42. 2006 + Cit. S. 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 7 §402
43. 2003 + Cit. S. 11 1 §402
44. 2003 + Enf. 10, 11 2 §404
45. 2002 + Cit. S. 10, 11 2 §402
46. 2002 + Cit. S. 10, 11, 12 3 §402
47. 2002 -- Cit. S. 11 1 §404
48. 2001 -- Enf. 10, 11 2 §402
49. 2000 -- Cit. S. 9, 10, 11 3 §402
50. 1999 + Enf. 11 1 §404
51. 1988 + Enf. 11 1 §404
52. 1988 -- Cit. S. 11, 12 2 §§402/404
53. 1997 -- Jud. Rev. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 7 §404
54. 1995 + Cit. S. 10 1 §402
55. 1993 -- Enf. 3, 5, 10 3 §402
56. 1990 + Enf. 10, 11, 12 3 §404
57. 1987 + Cit. S. 10, 11 2 §402
58. 1982 + Cit. S. 2, 10, 11 3 §402
59. 1979 + Cit. S. 2, 5, 10 3 §402
60. 1978 + Cit. S. 10, 11 2 §402
61. 1976 + Enf. 10 1 §402
a. Plus (+) denotes an expansive interpretation of “addition,” minus (-) denotes a restrictive interpretation. Note that 
even though the interpretation of “addition” may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for 
other reasons.
b. Avoid absurd results; 2. Broad policy goals, interpret in light of; 3. Deference to agency interpretation; 4. Inclusive or 
exclusive nature of definition, interpret in light of; 5. Legislative history; 6. Metaphor, use of; 7. Metamorphosis between 
statutory terms (not a canon of construction, but used enough here to note); 8. Noscitur a sociis; 9. Other statutes, 
interpret harmoniously with; 10. Plain meaning; 11. Precedent; 12. Structure of statute.
c. Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
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